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STA:'E OF IDAHO \ 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlf SS 
FILED: 
long FEB 17 PH 3: 54 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JA.CKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho 
Iimi ted partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
THE PATTERSON FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED UITIA DATED FEBRUARY 25, 
2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE; 
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED UITIA DATED JANUARY 13, 
2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; KL 
::PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation; 
::ruCEARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M. 
(DRDES, husband and wife; DAVID 
:::BARNES and MICHELLE BARNES, husband 
4lnd -wife; GARY L. PATTERSON and 
:::ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and 
"\\fife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERLY L. 
:lJION, husband and wife; and ANDREW J. 
I3RANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH, 
l1usb and and wife, 
Defendants. 




DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, Michael J. Hines, 
and respectfully submit this Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The undisputed facts set forth herein are established by the deposition testimony of 
plaintiff Jacklin Land Company's ("Jacklin") corporate representatives, consisting of Jacklin's 
Property Manager (Pat Leffel), Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) corporate designee (Tom Stoeser), and 
Jacklin's CFO (Tom Stoeser). Cited deposition pages are attached as Exhibits to the Affidavit 
afMichael J. Hines (Exhibit A-Leffel's deposition; Exhibit B-Rule 30(b)(6) deposition; and 
Exhibit C-Stoeser deposition). 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
A. DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF PAT LEFFEL, JACKLIN'S PROPERTY 
MANAGER. 
1. Pat Leffel was Jacklin's Property Manager :from 1993 through September 2008. 
Hines Aff, Exhibit A, p.ll. Mr. Leffel handled all lease negotiations with prospective tenants. 
Id. at pp. 12-13. He would make recommendations to Jacklin whether the prospective tenant 
was a suitable tenant. Id. at p. 14. On behalf of Jacklin, he was the person in charge of, and the 
first person to contact, to tenants complying with property restrictions and the applicable 
CC&Rs. Id. atpp.14-15. 
2. Mr. Leffel was very familiar with the recorded CC&Rs applicable to Riverbend 
Commerce Park, and testified that he had a full understanding of the applicable CC&Rs. Id. at 
p.15. 
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3. Mr. Leffel testified that if a prospective tenant was proposing an incompatible 
use for the property located in Riverbend Commerce Park, he would have discontinued lease 
negotiations on behalf ofJacklin. Id. at p. 19. 
4. In the April 2008 time period, Pat Leffel met with defendant Blue Dog RV, 
Inc. 's ("Blue Dog") Sales Manager, Dave Russell, at Blue Dog's RV shopping center located at 
Treaty Rock, Post Falls, Idaho. Id. at pp. 28-29. At the time that Mr. Leffel talked with Dave 
Russell, Mr. Leffel knew that Blue Dog was an RV shopping center and had visited their site 
operation. Id. at p. 29. 
5. After Mr. Leffel's visit to Blue Dog Treaty Rock site, Dave Russell called Pat 
Leffel to look at property located in the Riverbend Commerce Park as a potential site to 
relocate its RV shopping center. Id. at 35. 
6. Following Mr. Russell's inquiry, Mr. Leffel showed Blue Dog six lots owned by 
Jacklin at Riverbend Commerce Park located just across the street from the KLP property 
ultimately leased to Blue Dog. Id. at p. 37. Mr. Leffel showed these lots for the specific intent 
of Blue Dog relocating their RV shopping center to those lots. Id. at p. 38. 
7. When Mr. Russell inquired to Mr. Leffel about the availability ofthe lots due 
north across the street (hereafter, the "KLP property" which is owned by the defendants KLP 
Owners), Mr. Leffel gave Mr. Russell the owners' contact information to make inquiries 
regarding another potential leasing site. Id. at pp. 39-40. 
8. Over the course of four months, from April to July 2008, Mr. Leffel negotiated 
with Mr. Russell concerning leasing space to Blue Dog to relocate their RV shopping center to 
Jacklin's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 75. 
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9. Ultimately, the lease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog focused on 
leasing Lots 1 - 4 of Jacklin's property, which were vacant, undeveloped lots directly across the 
street from the KLP property (which also consisted of four undeveloped lots) Id. at p. 41. 
10. Jacklin extended lease terms to Blue Dog for the lease of Jacklin's property. 
Blue Dog felt that the lease rate was too high. Id. at p. 44. 
11. On July 7,2008, Mr. Russell informed Mr. Leffel that Blue Dog had decided to 
lease space from KLP, the property straight across the street from the property Jacklin offered 
to lease to Blue Dog. Id. at p. 47. 
12. Prior to July 7,2008, during all of lease negotiations between Blue Dog and 
Jacklin to relocate Blue Dog RV's shopping center to Jacklin's property, Jacklin never 
informed Blue Dog that an RV shopping center was an incompatible use or otherwise restricted 
in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 48. Up until Jacklin learned that Blue Dog had 
leased space from KLP on July 7,2008, Jacklin never informed Blue Dog that their RV 
shopping center would be violative of any CC&R or any other restriction. Id. at p. 49. 
Q. And during that same time period, the April through July 7th, up 
until when they informed you they had leased other property, you 
had never informed them that that RV shopping center that they 
proposed relocating to Lots 1,2,3 and 4 colored in orange was an 
incompatible use to any of River bend Commerce Park's CC&Rs; 
correct? 
A. We really didn't get into the CC&Rs. I didn't-
Again, it's a -- No. 
Q. You never communicated that. 
A. No. 
Q. And, in fact, you never communicated that the proposed use as an 
RV shopping center would have been violative of any restriction 
applicable to Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 colored in orange, correct? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. And Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Phase 1 colored in orange are subject to 
the CC&Rs that we've talked about that have been marked as 
Exhibit 1,2 and 3, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And at the time, this April through July i h time period when 
you're dealing with Dave Russell of Blue Dog, you were aware 
that these CC&Rs applied to the property you were talking about 
leasing, potentially leasing, to Blue Dog; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Id. at pp. 49-50. 
13. Jacklin never informed Blue Dog until it leased space from KLP that Blue Dog 
could not operate an RV shopping center in Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at pp. 53-54. 
14. Jacklin remained interested in leasing space to Blue Dog to operate its RV 
shopping center until Blue Dog terminated the lease negotiations after it indicated it had leased 
space from KLP. Id. at p. 54. 
15. During the entire time that Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease its 
property, Pat Leffel believed that Blue Dog's proposed RV shopping center was a compatible 
use with the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 55. Mr. Leffel believed that Blue Dog's 
proposed RV shopping center was consistent with the purpose ofthe Riverbend Commerce 
Park as described in the CC&Rs preamble; to wit: "The development is also intended to be a 
vivacious business park where manufacturing, warehousing and assorted commercial endeavors 
can enthusiastically pursue profit in an economical and beautiful environment." Id. at p. 59. 
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16. Jacklin never expressed any concerns about Blue Dog's RV shopping center 
being an incompatible use until Jacklin realized Blue Dog had leased space from a competitor. 
Id. at pp. 77-79. 
17. Once Blue Dog relocated its RV operation to the KLP property, Jacklin told 
KLP and Blue Dog that Blue Dog had to immediately vacate the property. Id. at p. 63. Other 
than telling Blue Dog to vacate the property, Jacklin never worked with Blue Dog to address 
any site concerns. Id. at p. 64. 
Q. Let's make sure we get a clean record on that. Other than telling 
them to vacate the property, did you ever work with them on a site 
plan to address your concerns? 
A. No. 
Q. So the only option you gave them was to leave as opposed to 
addressing the esthetic concerns that you might have, correct? 
A. Through correspondence. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is it fair to say that you made no effort whatsoever to work with 
Blue Dog on a site plan? 
MR. MAGNUSON: Again, I presume you're asking him 
individually. 
MR. HINES: Correct. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q. (BY MR. HINES) Correct statement? 
A. Correct statement. 
Id. at pp. 94-65. 
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18. Jacklin never gave Blue Dog the opportunity to make any site improvements. 
Id. at p. 63. Jacklin never infonned Blue Dog that it could stay on the property if they did site 
improvements. Id. at p. 63. Jacklin made no effort whatsoever to work with Blue Dog on a site 
plan. Id. at p. 65. There was nothing that Blue Dog could have done to address Jacklin's 
concerns about the RV operation other than to vacate the property. Id. at pp. 65-66. 
19. Jacklin's specific concerns about Blue Dog's operation consists of three items: 
(1) parking RV trailers on dirt; (2) the appearance of some canvas signage; and (3) moving RV 
units up and down Riverside Avenue, the same street that separates the KLP property from 
Jacklin's property. Id. at p. 66. Jacklin admits that it never worked with Blue Dog to address 
any of the three concerns. Id. at p. 67. When Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease 
its property, it never raised the issue ofRV traffic on Riverside Avenue, which is the same 
arterial accessing either the KLP property or the Jacklin property. Id. at p. 67. 
20. Similarly, Mr. Leffel never told Blue Dog that it would have to asphalt Jacklin's 
property if it leased that space. Id. at pp. 93-94. 
21. Jacklin's preference was to execute a lease with Blue Dog as opposed to Blue 
Dog reaching a deal involving the KLP property. Id. at p. 76. To fulfill its desire to lease space 
to Blue Dog, Pat Leffel took the initiative to keep the lease negotiations with Blue Dog going 
forward. Id. at p. 76. Jacklin never had any concerns about the RV center being a prohibited 
use under the CC&Rs until after Blue Dog signed a lease with KLP and Jacklin's attorneys got 
involved. Id. at p. 95 
22. After Blue Dog infonned Mr. Leffel that Blue Dog had leased space from KLP, 
all of the emails from Mr. Leffel to defendants advising them of Blue Dog's incompatible use 
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were ghost written by Jacklin's attorney. Id. at pp. 102-103. Mr. Leffel never told the KLP 
recipients of his emails that his emails were being ghost written by an attorney. Id. at pp. 121-
122. 
23. When Mr. Leffel sent these emails to Blue Dog and KLP, he was not aware of 
any specific violation ofthe CC&Rs as a result of Blue Dog RV shopping operation. Id. at pp. 
112-113. At the time ofthose email communications.Mr. Leffel was not aware of how Blue 
Dog's operation as a RV shopping center any way interfered with other property owners use of 
their property. Id. at p. 114. 
24. With respect to the 1990 Development Agreement, prior to the Blue Dog 
relocating its R V operation neither KLP nor any of the prior owners were ever in violation of 
that agreement, notwithstanding that no first class shopping center was ever built on Lots 1 - 6 
of that property. Id. atpp. 114-115,119-120. 
25. As to the CC&R articles that applied to the KLP property, Mr. Leffel testified 
that there is no material difference between those CC&R articles and those which applied to 
Jacklin's property right across the street which it offered to lease to Blue Dog. Id. at pp. 110-
111. 
26. Mr. Leffel further testified that, with respect to complying with the CC&Rs 
Articles, Blue Dog's current use of the KLP property does not differ from the use proposed by 
Blue Dog for Jacklin's property. Id. at pp. 112, 168. 
Q. So why would their use ofthe property on the Cordes property be 
any different than their use of the property on the Jacklin property 
as it relates to compliance with Articles II, III, IV, V and VI of the 
CC&Rs? 
A. I don't believe they are. But I'm not an attorney. 
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Id. at p. 112. 
27. After Jacklin informed KLP that Blue Dog's operation was in violation ofthe 
controlling CC&Rs, Jacklin provided KLP with the 2006 CC&R Declaration which by all 
accounts is inapplicable to the KLP property. Id. at pp. 123-124. 
28. The same four lots which Jacklin offered to lease to Blue Dog have been used 
by Jacklin as a temporary parking area in conjunction with heavy equipment auctions that were 
occurring on the adjoining property. Id. at p. 136. Jacklin charged and received parking fees 
for this temporary use. Id. at p. 137. Notwithstanding this temporary use, Jacklin did not make 
any site improvements to the undeveloped lots. Id. at p. 136. Jacklin never analyzed whether 
its temporary use violated the applicable CC&Rs. Id. at p. 137. Jacklin never advised other 
property owners in Riverbend Commerce Park of Jacklin's temporary use or obtained their 
permission. Id. at pp. 142-143 . Jacklin recently curtailed this temporary use of their property 
due to concerns of environmental contamination caused by this temporary use. Id. at p. 137. 
29. Jacklin's use of its Lots 1-4 as a parking lot facilitated the auction of heavy 
equipment occurring on the property immediately to the West of both the Jacklin and KLP 
properties. Id. at pp. 139-140. The heavy equipment was parked on that adjacent property and 
clearly visible from both Jacklin's and KLP's properties. Id. at pp. 139-140. RV auctions were 
also held on the adjacent property, where a high volume ofRV rigs would be parked for the 
sale. Jacklin also stores tractors on its adjoining property, which it concedes could be a 
violation of the CC&Rs. Id. at pp. 148-149. 
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B. DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF JACKLIN'S RULE 30(b)(6) 
CORPORATE DESIGNEE 
30. Tom Stoeser was Jacklin's Property Manager from 1988 until 1993 when Pat 
Leffel was hired. Hines Aff., Exhibit B, p. 11. 
31. Ifa tenant at Riverbend Commerce Park was in violation of the applicable 
CC&Rs, Jacklin's policy would be to notify the offending tenant as soon as possible. Id. at p. 
13. 
32. Prior to Blue Dog's tenancy, Jacklin never believed that KLP's or its 
predecessors' use ofthe KLP property was in violation of any CC&Rs. 
33. The 1990 Agreement (attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Richard A. 
Cordes, and hereafter referred to as the "Development Agreement") is the Agreement at issue 
in this lawsuit. Id. at pp. 17-18, 21. 
34. The Development Agreement was drafted by Jacklin, and not QCA, the other 
signatory to the Agreement. Id. at p. 20. 
35. The fact that KLP Lots 1 - 4 remained undeveloped was not a violation of the 
Development Agreement. Id. at pp. 25-26. The fact that Lots 1 - 4 do not have a first class 
shopping center on them is not a violation of the Development Agreement. Id. at pp. 26-27. 
36. Only when the KLP property is developed does KLP have to construct a first 
class shopping center on the developed property. Id. at p. 27. 
37. After Blue Dog took over the tenancy ofKLP's property, that property was not 
developed in any fashion. Id. at p. 28. No building was constructed on that property. Id. 
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38. Under the Development Agreement, there is no time frame to construct a first 
class shopping center. Id. at p. 27, 33. Jacklin had the opportunity to insert a time requirement 
if it had wanted. Id. at p. 34. 
39. The Development Agreement does not use the verbiage that Lots 1 - 17 have to 
be used as a first class shopping center. Id. at p. 31. The Agreement further does not state that 
all of the Lots 1 -17 have to be used as a first class shopping center. Id. at p. 32. The 
Agreement does not prohibit multiple operations on Lots 1 - 17. Id. at pp. 34-35. The 
Agreement does not expressly prohibit the use of the property in another form. Id. The 
Development Agreement further does not prevent KLP from selling Lots 1 - 4 of the original 
purchased Lots 1 - 17. Id. at p. 24. There could be a completely separate development on Lots 
1 - 4. Id. at pp. 24-25. 
40. The Development Agreement does not specifically prohibit the use of an RV 
center. Id. at p. 33. 
41. The only provision of Articles 2 - 6 of the 1989 CC&Rs which Jacklin could 
point to as purportedly prohibiting the temporary use of Lots 1 - 17 is Article 3.11. Id. at pp. 
35-36,38,41. Jacklin admits that Article 3.11 only applies to a parking lot. Id. at p. 39. 
42. The Development Agreement does not define what a first class shopping center 
IS. Id. at p. 42. Jacklin cannot express what constitutes a first-class shopping center. Id. at p. 
43. Jacklin does not know the distinction between a first class, second-class, and third-class 
shopping center. Id. The CC&Rs do not define what a first class shopping center is. The 
Development Agreement does not even define what a "shopping center" is. Id. at p. 44. 
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43. When asked whether a first class shopping center is inherently ambiguous, 
Jacklin answered: "I don't know." Id. at p. 45. Jacklin does not know if an RV sales operation 
could constitute a first class shopping center because Jacklin never defined the term. Id. at p. 
47. 
44. Jacklin conceded that a RV sales operation could constitute a first class 
shopping center. Id. at p. 48. 
45. The recorded 1989 CC&Rs for Riverbend Commerce Park do not apply to Lots 
1 - 17 (the KLP property). Only Articles 2 - 6 of the 1989 CC&Rs apply contractually to that 
property. Id. at pp. 49-50. When asked whether the 1989 CC&Rs were already terminated 
prior to the incorporation of Articles 2 - 6 of those CC&Rs into the Development Agreement, 
Jacklin answered: "I don't know." Id. at p. 51. 
46. The Jacklin's property that it offered to lease to Blue Dog is subject to the 2006 
Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs. Id. at p. 56. Articles 2 - 6 of the 2006 CC&Rs are similar 
to Articles 2 through 6 found in the 1989 CC&Rs which purportedly apply to the KLP 
property. Id. at p. 56. The only material difference is Article 3.11 addressing the parking 
restriction. Id. at p. 57. 
47. Jacklin is not aware of any changes in Articles 2 - 6 in the 2006 CC&Rs, as 
compared to Articles 2 - 6 in the 1989 CC&Rs, that would make an RV operation more 
permissible under the 2006 CC&Rs than the 1989 CC&Rs. Id. at p. 59. 
48. Other than giving KLP a copy of the wrong CC&Rs, Jacklin did nothing to work 
with KLP to submit a site plan concerning the Blue Dog operation. Id. at p. 66. The only thing 
that Jacklin did to work with KLP on site issues concerning the Blue Dog operation was 
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testified to in Mr. Leffel's deposition. Id. at p. 67. There is no written communication 
indicting that Jacklin was willing to work with KLP on site issues. Id. at p. 74. 
49. Jacklin never identified for defendants a specific CC&R article or restriction 
that Blue Dog is purportedly in violation of. Id. at pp. 78-79. 
50. Jacklin confinned, as expressed in a letter from its attorney to KLP, that 
notwithstanding any efforts made by KLP to obtain Jacklin's consent and approval for Blue 
Dog's operations, Jacklin would have denied it. Id. at pp. 82-84. No matter how Blue Dog 
developed the RV operation on KLP's property, it would have been unacceptable in the eyes of 
Jacklin. Id. at p. 88. 
51. Blue Dog offered to make $50,000 worth of site improvements, which Jacklin 
rejected. Id. at pp. 85-86. Even with such site improvements, Jacklin would not have approved 
Blue Dog's use of the property. Id. 
52. Jacklin believed that Blue Dog's operation was compliant with the Riverbend 
CC&Rs when Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property. Id. at pp. 86-
87. It was Blue Dog who cut off the lease negotiations with Jacklin, not vice versa. Id. at p. 
92. 
53. Jacklin cannot identify any monetary damages or injury as a result of Blue 
Dog's operation. Id. at p. 89. Blue Dog's operation has not caused any irreparable hann, and 
Jacklin is not aware of any facts to indicate Jacklin has been irreparably harmed. Id. Jacklin 
cannot identify a single lost tenant or purchaser of property in Riverbend Commerce Park as a 
result of Blue Dog's RVoperation. Id. at p. 121. 
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54. Jacklin admits that it has used its undeveloped lots, located directly across from 
the KLP property, for a temporary commercial use. Id. at p. 94. Jacklin has used its vacant lots 
as a parking lot for which it received compensation. Id. Notwithstanding putting its 
undeveloped property into commercial use, Jacklin did not prepare a site plan, or perform any 
landscaping or parking upgrades. Id. 
55. Jacklin admits that RV auctions occur on the property immediately to the West 
of Jacklin's and KLP's undeveloped properties. Id. at p. 100. Numerous RV units are parked 
on site during the auctions. Id. at p. 100. 
56. When Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property, Jacklin 
did not believe that the Blue Dog operation was contrary to a premier commerce park such as 
Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 120. 
57. Even though Jacklin believed that an RV center could constitute a first class 
shopping center, Jacklin never told KLP that belief. Id. at p. 124. 
58. Jacklin never offered to sit down with KLP and work through site issues 
concerning the Blue Dog operation. Id. at p. 126. Jacklin never communicated to KLP the 
type of site improvements that would need to take place for the Blue Dog operation. Id. 
C. DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF TOM STOESER, JACKLIN'S CFO. 
59. Tom Stoeser, Jacklin's CFO, never expressed any concerns to Pat Leffel, 
Jacklin's Property Manager, that Blue Dog's proposed RV operation on Jacklin's property in 
Riverbend Commerce Park would be an incompatible use. Hines Aff., Exhibit C, p. J 2. 
60. The owners of Blue Dog agreed to personally guarantee the proposed lease 
between Blue Dog and Jacklin for the lease of Jacklin's property. Id. at p. 14. 
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61. After Blue Dog infonned Jacklin that Blue Dog had leased property from KLP, 
Jacklin did not work with Blue Dog to address any site concerns prior to ordering Blue Dog off 
the property. Id. at p. 19,28. Jacklin never extended any offer to work with Blue Dog on site 
issues. Id. 
62. Mr. Stoeser never asked Blue Dog for a site plan, let alone requested one, prior 
to demanding that Blue Dog vacate the KLP property. Id. at p. 27. 
63. Mr. Stoeser testified that any efforts made by KLP to obtain site approval from 
Jacklin for Blue Dog's operation would have been futile because Jacklin would have rejected it. 
Id. at pp. 32-34. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a case about sour grapes. 
Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company ("Jacklin") negotiated with defendant Blue Dog RV, 
Inc. ("Blue Dog") for four months to relocate Blue Dog's RV shopping center to undeveloped 
land owned by Jacklin in Riverbend Commerce Park located in Post Falls, Idaho. At all times 
during these discussions, Jacklin represented that Blue Dog's RV sales operation was a 
compatible use in the business park and a permitted use under the applicable CC&Rs. Jacklin 
was excited about the prospect of Blue Dog relocating to Riverbend Commerce Park, and 
raised no concerns whatsoever about Blue Dog's operation. During the course of the 
negotiations, Jacklin even referred Blue Dog to property right across the street from Jacklin's 
proposed lease site as additional property which Blue Dog could acquire for its RV operation or 
for a temporary staging site for its RV units. This adjacent property (hereafter, the "KLP 
property") is owned by the defendants KLP ownership group. 
Jacklin's attitude toward Blue Dog's RV operation only changed when Blue Dog 
advised Jacklin that it had received better lease terms from KLP and that it was no longer 
interested in leasing Jacklin's property. Having lost out in the lease negotiations, Jacklin turned 
a new face toward Blue Dog's RV operation, claiming for the first time that it was an 
incompatible use and ordering Blue Dog to immediately vacate KLP's property. Further, 
Jacklin categorically refused to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns 
which Jacklin had regarding Blue Dog's operation. 
Jacklin subsequently commenced suit against defendants seeking to permanently enjoin 
Blue Dog's operation on KLP's property. The purported basis is a 1990 Development 
Agreement signed by Jacklin and KLP's predecessor. Plaintiff has now filed a motion for 
summary judgment asking the Court to enjoin Blue Dog's operation, and defendants have filed 
a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal ofplaintiff's complaint. 
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The Court should grant defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment and deny 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment for the following reasons. First, under contract 
construction standards governing the interpretation and enforceability of restrictive covenants, 
including the requirement that all ambiguities are to be interpreted in favor of the free use of 
land, the 1990 Development Agreement does not expressly or by implication prohibit Blue 
Dog's RV operation. Second, Jacklin admits that it has suffered no irreparable injury as 
required to obtain injunctive relief. Third, Jacklin's refusal to work with Blue Dog and KLP to 
address Blue Dog's RV operation and any site concerns constitutes a breach ofthe1990 
Development Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which bars 
Jacklin from asserting claims against defendants under the Agreement. Lastly, defendants' 
affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel, ground in Jacklin's inequitable reversal of its 
position as to whether Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permitted operation in Riverbend 
Commerce Park, bars plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. 
II. FACTS 
A. MATERIAL BACKGROUND FACTS. 
1. KLP's and Jacklin's Properties at Issue. 
The KLP property and the Jacklin property at issue are directly across from each other 
in the Riverbend Commerce Park and are separated by the same arterial, Riverside Avenue. 
KLP owns Lots 1 through 17, Phase I, Block 1, in Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit of Rick 
Cordes, ~ 4. KLP Lots 1-4 are undeveloped. Lots 5 through 6 are paved parking lots. Lots 7-
17 consist of the constructed Outlet Mall. Id. The Jacklin property at issue consists of Lots 1-
4, Phase I, Block 2 in Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit of Michael J Hines, Exhibit A 
(Leffel Depo.), p. 37. These four lots are nearly identical in location and condition to the KLP 
property. Cordes AjJ., ~ 6. Both consist of undeveloped lots, accessed by the same arterial. 
Both are grass covered and neither is paved nor graveled. Id. 
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For four months, from April to July 2008, Jacklin extensively negotiated with Blue 
Dog for Blue Dog to relocate its RV shopping center to Jacklin's four undeveloped lots, Lots 1-
4. Hines Aff, Exh. A, pp. 75-76. Ultimately, Blue Dog chose to lease property from KLP for its 
RV shopping center operation. Affidavit of Dave Russell, ~ 15. The leased KLP property 
consists ofthe four undeveloped Lots 1 through 4 (where Blue Dog parks non-motorized RV 
units), the two paved Lots 5 through 6 (where Blue Dog parks its motorized RV units), and Lot 
7 upon which sits the Western edge of the constructed Outlet Mall which Blue Dog uses as its 
sales office. Cordes Aff., ~ 5. 
2. The 1990 Development Agreement and Applicable CC&Rs. 
The defendant owners of the KLP property purchased Lots 1 through 17 in 2005 from 
Prime Retail, Inc., a successor in ownership to Quality Centers Associates ("QCA"). Id. at ~ 7. 
QCA purchased that property from Jacklin in approximately 1990. Id. As consideration of 
QCA's purchase of Lots 1 through 17 from Jacklin, the parties executed a development 
agreement which was recorded on November 7, 1990 (hereafter, the "Development 
Agreement"). Id., Exhibit B. 
In the Development Agreement, QCA agreed to "construct and maintain upon said 
Purchased Property [Lots 1-17], a first class shopping center. ... " Id. at ~ 8. QCA complied 
with the 1990 Development Agreement by constructing the Outlet Mall in approximately 1991. 
Id. Significantly, the Outlet Mall only physically sits on and comprises Lots 7-17, with Lots 5-
6 comprising a paved parking lot. Id. Lots 1-4 have always remained undeveloped lots. Id. 
Lots 5-6 never had a building constructed upon it. Id. Thus, no building was ever constructed 
and maintained on Lots 1-7. Id. 
In consideration of QCA purchasing Lots 1-17 from Jacklin, the 1990 Development 
Agreement also removed the previously recorded Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs as 
encumbrances upon Lots 1-17. Id. at ,r 9. The CC&Rs applied to property within the 
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Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Thus, no recorded CC&Rs instrument applies to KLP's Lots 
1-17. Id. In the Development Agreement, QCA did agree contractually to continue to comply 
with Articles 2 though 6 of the previously existing CC&Rs, but the 1990 Development 
Agreement expressly removed the Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs as recorded 
encumbrances against Lots 1-17. Id. 
When KLP acquired Lots 1-17 in 2005, Lots 1-4 remained undeveloped and no first 
class shopping center had been constructed on those lots. Id. at ~ 10. At no time did Jacklin 
ever advise KLP or its predecessors that either were in violation ofthe 1990 Development 
Agreement because no first class shopping center was constructed on Lots 1-4. Id. This is 
because the Development Agreement only required a first class shopping center to be 
constructed and maintained upon the Purchased Property as a whole, which was satisfied by 
constructing the Outlet Mall on Lots 7-17 in approximately 1991. Id. The Development 
Agreement did not require that a first class shopping center be physically constructed upon and 
maintained on all 17 lots. Id. Jacklin permitted and expressly approved the use of the property 
in this fashion for nearly 18 years. Id.; Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 119-120. Prior to leasing Lots 1 
through 7 to Blue Dog in July 2008, at no time did Jacklin ever advise KLP that it was in 
violation of any agreement or use restriction by not having constructed a first class shopping 
center on Lots 1 through 4. Cordes Aff., ~ 11; Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 114-115. 
3. Jacklin's Four Months of Negotiations with Blue Dog to Relocate Its RV 
Shopping Center to Jacklin's Property. 
From April through July 2008, Jacklin and Blue Dog extensively negotiated Blue Dog's 
potential lease of Jacklin's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Russell Aff. at ~ 9. 
Jacklin's Property Manager, Pat Leffel, first met Blue Dog's Sales Manager, Dave Russell, 
when Mr. Leffel visited Blue Dog's prior location at Treaty Rock Plaza in Post Falls, Idaho. 
Id. at 4. Mr. Leffel, who is in charge of all lease negotiations and enforcement of CC&Rs for 
Jacklin at Riverbend Commerce Park, was fully aware of Blue Dog's RV shopping center 
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operation. Id.; Hines Af[., Exh. A., p. 29. A short time later, Blue Dog contacted Mr. Leffel and 
inquired about available space in the Riverbend Commerce Park where Blue Dog could 
relocate its RV shopping center. Russell Ajf., ~ 5. Mr. Leffel responded very enthusiastically, 
and ultimately identified Lots 1 through 4 owned by Jacklin as a suitable lease site. Id. at ~ ~ 6, 
10. Discussions also occurred involving Blue Dog's lease ofa building owned by Jacklin just 
South of Lots 1-4 to house Blue Dog's service operation. Id. at 8. Jacklin's Property Manager 
was fully aware of Blue Dog's intended use for its property, and at no time did Jacklin ever 
raise any concerns about an RV shopping center constituting an incompatible use or otherwise 
violating any CC&Rs or restrictions in place at Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at ~~ 8,9. To 
the contrary, during the four months of negotiations, Jacklin indicated that it was very excited 
about the prospect ofleasing space to Blue Dog for its RV shopping center in Riverbend 
Commerce Park. Id. at ~~ 6, 9. 
Negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog progressed to the point where Jacklin's 
Property Manager stated that he would draft up lease terms and determine the rental rate for 
Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property for its RV shopping center operation. Id. at ~ 11. Jacklin 
also asked at this time for Blue Dog's financial information which Blue Dog provided. Id. 
Jacklin further requested the owners of Blue Dog to personally guarantee the lease. Hines Ajf., 
Exhibit C (Stoeser Depo.), p. 14. Ultimately, Jacklin extended a lease rental rate offer to Blue 
Dog of approximately $25,000 per month for a ten year term. Russell Ajf., ~ 11. 
After receiving Jacklin's proposed financial terms for the lease, Blue Dog inquired 
about the four lots directly across the street to the North from Jacklin's proprty (the KLP 
property). Id. at '112. Those lots, while very similar to Jacklin's four undeveloped lots, were 
slightly closer to Interstate 90 and therefore more visible to vehicle traffic. Id. Mr. Russell 
told Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog would like to pursue acquiring rights to that 
property as well. In response, Jacklin's Property Manager told Blue Dog that the property was 
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not owned by Jacklin but that he would be happy to put Blue Dog in contact with the owners 
(KLP). Id.; Hines Ajf., Exh. A, p. 39. Jacklin gave Blue Dog Rick Cordes' contact infonnation 
as a representative ofKLP, one of the owners ofthe KLP property. Id. Jacklin's Property 
Manager further offered to contact Mr. Cordes on Blue Dog's behalf. Russell Ajf., ~ 12. At 
this time, there was no doubt that Jacklin was aware that Blue Dog's potential interest in the 
KLP property, as well as in Jacklin's property, was for the relocation of Blue Dog's RV 
operation. Id.; Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 48. 
Mr. Cordes responded to Blue Dog that KLP might in fact be interested in leasing some 
of the KLP property to Blue Dog. Cordes Ajf., ~ 13. KLP had chosen not to further develop 
Lots 1-4 based on the uncertainty of where and when the new Beck Road interchange would 
be built connecting into Interstate 90. Id. Once that interchange was built, which would give 
direct access to the Western portion of the Riverbend Commerce Part and KLP's property, it 
would affect the type of tenants attracted to the KLP property, and hence, the type of 
development that would occur. Id. Accordingly, KLP was interested in Blue Dog's overture 
and its proposed temporary use of Lots 1-4. Id. 
4. Blue Dog's Decision to Lease Property from KLP. 
Blue Dog then proceeded to have lease negotiations with both KLP and Jacklin. Russell 
Ajf., ~ 13. Blue Dog specifically indicated to KLP that Blue Dog was also still negotiating with 
Jacklin to use Jacklin's property directly across the street for its RV shopping center operation. 
Cordes Ajf., ~ 14. During this time period, Blue Dog also raised the issue to Jacklin of Blue 
Dog needing a temporary site to move its RV units ifit ultimately leased property in the 
commerce park. Russell Ajf., ~ 14. In response, Jacklin's Property Manager again referred 
Blue Dog to the KLP property as a potential temporary site for the RV units. To facilitate this, 
Jacklin even offered to assist Blue Dog in obtaining City approval for the temporary use of 
parking RV units on the KLP property. Id. 
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Ultimately, Blue Dog found KLP's lease terms to be better than Jacklin's and decided 
to lease with KLP. Russell Aff, ~ 15. On July 1,2008, KLP signed a lease with Blue Dog for 
Lots 1-7 to relocate and operate their RV shopping center. Cordes Aff, ~ 15. Because it was 
Jacklin's own Property Manager who referred Blue Dog to KLP, KLP never dreamed that 
Jacklin would subsequently take the position that an RV operation was an impermissible use in 
the Riverbend Commerce Park or specifically on KLP's property. Id. Indeed, Jacklin was the 
developer ofthe Riverbend Commerce Park who drafted the controlling CC&Rs, so if anyone 
should have been aware of a restriction, it should have been Jacklin. Id. KLP had absolutely 
no reason to question the appropriateness of Blue Dog's RV operation on its property based on 
the fact that Blue Dog was referred and recommended to KLP by Jacklin's Property Manager--
the very source from whom KLP would have otherwise sought approval. Id. Moreover, KLP 
was aware that Jacklin was pursuing the same use on their own property, further reinforcing for 
KLP the legitimacy and approval of an RV sales operation. Id. 
5. Blue Dog's Relocation of its RV Shopping Center to the KLP Property. 
During approximately the first week of July 2008, Blue Dog relocated its RV shopping 
center to the KLP property. Blue Dog's relocated operation is precisely the type ofRV 
shopping center that Blue Dog had communicated to Jacklin's Property Manager during the 
four months that Jacklin and Blue Dog negotiated a potential lease. Russell Aff, ~ 21. It is the 
same type ofRV operation that Jacklin's Property Manager saw when he visited Blue Dog's 
operation at Treaty Rock. Id. 
Upon relocating Blue Dog's shopping center to the KLP property, defendants did not 
develop the property or erect any structures. Id. at ~ 22. Essentially, non-motorized RV units 
are parked on the four vacant lots. Motorized RV units are parked on the two paved lots. Blue 
Dog then also uses a previously constructed office building connected to the Outlet Malls to 
perfonn office work. Cordes Aff, ~ 5. 
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6. Jacklin's Uncompromising Demand to Blue Dog to Vacate the KLP Site 
and Refusal to Work with KLP and Blue Dog to Address Any Site 
Concerns. 
Upon agreeing to lease terms with KLP, Blue Dog informed Jacklin's Property 
Manager that it was no longer interested in leasing Jacklin's Lots 1-4. Russell Aff, ~ 16. 
Jacklin's Property Manager Leffel seemed surprised and disappointed that Jacklin had not 
reached an agreement with Blue Dog. Id. Jacklin's Property Manager testified that Jacklin's 
desire was for Blue Dog to strike a deal with Jacklin, not with KLP. Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 76. 
However, Blue Dog was still discussing at that point the possibility of also leasing the building 
site from Jacklin for Blue Dog's service center. Russell Aff, ~ 16. At this time, when Blue 
Dog advised Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog had reached an agreement with KLP to 
lease and relocate its RV shopping center to KLP' s property, but before the relocation had 
occurred, Jacklin did not give any indication whatsoever that an RV shopping center was an 
incompatible use or restricted in any way in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. To the 
contrary, Jacklin has now admitted that during the entire period of negotiations with Blue Dog, 
it believed Blue Dog's RV operation was a compatible use in the Riverbend Commerce Park 
and fully compliant with any pertinent CC&Rs. Hines Aff, Exhibit B (Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) 
Depo.), pp. 120, 85-86. Jacklin's opinion only changed when it lost out on the lease 
negotiations with Blue Dog. 
Given the multiple assurances by Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog's RV sales 
operation was a compatible and permitted use in the Riverbend Commerce Park, Blue Dog 
relocated to KLP's property the first part of July 2008. Russell Aff, ~ 18. In a 180 degree 
reversal, Jacklin's Property Manager then informed Blue Dog for the first time that its RV sales 
operation was not a permitted use in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Blue Dog was 
astounded at this news,given that during the four months of negotiations with Jacklin, which 
included discussions relating to locating both on Jacklin's and KLP's properties, at no time did 
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Jacklin raise any concerns or restrictions regarding operating an R V shopping center in 
Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Moreover, it was Jacklin who referred Blue Dog to KLP 
regarding their property as a potential site for Blue Dog's RV operation. Id. Why would 
Jacklin refer Blue Dog to the owner of a potential lease site ifin fact that lease site could not 
house an RV shopping operation? Id. Had Jacklin advised Blue Dog that a RV Shopping 
Center was an incompatible use or otherwise restricted, Blue Dog would have discontinued 
lease negotiations and pursued other sites outside of River bend Commerce Park. Id. 
When Blue Dog raised these issues with Jacklin's Property Manager, he was very 
apologetic. Id. at, 19. Jacklin's Property Manager told Blue Dog that the "powers to be" at 
Jacklin had changed their mind and at this point would not allow Blue Dog to operate an RV 
center on someone else's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Based on the 
Property Manager's words and conduct, Blue Dog believed that Jacklin now opposed Blue 
Dog's RV operation simply because Jacklin lost out on the leasing opportunity to a competing 
owner. Id. 
Not only had Jacklin mislead Blue Dog into believing that its RV shopping center was a 
perfectly suitable operation for the Riverbend Commerce Park, but it absolutely refused to 
work with Blue Dog or KLP to address any site concerns. Id. at, 23; Cordes Aff., '19. KLP 
and Blue Dog offered to spend at least $50,000 in substantial site improvements on the four 
undeveloped lots, including landscaping and surface work. Cordes Aff., , 19. Blue Dog went 
so far as to contact multiple contractors to get bids. Russell Aff., '23. However, Jacklin 
responded that it would not matter; Jacklin would still demand that Blue Dog vacate the 
premises regardless of what site improvements Blue Dog and/or KLP undertook. Cordes Aff., 
, 19; Russell Aff., '23. Jacklin's corporate representative testified that no matter how Blue 
Dog operated its shopping center on KLP's property, no matter what site improvements were 
made, in Jacklin's eyes Blue Dog's RV sales operation on KLP's property would be 
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unacceptable. Hines A[f., Exh. B, p. 88; Exh. A, pp. 65-66. It is further undisputed that Jacklin 
categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns that Jacklin 
had or to work on an acceptable site plan. Russell Aff., ~ 20; Cordes Aff., ~ 19; Hines Aff., Exh. 
A, pp. 63-65; Exh. B, pp. 65, 67, 126. 
Refusing all of Blue Dog's and KLP's efforts to address site concerns, Jacklin gave 
defendants the uncompromising ultimatum of immediately vacating Blue Dog's operation from 
the KLP property or face litigation. Cordes Aff., ~ 18; Russell Aff., ~ 20. 1 Believing that Blue 
Dog's RV shopping center is absolutely compatible with the other business operations in 
Riverbend Commerce Park, and that it is a professionally owned and operated first class 
shopping center specializing in high-end RV units, defendants choose to stand their ground 
and not bear the expense of relocating. Cordes, ~20. 
Jacklin then filed suit on August 22,2008, seeking a permanent injunction, a declaration 
of rights, and the imposition of punitive damages. See Complaint. 
B. UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH ENTITLE DEFENDANTS TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
In addition to the undisputed facts referenced above, defendants incorporate herein the 
undisputed facts set forth in Defendants' Statements of Undisputed Material Facts in Support 
of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
1 As a further sign of deceptive practices by Jacklin, when its Property Manager was exchanging 
emails with Rick Cordes ofKLP advising KLP to remove Blue Dog from the property, all of 
the emails were ghostwritten by KLP's attorney at the Witherspoon Kelley firm, which Jacklin 
did not disclose. Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 102-103, 110, 121-122, 125, 130. Had this been 
disclosed, Mr. Cordes would have involved KLP's own attorney in responding. Cordes Aff., ~ 
22. 
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III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD. 
A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when all of the facts contained 
in all the applicable pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits have been construed 
most favorably to the nonmoving party, and it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bailey v. Ness, 
109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985); LR.C.P. 56(c). The evidence must be construed in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 
899,876 P.2d 595 (1994). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable 
inferences must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851 (1991). Ifthe evidence is conflicting on 
material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is 
not appropriate. Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120,645 P.2d 350 (1982). A material fact is 
one upon which the outcome ofthe case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849, 
908 P.2d 143 (1995). 
B. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT 
BLUE DOG'S RV SHOPPING CENTER OPERATION. 
1. Legal Standard Governing the Interpretation and Enforcement of 
Restrictive Covenants. 
In order for a restrictive covenant to be enforced, it must be expressly and 
unambiguously set forth. Gabriel v. Cazier, 130 Idaho 171, 173,938 P.2d 1209 (1997) 
(because restrictive covenants are in derogation ofthe common law right to use land for all 
lawful purposes, restrictions are not to be construed to extend by implication but rather must be 
clearly expressed in the covenant). All doubts and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of 
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the free use ofland. Id.; Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 830-31, 70 P.3d 
664 (2003). 
In construing a covenant that imposes restrictions on the use of land, the governing 
rules are generally the same as those which apply to any contract or covenant. Sun Valley 
Center for the Arts and Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Company, 107 Idaho 411, 413, 690 P.2d 
346 (1984); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 147,350 P.2d 348 (1960). The interpretation and 
legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions oflaw to be resolved by the court rather 
than the jury. Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693,697,692 P.2d 337 (1984). When the 
language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions 
oflaw. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743 (2003). 
If, after applying ordinary processes of contract interpretation, there remains doubt as to 
the actual, mutual intent ofthe parties, then the contract ambiguity should be resolved against 
the party who used the ambiguity in drafting the contract. See Farnsworth v. Dairymen's 
Creamery Ass'n., 125 Idaho 866,870, 876 P.2d 148 (1994) (summary judgment warranted 
based on rule of contract interpretation that ambiguity should be resolved against party who 
drafted ambiguous contract); Hillside Service Co. v. Alcorn, 105 Idaho 792, 795, 673 P.2d 392 
(1983) (provisions of a contract must be construed in favor of the non-drafting party). 
The rules of contract construction require the Court first to determine whether there is 
an ambiguity. Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829. The court must view the 
agreement as a whole and analyze the plain language of the covenant. Id. A restrictive 
covenant is ambiguous ifit is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Gabriel, 
130 Idaho at 173. Determining whether there is an ambiguity is a question oflaw. Pinehaven 
Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829. 
In Pinehaven Planning Board, the trial court granted a planning board summary 
judgment (i) declaring that the landowners' short-term rental of their cabin violated a restrictive 
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covenant, and (ii) pennanently enjoining them from renting the cabin for short-tenn use. 
Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 827. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
restrictive covenants were unambiguous and clearly allowed the landowners to rent their 
property for short tenns. Id. at 829. Notably, the court also stated that even ifthe restrictive 
covenants were ambiguous, the landowners would still prevail because given two reasonable 
interpretations of the restrictive covenant, the ambiguity must be resolved as a matter oflaw in 
favor of the free use ofland. Id. at 830. 
Similarly, in Sun Valley Center, the grantees of real property brought an action to 
detennine, among other things, whether the grantor's successor could enforce a restrictive 
covenant that provided for the review and approval of proposed plans by a design committee. 
Sun Valley Center, 107 Idaho at 412. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
grantor's successor on all issues and upheld the restriction on the property. Id. at 413. The 
Idaho Supreme Court reversed. Applying the rules of contract construction to the restrictive 
covenant, the Supreme Court held that the intent of the parties with respect to the covenants 
establishing and directing the design committee were unclear and ambiguous and presented an 
issue of fact such that summary judgment in favor of upholding the property restriction could 
not be decided on summary judgment. Id. at 413,414. See also Smith, 82 Idaho at 147-48 (the 
Supreme Court held that, in an action for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant, where the 
words and expressions used therein were unclear and ambiguous, it was reversible error for the 
trial court to grant judgment upholding the restriction). 
Here, the 1990 Development Agreement does not expressly or by implication prohibit 
Blue Dog's RV shopping center on the KLP property. Combining (a) the express terms of the 
Development Agreement with (b) the cannon of constructions that (i) all doubts regarding the 
scope of restrictive covenants are to be interpreted in favor of the free use ofland and (ii) all 
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ambiguities are to be interpreted against the drafter (Jacklinf of the restriction, defendants are 
entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs complaint as a matter oflaw. 
2. Express Scope of the Development Agreement. 
The Development Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block one, Riverbend Commerce 
Park, Phase I, City of Post Falls, County of Kootenai, Idaho ("Purchased 
Property"), by Purchaser and the removal of record on even date herewith of that 
certain Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (as amended) as it 
affects the Purchased Property, and other good and valuable consideration, 
Purchaser agrees: (i) to construct and maintain upon said Purchased 
Property, a first class shopping center which shall be in compliance with all 
state and local building codes and ordinances; (ii) to work together with 
Seller to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the 
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with 
other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park, and (iii) despites its removal of 
record as to the purchased property, Purchaser agrees to comply and conform 
to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in those Declarations of Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions recorded November 28, 1988 ... [and as 
subsequently amended] ... which are incorporated herein by this reference in its 
use and maintenance ofthe Purchased Property excepting those which are 
inapplicable to a retail shopping center (as shall be mutually agreed upon) or 
which violate applicable local building codes and ordinances. 
Cordes Ajf., Exhibit B (emphasis added). 
Jacklin's entire Complaint turns on the flawed assertion that the Development 
Agreement expressly prohibits Blue Dog's RVoperation. Blue Dog's RV operation is barred 
only if the express terms of the Development Agreement prohibit this type of operation. See 
Gabriel, 130 Idaho at 173; Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829. As demonstrated 
below, as a matter oflaw, neither clause (i)'s reference to a first class shopping center, nor 
clause (iii)'s incorporation of Articles 2-6 of the previously terminated CC&Rs serves to 
prohibit Blue'Dog's RV shopping center on KLP's property. The plain terms ofthe Agreement 
2 On cross-examination, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) representative admitted that Jacklin drafted the 
Development Agreement, not KLP's predecessor. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, p. 20. 
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itself, as well as Jacklin's historical treatment of the property, provide no legal basis to bar Blue 
Dog's RV operation. 
3. Clause (i)'s Reference "to construct and maintain a first class shopping 
center" Does Not Prohibit Blue Dog's RV Shopping Center Operation. 
As a matter of law, the Development Agreement's reference "to construct and maintain 
a first class shopping center" does not expressly, nor even by implication, prohibit Blue Dog's 
RV shopping center on KLP's property for the following independent reasons. 
(a) It Is Not a Use Restriction. Jacklin grossly misstates the nature and 
scope of clause (i). This clause is not a use restriction. Rather, it simply provides that the 
Purchaser is to construct and maintain a first class shopping center upon the property. It 
doesn't address, let alone, prohibit any uses on the property, let alone barring a RV sales 
operation. Jacklin concedes that the Agreement does not expressly prohibit the use of the 
property as an RV sales operation. Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 33. As the drafter of the 
Development, if Jacklin had wanted to specifically prohibit such a use, it certainly had the 
opportunity to do so. And any such omission is interpreted against Jacklin. Farnsworth, 125 
Idaho at 870. 
The existence ofJacklin's omission explains Jacklin's strategy of referring to "use 
language" that does not exist. The need for Jacklin to contort the language of clause (i) into an 
actual use restriction is best evidenced by Jacklin's repeated mischaracterization of the 
language both to KLP and in its motion papers. In Pat Leffel's emails to KLP demanding the 
immediate vacation of Blue Dog's operation (emails clandestinely ghost written by Jacklin's 
attorney), Jacklin writes: "QCA agreed [referring to the Development Agreement] to use the 
lots solely to "construct a first class shopping center" and for no other purpose." Cordes Aff., 
Exhibit C, p. 1. However, the Development Agreement does not state how the Lots are to be 
used or that certain purposes are prohibited. Pat Leffel, then, states in his filed Affidavit: 
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Bye-mail dated July 14, 2008, I responded to Mr. Cordes by advising him of the 
QCA Agreement of November 1990. I also advised him that QCA agreed "to 
use the lots solely to 'construct a first class shopping center' and for no other 
purpose." 
Affidavit of Pat Leffel Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, ~15. By putting in 
quotes and thereby ascribing to the Development Agreement an express use restriction which 
does not exist, Jacklin's Property Manager flags the fatal weakness of Jacklin's position. 
Notwithstanding J acklin's concerted effort to misrepresent the language of clause (i), the 
unavoidable legal conclusion, as directed by standard contract construction, is that the 
Development Agreement does not expressly prohibit a RV sales operation. 
(b) The Obligation to Construct and Maintain a First Class Shopping 
Center Has Been Satisfied. The Development Agreement required KLP's predecessor to 
"construct and maintain upon said Purchased Property [Lots 1-17], a first class shopping 
center ... " This was satisfied in 1991 upon the construction of the Outlet Mall, which has been 
maintained since. No further development on the Purchased Property was required nor has it 
occurred. Indeed, Lots 1-4 have remained vacant (until Blue Dog's relocation) and 
undeveloped for the last 18 years. Notably, the fact that Lots 1-4 remained undeveloped was 
never viewed by Jacklin as a breach of the Development Agreement. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, pp. 
25-27. Notwithstanding that no first class shopping center was ever constructed on Lots 1-6, 
Jacklin concedes that there was no breach of the Development Agreement. Id. Thus, Jacklin's 
own actions confirm that the Development Agreement never required a first class shopping 
center to be constructed upon each separate lot of the Purchased Property. So long as a first 
class shopping center was built upon the Purchased Property as a whole, the purchaser satisfied 
the Development Agreement. At a minimum, whether the Agreement required a first class 
shopping center to be physically constructed on each ofthe 17 Lots is an ambiguity that must 
be interpreted against Jacklin as the drafter of the Agreement as well as the party who is 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .... : 17 
552 
attempting to restrict the free use ofland. See Farnsworth, 125 Idaho at 870; Pinehaven, 138 
Idaho at 830. 
(c) Blue Dog's Operation is a First Class Shopping Center. The 
Development Agreement does not define what constitutes a "first class shopping center," which 
Jacklin concedes. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, 42. Jacklin, who drafted the Agreement, admits that it 
does not know the distinction between a first, second or third class shopping center. Id., at 43. 
The Agreement does not even define what a "shopping center" is. Id. at 44. When asked at the 
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition whether an RV sales operation could constitute a first class shopping 
center, Jacklin testified: "I don't know because we [Jacklin] didn't define the term." Id. at 47. 
Further, when asked whether the term "first class shopping center" is inherently ambiguous, 
Jacklin's corporate officer answered simply: "I don't know." Id. at 45. Ultimately, Jacklin 
conceded that a RV shopping center could be a first class shopping center. Id. at 48. 
Blue Dog's RV sales operation is a first class shopping center. See Cordes Ajf., ~20. It 
is a retail location selling high end RV units, many priced in the hundred(s) of thousands of 
dollars. It is the same type of shopping center operation that Mr. Leffel saw when he visited 
Blue Dog's operation at Treaty Rock. Russell Ajf., ~9. Blue Dog's shopping center on the 
KLP property does not violate any definition of "first class shopping center" provided in the 
Development Agreement or otherwise by Jacklin. Further, there is no requirement that there be 
only one first class shopping center on Lots 1-17. Jacklin concedes that the Development 
Agreement does not prohibit multiple operations on Lots 1-17. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, pp. 34-35. 
(d) Blue Dog's Operation is a Permitted Temporary Use. The 
Development Agreement contains no time deadline for the construction of first class shopping 
centers on Lots 1-17, as Jacklin admits. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, pp. 27, 33. Moreover, it does not 
prohibit any temporary use of the property prior to the construction of the first class shopping 
centers. Cordes Ajf., Exh. B. KLP has made clear that Blue Dog's shopping center, which has 
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a base teml ofthree years, is a temporary use until the Beck Road Interchange is constructed. 
Cordes Aff., ~ 20. 
(e) Jacklin Admits that a First Class Shopping Center Only Has to be 
Constructed When Property Is Developed. The final admission by Jacklin is perhaps the 
most fatal. Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that the fact that Lots 1-4 were 
undeveloped did not constitute a violation ofthe Development Agreement. Hines Aff., Exh., B, 
p. 26. According to Jacklin, a first class shopping center only had to be constructed after the 
Lots were developed: "Jacklin's understanding is when those lots are developed-there was no 
time frame to construct it, but they had to construct a first class shopping mall." Id. at 27. 
Jacklin then concedes that after Blue Dog took over the tenancy of the KLP property, they did 
not develop the property. Id. at 28. Thus, by Jacklin's own testimony, even assuming that 
Blue Dog's operation is not a first class shopping center (which defendants dispute), there was 
no contractual obligation to construct a first class shopping center until the property is 
developed. Critically, it is undisputed that there has been!!Q development of the property in 
connection with the Blue Dog tenancy. 
4. Clause om's Incorporation of Articles 2-6 of the Terminated CC&Rs Does 
Not Prohibit Blue Dog's RV Shopping Center Operation. 
In consideration of the Purchaser agreeing to buy Lots 1-17 , Jacklin agreed to temlinate 
the recorded 1988 CC&Rs, including all amendments, governing Riverbend Commerce Park as 
applicable to Lots 1-17.3 The Development Agreement then incorporated Articles 2-6 of the 
temlinated CC&Rs. See Hines Aff., Exhibit F, 1989 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
3 There were subsequent Amended Declarations of CC&Rs that applied to Riverbend 
Commerce Park,the last recorded in 2006. See Hines Aff., Exhibit D, 2006 Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Riverbend Commerce Park. Notwithstanding 
Jacklin's Property Manager representing to Blue Dog that the 2006 CC&Rs applied to the KLP 
property (Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 123), the express temlS of the 2006 CC&Rs make clear that it 
does not apply to the KLP property: "Neither this Declaration nor prior Declarations shall 
apply to Lots 1-17 of Block One of Riverbend Commerce Park .... Lots 1-17 of Block 
One ... are specifically excluded." Hines Aff., Exh. D, p. 1. 
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Restrictions of Riverbend Commerce Park, pp. 1-11. However, even to the extent that the 
incorporation ofterminated Articles of a Declaration of CC&Rs is legally valid, nothing in 
Articles 2-6 prohibits Blue Dog's RV shopping center. 
(a) Articles 2-6 Have No Legal Effect Because They Were Previously 
Terminated. On October 16, 1990, Jacklin executed the "Amendment of Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of River bend Commerce Park." Hines Ajf., Exhibit E. 
In it, Jacklin expressly terminated all prior and subsequent CC&Rs as applicable to Lots 1-17 
(the KLP property): "All restrictions ofthe 1990 and prior CCRs as apply to Lots 1-17 of 
Block one of River bend Commerce Park are terminated. The same lots are specifically and 
intentionally excluded from the superseding 1990 CCRs." Id. (emphasis added). 
Significantly, at the time that the parties executed the Development Agreement (on 
November 7, 1990) the CC&Rs, including Articles 2-6, had already been terminated and were 
null and void. Thus, the Development Agreement incorporated null and void CC&R Articles 
2-6. Terminated CC&R Articles, whether contractually incorporated or through the recording 
statute, cannot impose legal obligations on any successor owner of Lots 1-17, including KLP. 
Articles 2-6, therefore, have no legal applicability to KLP's use of Lots 1-17. 
(b) Articles 2-6 Do Not Prohibit an RV Sales Operation. Even assuming 
that Articles 2-6 legally apply to KLP's Lots 1-17, they do not prohibit Blue Dog's shopping 
center. Article 6 sets forth "Uses and Operation." Hines Ajf., Exh. F, p. 10. It states that: 
"Light industrial and commercial uses are intended for the development." Id. Blue Dog's RV 
operation certainly fits this description. Article 6.3 further expressly lists the "Specific Uses 
Prohibited." Id. Notably missing from this list is the prohibition of an RV sales operation. Id. 
Articles 2-5 similarly do not expressly prohibit a RV shopping center operation. Hines Ajf., 
Exh. F, pp. 1-10. 
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(c) Articles 2-6 Do Not Prohibit a Temporary Use of the Property. 
Nowhere in Articles 2-6 is a temporary use of the KLP property prohibited. Id. Jacklin argues 
that Article 3.11 sets forth this prohibition. Hines Aff., Exh., B, pp. 35-36. Article 3.11 actually 
provides: "Parking: Temporary Lots. Parking lots for temporary parking (parking used prior 
to or during construction of improvements) need not meet all requirements specified above but 
must be reasonably dust, weed, and refuse free and be maintained as temporary lots no longer 
than one (l) year from date of occupancy." Hines AjJ., Exh. F, p. 4. This Article only 
addresses a temporary parking lot utilized during construction. It does not address a temporary 
use of the property different than a first class shopping center. Moreover, Blue Dog is not 
using Lots 1-6 as a temporary parking lot. Further, even under this strained interpretation, Blue 
Dog would have one year to comply, which has not expired. 
(d) Articles 2-5 Are Only Triggered When the Property Has Been 
Developed, Which Has Not Occurred. The landscaping (Article 2), parking (Article 3), 
signage (Article 4), design and construction limitations (Article 5) all contemplate development 
of the property before the specific obligations are triggered. Hines AjJ., Exh. F, pp. 1-10. As 
Jacklin admits, no development of Lots 1-4 have occurred, and therefore, these specific 
requirements have not been triggered and are premature. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, p. 28. 
(e) Blue Dog's Efforts to Make Site Improvements Were Rendered 
Futile by Jacklin's Refusal to Cooperate. Blue Dog offered to spend in excess of $50,000 to 
make site improvements. However, Jacklin categorically rejected this and all efforts to work 
with Blue Dog and KLP on site issues. Jacklin admits that no matter how defendants 
developed Blue Dog's RV shopping center, it would have still been unacceptable to Jacklin. 
Id. at p. 88. Jacklin's CFO further concedes it would have been "futile" for Blue Dog to make 
any site improvements because Jacklin's approval would have still been withheld. Hines Aff., 
Exh. C, pp. 33-34. Idaho recognizes futility as a defense to performance. See Sullivan v. 
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Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184, 192 n.3 (1993) ("One party by a breach cannot make it 
impossible, difficult, unfair, or futile for the other party to perform and then invoke the other's 
alleged non-performance as a defense"); see also Chapman v. Olbrich, 217 S.W.3d 482, 491 
(2007) (in action seeking specific performance of a contract, tender of performance of 
contractual obligations is excused when tender would be futile or when defendants have 
repudiated the contract); 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance § 84 (2008). Thus, by rendering 
all efforts by Blue Dog to make site improvements and to conform with Articles 2-6 futile, 
Jacklin is now barred from complaining about defendants' alleged non-performance. 
(1) An Alleged Violation of Articles 2-6 Does Not Grant Jacklin the 
Right to Evict Blue Dog from the Property. Even if Blue Dog's operation violated any 
provision of Articles 2-6, nothing in those Articles authorizes eviction as a remedy. The 1989 
and 2006 CC&Rs that apply to Riverbend Commerce Park as a whole (other than Lots 1-17) 
both contain comprehensive enforcement procedures in Article 8. Hines AjJ., Exh. D, pp. 16-
18; Exh. F, pp. 14-16. However, the Development Agreement does not incorporate or 
otherwise set forth any enforcement procedures. Thus, the Development Agreement does 
authorize the remedy now sought by Jacklin. 
(g) The Same Substantive CC&R Articles Would Have Applied to Blue 
Dog's Operation on Jacklin's Property. Jacklin's after-the-fact assertion that Blue Dog's RV 
operation violates Articles 2-6 flies in the face of Jacklin's four month solicitation ofthe same 
Blue Dog RV operation for its property. Jacklin testified that Blue Dog's operation was a 
permissible use for its property and complied with the applicable CC&Rs. Hines Aff., Exh. B, 
pp. 86-87. Jacklin would not have negotiated with Blue Dog ifit believed it was a non-
conforming use. Hines Aff., Exh. B, pp. 48-49. Jacklin further testified that there were no 
material, substantive differences in Articles 2-6 ofthe 2006 CC&Rs that applies to the Jacklin 
property, and Articles 2-6 of the 1988 CC&Rs that purportedly applies to the KLP property. 
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Hines AjJ., Exh. A, pp. 52-53; Exh. B, pp. 56, 59. Thus, Jacklin's own actions and 
representations demonstrate that Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permissible use under 
Articles 2-6. 
C. JACKLIN'S CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF INDEPENDENTLY FAIL 
FOR FAILURE TO PROVE IRREPERABLE INJURY. 
Injunctive relief is only authorized when the claimant demonstrates "(1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Norton, 503 F.3d 836,843 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S.388, 391 (2006»; Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). 
Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief are legally defective because plaintiff does not 
satisfy the irreparable harm element. Harris, 106 Idaho at 518 (second element requires 
moving party to show "great or irreparable injury"). Not only does plaintiff fail to plead 
irreparable harm in the Complaint (see Complaint), but Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent 
testified unequivocally that Jacklin has not been harmed or injured by Blue Dog's RV 
operation on KLP's property. 
Q. (By Mr. Hines). Are you able to quantify for me any monetary damage or injury as 
a result of Blue Dog's RV operation? 
A. (Jacklin's 30(b)(6) Representative). No. 
Q. Are you aware of any facts to indicate that Jacklin has been irreparably harmed as a 
result of Blue Dog's operation? 
A. As stated before, the current tenant. There's been inquiries as to what's going on 
because everybody else has had to comply with the CC&Rs, and they're wondering 
what's going on with Blue Dog. 
Q. But how has that caused any irreparable harm to Jacklin? 
A. It hasn't yet. 
Q. SO sitting here today you're not aware of any facts to suggest that Blue Dog's 
operation has caused any irreparable harm, correct? 
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A. Not as of yet. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 89. Jacklin's corporate representative further testified: 
Q. With respect to alleged damages caused by the RV Center operation, that operation 
has been going from July 2008 until today, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can you identify a single perspective tenant who Jacklin has lost as a result of the 
operation? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you identify a single land sale that was foregone because of the operation? 
A. No. 
Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 121. 
Jacklin's admission that it has suffered no harm, let alone irreparable harm, requires 
dismissal of plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. See Udell v. Idaho State Bd of Land 
Comm., 119 Idaho 1018, 1019,812 P.2d 325 (1991) (court upheld determination that plaintiffs 
had not established right to injunctive relief where they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury 
which could not be compensated by monetary damages); see also Smith v. Ravalli County Bd. 
of Health, 209 Mont. 292, 296, 679 P.2d 1249 (1984) (property owners were not entitled to 
preliminary injunction where they presented no evidence that their property would be damaged 
if septic system became operable). 
D. JACKLIN'S BREACH OF THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BY 
REFUSING TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH WITH KLP TO APPROVE A SITE 
PLAN PREVENTS ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT AGAINST KLP. 
Ifa breach of contract is material, the other party's performance is excused. J.P. 
Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46 (1996) 
(in action for payments due under a personal services contract, court found that plaintiffs 
breach was material so defendant's duty to pay plaintiff under the contract was excused). "A 
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substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches the fundamental purpose of the 
contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract." Id. 
"It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the 
failure of performance, either of an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own 
liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure." Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 
133,391 P.2d 344 (1964) citing 5 Williston on Contracts, § 677 (3d ed. 1961). "One who 
unjustly prevents the performance or the happening of a condition of his own promissory duty 
thereby eliminates it as such a condition. He will not be permitted to take advantage of his own 
wrong, and to escape from liability for not rendering his promised performance by preventing 
the happening of the condition on which it was promised." Id. citing 3A Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 767 (1960). 
Here, clause (ii) of the Development Agreement contractually obligated Jacklin "to 
work together" with KLP "to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the 
shopping center." Cordes Ajf., Exh. C. This express contractual covenant reinforces what the 
law already imposes. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in every 
contract. Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595 (2002) (a duty 
of reasonable performance exists in every contract). This legal covenant requires the parties to 
perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement. Id.; George v. Univ. of 
Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 37, 822 P.2d 549 (1991) (the implied covenant places a good faith 
obligation on each party to take reasonable measures to ensure that the other party obtains the 
benefits of the agreement). A violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates, 
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Steiner, 138 Idaho at 242. A 
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing relieves the non-breaching party 
of any further legal duty to perform under the contract. See Stravens Planning Associates, Inc., 
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129 Idaho 545 (because plaintiffs breach of implied duty went to the heart and purpose of the 
contract and was thus material, defendants duty to pay under the contract was excused). 
It is undisputed that Jacklin categorically refused to work with KLP or Blue Dog to 
address any site concerns involving Blue Dog's shopping center operation. Jacklin's Property 
Manager testified that Jacklin never gave defendants any opportunity to make site 
improvements or address site concerns. Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 63. Other than ordering Blue 
Dog to immediately vacate the property, Jacklin never worked with defendants on a site plan or 
to address site concerns. Id. at p. 64. There was nothing Blue Dog could do to placate Jacklin 
short of vacating the property. Id. at pp. 64-65. Jacklin's CFO testified that after Blue Dog 
informed Jacklin that it had leased premises from KLP, Jacklin did not work with Blue Dog in 
any manner to address site concerns, but rather simply ordered Blue Dog to vacate. Hines Aff, 
Exh. C, p. 19. Jacklin never extended any offer to work with Blue Dog. Id. 
Similarly, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent testified that Jacklin: (i) never offered to sit 
down with KLP and work through site issues (Hines Aff, Exh. B, p. 126); (ii) never 
communicated the type of site improvements that would have to occur to satisfy Jacklin's 
concerns (id.); and (iii) summarily rejected Blue Dog's offer to make over $50,000 of site 
improvements @. at pp. 85-86). In the eyes of Jacklin, no matter how defendants developed 
Blue Dog's RV shopping center, it would have still been unacceptable to Jacklin. Id. at p. 88. 
Jacklin even withheld from defendants its belief that a RV sales operation could be a first class 
shopping center. Id. at p. 124. 
Jacklin's complete refusal to work with defendants to address site concerns constitutes a 
breach of the Development Agreement as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. As such, Jacklin's own breach bars it from advancing claims of breach of the 
Development Agreement against defendants. See Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho at 133; 
McOmber v. Nuckols, 82 Idaho 280, 284,353 P.2d 398 (1960) (where plaintiff first refused to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .... : 26 
561 
allow defendant to perform under the contract, plaintiff could not recover damages for 
defendant's failure to perform). 
E. DEFENDANTS' WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL DEFENSES PRECLUDE 
ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
The affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel are recognized defenses to the 
enforcement of a restrictive covenant. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 43 ("The broad rules of 
waiver and estoppel generally are applicable to the enforcement of covenants. Thus, a person 
by his or her conduct may be estopped from asserting a right to enforce a covenant."); Atwood 
v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006) (the doctrine of quasi-estoppel 
"prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent 
with a position previously taken"); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 
144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). 
Waiver requires a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right that is relied 
upon by an adverse party and which alters their position. A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-
American Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005). Quasi-
estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original 
position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to 
the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he 
or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. Atwood, 143 Idaho at 114. 
Jacklin repeatedly assured Blue Dog that its RV sales operation would be a compatible 
use in Riverbend Commerce Park. Jacklin referred Blue Dog to the KLP property both as a 
potential lease site and as a temporary staging site for RV units. Jacklin then reversed its 
approval of Blue Dog's RV shopping center only after it lost out in the lease negotiations to 
KLP. Jacklin's conduct squarely fits the affirmative defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .... : 27 
First, Jacklin took a different position than its original position. Jacklin originally 
represented to Blue Dog that its RV sales operation was a compatible use in Riverbend 
Commerce Park, then reversed itself and said that it was an incompatible use after Blue Dog 
notified Jacklin that it had leased space from KLP. 
Second, Blue Dog suffered significant disadvantage in Jacklin's change of position. 
The uncontroverted evidence is if Jacklin had told Blue Dog either that its RV sales operation 
was an incompatible use in Riverbend Commerce Park or that an RV sales operation was 
prohibited on KLP's property, Blue Dog "would have discontinued lease negotiations and 
pursued other sites outside of River bend Commerce Park." Russell Aff., ~ 18. 
Third, it would be unconscionable to permit Jacklin to change its position from one it 
already acquiesced in. The defendants directly relied on Jacklin's representations that an RV 
sales operation was a permissible use in Riverbend Commerce Park and that KLP was a 
suitable site for that operation based on Jacklin's referral of Blue Dog to KLP. Blue Dog and 
KLP relied upon Jacklin's conduct by agreeing to a three year lease. Blue Dog has spent 
considerable time and money in relocating to Riverbend Commerce Park. For Jacklin to now 
reverse itself and demand that Blue Dog vacate the KLP site is unconscionable. To the extent 
that Jacklin ever possessed the right to bar an RV operation from Riverbend Commerce Park, 
Jacklin has waived that right because of its inequitable conduct toward Blue Dog and KLP 
which defendants have relied upon to their detriment. 
F. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS FOR TWO 
INDEPENDENT REASONS. 
Initially, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment fails for the same legal reasons 
argued above in support of defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. An injunction is 
not warranted and will not issue unless the party against whom relief is sought is violating, or 
threatens to violate, some right of the party seeking the remedy. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 503 
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F.3d at 843; Brunzell v. Stevenson, 30 Idaho 202, 164 P. 89 (1917). As set forth in Legal 
Argument Sections B through E above, Jacklin cannot identify any legal rights that defendants 
have violated. The express terms of the Development Agreement do not prevent a RV sales 
operation, and the cannons of construction require that any ambiguity be interpreted against 
finding such a land use restriction. Thus, for the multiple reasons set forth above and 
incorporated herein, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied. See Brunzell, 
30 Idaho at 202 (injunction overturned on appeal when the trial court determined that no legal 
rights had been violated). 
Alternatively, defendants' affirmative defenses of breach of contract, waiver and 
estoppel create issues of material fact which preclude plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
As argued above, defendants believe that uncontroverted facts support these affirmative 
defenses which warrant dismissal ofplaintiffs complaint as a matter of law. However, even if 
the Court disagrees, at a minimum, defendants have raised questions of fact in connection with 
these defenses which prevent summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
The existence of waiver and estoppel is a factual determination. Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, 650 P.2d 657,660 (1982); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. 
Meridian Athletic Association, Inc., 105 Idaho 509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983) (in breach of 
contract action regarding right of first refusal, genuine issues of material fact existed whether 
there was implied or express waiver of that right, precluding summary judgment); United States 
v. James Stewart Co., 336 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1964) (the existence of estoppel is a question 
of fact). Genuine issues of material fact regarding waiver and estoppel preclude summary 
judgment. Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992); 
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006) also see Regents of University of 
California v. Principal Financial Group, 412 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1046 (N.D.Ca1.2006) (questions 
regarding estoppel were intensely factual and inappropriate for resolution on a motion for 
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summary judgment); Cedars Sinai Medical Center v. Mid-West Nat. Life Ins. Co., 118 
F.Supp.2d 1002, 1012-13 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (denying summary judgment because of fact issues 
related to inducement and reliance). 
In this case, ifthe Court chooses not to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for the legal 
reasons set forth above, it should nevertheless deny plaintiffs motion because genuine issues of 
material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and consistent with Idaho's strong presumption 
upholding the free use of land, defendants respectfully request the Court (i) to grant defendants' 
cross-motion for summary dismissing plaintiff s Complaint in full with prejudice, and (ii) to 
deny plaintiff s motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this \1~ day of February, 2009. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
BY~ MICHAEJHINES""'" 
ISB #6876 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT 
ISB #6911 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company, by and through its attorney of record, John 
F. Magnuson, and respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (filed December 11, 2008). This Motion is supported by the pleadings and 
submissions on file herein, together with the accompanying Affidavit of J ohn F. Magnuson pursuant 
to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c). To the extent necessary, the Court should consider this Reply 
Memorandum, and the supporting affidavit submissions filed by Jacklin, to constitute an opposition 
to Defendants' untimely "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.,,1 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Defendants' opposing Memorandum (filed February 17,2009) reads like a John Grisham 
novel. The Defendants apparently see phantoms and conspiracies behind every door. Yet like a 
Grisham novel, the Defendants' Memorandum is, in large part, nothing more than a work of fiction 
advanced by Defendants in an effort to extricate themselves from clearly enunciated rules and 
obligations to which they have succeeded. 
There is an oft-cited maxim in the First Judicial District that suggests that if the pleadings 
and submissions related to a motion for summary judgment are several inches thick, as here, then 
there must be a material issue of fact somewhere in the stack. This appears to be the Defendants' 
hope. Plaintiff suggests that when the undisputed material facts are viewed with clarity, and in the 
light of day, that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested and that the Defendants' efforts to 
Plaintiff has separately moved the Court for entry of an order striking Defendants' 
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment" from the calendar of March 3,2009. As set forth in the 
Affidavit of counsel filed in support of said Motion to Strike, Defendants have had months of notice 
of the impending summary judgment date, which was rescheduled at their request to provide for 
discovery, and yet they still insist on filing an untimely motion for summary judgment on the eve of 
the hearing date. The motion does not comply with the timelines under IRCP 56( c) and should be 
stricken for the reasons advanced. 
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"dodge" and "duck" should end. 
The facts at bar, together with the controlling documents and controlling law, are relatively 
straightforward. The Defendants have been asked to cease their unpermitted use of the subject 
property since the inception of the lease between Blue Dog and KLP. The Defendants have refused. 
In support ofthis refusal, the Defendants continue to attempt to characterize the facts as ifthe parties 
were characters in a cheap dime novel. Their efforts have proven successful to date. Blue Dog has 
remained as a tenant on the subject property for seven months, through the "Winter of Our 
Discontent," while throwing sand in the gears of justice. 
This is not, as Defendants posit, "a case about sour grapes." True, the case has something 
to do with wine (or shall we say "whine"?). In reality, the case bears the hallmark of a problem too 
often seen in contemporary American society: an individual or entity who seeks to place the blame 
for his actions on others, decrying any sense of self-accountability or responsibility. This case is 
really about a party who knowingly breaks clear rules, consensual rules that bind the Defendants for 
the benefit of Jacklin, only to deny accountability when challenged. 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND TERMS. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 11, 2008), Jacklin 
submitted its "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts." Those facts are incorporated herein as 
though set forth in full. Where noted, they will be referred to by the acronym "SOF." Also, attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, for the Court's convenience, is a copy of Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Tom 
Stoeser (also filed December 11, 2008). 
"Riverbend Commerce Park" is a multi-phased commerce park developed by Jacklin. See 
SOF at '1. The First Phase of River bend Commerce Park ("RCP") was platted in 1988. Id. at '2. 
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RCP's First Phase created various lots, including Lots 1-17 of Block 1. Id. at '3. This 
property is now owned by the Defendant Owners (KLP). A portion ofthe property is leased to Blue 
Dog. Depicted on Exhibit A in yellow is that area including Lots 1-17 of Block 1 of Phase 1 ofRCP. 
The Blue Dog leasehold is located on the western edge of the KLP property. 
When originally platted and developed, the First Phase was subj ect to a certain "Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of River bend Commerce Park." Id. at,7 (Instrument No. 
1135200). These Covenants original encumbered the property that is now owned by KLP and 1 eased 
by Blue Dog. The Covenants were thereafter amended in 1989 through Kootenai County Instrument 
No. 1155779. Id. at ,6. Like the original Covenants, the amended Covenants once encumbered the 
property now owned by KLP and leased by Blue Dog. 
In 1990, Jacklin entered into negotiations with an entity known as "Quality Centers 
Associates" ("QCA"), which had expressed an interest in purchasing that portion of Phase 1 ofRCP 
that includes the property now owned byKLP (as well as the portion leased to Blue Dog). Id. at,7. 
QCA, which intended to use the property now owned by KLP for commercial purposes, expressed 
its desire that the then-controlling Covenants be removed as a matter of title from the subject 
property. Id. at,l O. 
Jacklin agreed to QCA's request on certain terms and conditions. Those terms and 
conditions were ultimately memorialized by an Agreement recorded as Kootenai County Instrument 
No. 1200512. Id. at '12. See also Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G. That 
agreement is referred to herein as the "QCNJacklin Agreement.,,2 
2 Defendants' opposing submissions on summary judgment repeatedly refer to the 
QCNJacklin Agreement as "the Development Agreement." Interestingly, the word "development" 
does not appear anywhere in the agreement. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G. Such loose 
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The QCNJacklin closing, with respect to the property now owned by KLP, took place in 
November of 1990. Id. at '13. The QCNJacklin Agreement was recorded as Kootenai County 
Instrument No. 1200512. Id. The QCNJacklin Agreement provided, as to the KLP property at issue, 
as follows: 
• QCA, individually and on behalf of its successors and assigns in and to any 
portion of the subject property, agreed "to construct and maintain ... a first 
class shopping center .... " 
• QCA agreed to "work together with [Jacklin Land Company] to achieve a 
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it 
shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within 
Riverbend Commerce Park. ... " 
• QCA agreed to otherwise comply and conform to Articles IT, ill, IV, V, and 
VI ofthe Declarations as amended as ofthat date (Instrument No. 1155779). 
See SOF at ,13. See also Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G. 
As noted, the QCAlJ acklin Agreement is unique to the KLPIBlue Dog property. It limits the 
use thereof to the construction and maintenance of a first class shopping center. It requires the owner 
of the property (since it is binding upon KLP as QCA's successor-in-interest) to "work together with 
[Jacklin Land Company] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping 
center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend 
Commerce Park. ... " Id. 
Finally, it incorporates, as a matter of contract, Articles II-VI of the Covenants in effect as 
of the closing date (Instrument No. 1155779). In short, although the KLP/QCA property was 
excluded from the Covenants generally applicable to the Riverbend Commerce Park, it was 
characterization is endemic ofthe Defendants' position in response to Jacklin's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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nonetheless made subject to Articles II-VI of the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants as they 
existed on the date of closing. It was further made subject to the unique contractual undertakings 
that encumbered and pertained to that parcel (related to a "mutually acceptable design and 
appearance" and a "first class shopping center"). The remainder of Phase 1, including Lots 1-4 as 
depicted in orange on Exhibit A above the "Phase 1" line, remained subject to the RCP Covenants 
and any subsequent amendments thereto. 
Jacklin then proceeded to develop Phases 2 and 3 of RCP. The remaining lots created in 
Phases 2 and 3 of RCP, with one exception, remain subject to the RCP Covenants and any 
subsequent amendments thereto.3 
Depicted on Exhibit A are six lots colored orange. These orange lots are owned by Jacklin. 
Discussions were had, as described in the Affidavit of Pat Leffel (filed December 11, 2008) and the 
Leffel deposition transcript (attached as Exhibit A to the Hines Affidavit), between Jacklin and Blue 
Dog as to Blue Dog's possible lease terms for use of all or a portion of the orange property (and 
potentially the adjoining pink property) for an RV sales facility. This Jacklin property, located in 
both Phases 1 and 2 (as depicted on Exhibit A), is subject to the general RCP Covenants (and any 
subsequent amendments thereto) and not the QCAJJacklin Agreement. As set forth below, the 
Defendants have a convenient way of ignoring this distinction when it suits their needs. 
To summarize, there are then three agreements that pertain to the disputes at issue: 
3 The one exception involves another purchase by QCA. QCA purchased a portion of 
Phase 2, after it had made its purchase of the subject property (the KLPlBlue Dog property). See 
SOF at ~24. As with its first purchase, QCA wanted the property to be removed from the scope of 
the RCP Covenants. As with the first transaction with QCA, Jacklin agreed so long as QCA would 
use the property "as a first class shopping center" and in compliance with Articles II-VI of the 
Covenants incorporated in the Agreement. See SOF at ~24. See also Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. I. 
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(1) The November 1990 QCAlJ acklin Agreement pertains to the KLP !Blue Dog 
property only. 
(2) The RCP Covenants in effect in November of 1990 (Kootenai County 
Instrument No. 1155779), at Articles II-VI, contractually bind the KLP!Blue 
Dog property. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C. 
(3) The current variant ofthe RCP Covenants (Hines Affidavit at Ex. D) governs 
the use ofthe Jacklin property (which Jacklin once considered leasing to Blue 
Dog) (colored in orange on Exhibit A). 
Against this background, one needs to view the Defendants' "grapes of wrath" theory with scrutiny. 
III. DEFENDANTS' FACTUAL "ASSERTIONS." 
Set forth below is a discussion of certain of the vague, conclusory, or simply incorrect 
assertions (characterized as "fact") made by Defendants in opposition to Jacklin's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (and presumably in support of Defendants ' untimely Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment). 
A. The Affidavit of Richard A. Cordes. 
1. Cordes (a principle in KLP) avers that Lots 1-4 of the JoSLP property (leased to Blue 
Dog) "are nearly identical in location and condition" to Lots 1-4 ofthe Jacklin property (which are . 
colored in orange on Exhibit A and were the subject oflease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue 
Dog). Any implication by Cordes that the properties are "identical" must be rejected based on the 
clear record evidence. The KLP property is not subject to the RCP Covenants. Rather, it is subject 
to Articles II-VI ofthe Covenants in effect in November of 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779) by way 
ofincorporation under a consensually agreed to contract. Further, the KLP property is subject to the 
property-unique limitations arising under the QCNJ acklin Agreement ("first class shopping center" 
and "mutually acceptable design and appearance"). The Jacklin property, which actually remains 
in the Riverbend Commerce Park, is subject to a wholly separate set of restrictions, in the form of 
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the current Covenants and any subject amendments thereto. See Hines Affidavit at Ex. D.4 
2. Cordes refers to the QCAlJacklin Agreement that was recorded against the KLP 
property in November of 1990 as "the 1990 Development Agreement." See Cordes Affidavit at ~7 
and throughout. In actuality, the Agreement is captioned "Agreement," and nowhere in the same 
does it contain the word "development." It is a "use" agreement, as confirmed by the obligation 
imposed upon QCA (and now KLP) to ensure that the use ofthe property (a shopping center) "shall 
be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park. ... " 
See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G. 
3. Cordes, who wasn't a party to the original Agreement, somehow is able to conclude 
that QCA complied with its obligations under the QCAlJacklin Agreement, as of 1991, by 
constructing "the Factory Outlet Malls" on Lots 7-17 and a paved parking lot on Lots 5-6. See 






This distinction was noted by Mr. Stoeser in his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition: 
Is an RV operation in general compatible with other uses in Riverbend 
Commerce Park? 
Yes, if it complies with the CC&Rs in Riverbend Commerce Park. Now, by 
"Riverbend Commerce Park" I'm excluding Lots 1-17 and Lots 1-14 because 
they have a different standard. 
The different standard being what? 
That they have difference CC&Rs, and they have - as a minimum. They also 
have to have a first class shopping mall, and it has to be mutually agreed 
upon with us. 
See Magnuson Affidavit under Rule 32(a)(4) and Rule 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 89-90. Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition transcript of Stoeser. The cited portions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition transcript of 
Stoeser were omitted from the deposition excerpts offered by the Defendants in opposition to 
Jacklin's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Agreement that pertained to the lots that were developed in 1991. The Agreement applies to all of 
the affected lots (i.e., Lots 1-17 of Block 1), rather than those designated by KLP some 19 years after 
the fact. 
4. Cordes correctly notes in ,9 of his Affidavit that the KLP property was removed from 
the Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs in November of 1990. He also correctly notes that KLP's 
predecessor-in-title (QCA) contractually impressed upon the KLP property (by incorporation) 
Articles ll-VI of the CC&Rs in effect in November of 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779). 
5. Cordes apparently alleges some sort of precedential value based on his allegation that 
Jacklin never advised QCA or KLP that they were in violation of the QCNJacklin Agreement by 
failing to develop Lots 1-4. See Cordes Affidavit at '10. Cordes' conclusion is based upon the 
erroneous label he ascribes to the 1990 Agreement ("The 1990 Development Agreement"). The 
word "development," as noted, is not present in the agreement. The word "use," however, is. The 
Agreement is a "use" agreement. The only authorized "use" under the Agreement for the property 
was a "first class shopping center" that was "mutually acceptable in design and appearance" to 
Jacklin and compliant with Articles ll-VI ofthe 1990 Covenants. There is no obligation under the 
Agreement, contrary to what Cordes alleges, to "develop" the property. However, if the property is 
developed or "used," it must comply with the provisions ofthe QCNJacklin Agreement. Neither 
KLP nor Blue Dog have so complied. 
6. At Paragraph 12, Cordes states: "that Mr. Leffel referred him [Dave Russell] to KLP 
to see ifKLP would be interested in leasing the vacant Lots 1-4 to Blue Dog for its RV shopping 
center." An objection is interposed to this statement in that it constitutes hearsay. Moreover, Mr. 
Cordes had no contacts with Leffel or Jacklin regarding the proposed Blue Dog leasehold until after 
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Blue Dog and KLP had signed a lease. This fact is undisputed. Leffel himself, the party allegedly 
speaking with Russell, simply provided KLP's contact infonnation to Russell at Russell's request. 
See Russell Affidavit at ~12. See also Leffel deposition transcript (Hines Affidavit at Ex. A), at pp. 
39-40: 
Id. 
Q. And, again, your understanding is that his [Russell's] interest in the Cordes 
lots was with respect to possibly acquiring those lots? 
A. He was looking at his options and he wasn't specific on - it's just, "Is this 
available?" "Potentially." "Is this available?" "Potentially." "If this is, then 
who do I contact?" And so I told him. 
7. Cordes states, "Because it was Jacklin's own Property Manager who referred Blue 
Dog to us, I never dreamed that Jacklin would subsequently take the position that an RV operation 
was an impennissible use in the Riverbend Commerce Park or specifically on our property." See 
Cordes Affidavit at ~6. The record reflects, based upon Russell's Affidavit and Leffel's deposition 
testimony, that Leffel gave Cordes' contact infonnation to Russell. Cordes also mischaracterizes 
Jacklin's position when he states that an RV operation was an impennissible use in the Riverbend 
Commerce Park. The KLPlBlue Dog is not subject to the current Riverbend Commerce Park 
Covenants. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32( a)( 4) and IRCP 56( c) at Ex. B (pp. 89-90). 
states: 
8. Incredibly, Cordes, in a wholly conc1usory statement flatly contradicted by the record, 
We [KLP] had absolutely no reason to question the appropriateness of Blue Dog's 
RV operation on our property based on the fact that Blue Dog was referred and 
recommended to us by Pat Leffel of Jacklin (author of the CC&Rs), the very source 
from which we would have otherwise sought approval. ... 
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See Cordes Affidavit at ~14 (emphasis in original). No reason to question the appropriateness of 
Blue Dog's RV operation? Why didn't Mr. Cordes look at a copy of his title policy he received 
when he purchased the property three years earlier? See Magnuson Affidavit filed December 11, 
2008 (at Ex. D). Why is it that today (or at least the date he signed the Affidavit), Cordes, apparently 
a sophisticated real estate developer, professes an inability to understand the fact that the KLP 
property is not subject to the current Riverbend Covenants but the Jacklin property (which Jacklin 
considered leasing to Blue Dog) is? Why is it that Cordes frankly apologized when the QCNJ acklin 
Agreement was brought to his attention ("[P]lease accept our apologies for not knowing this 
information or being aware ofthe CC&R restrictions on this parcel. I will notify Blue Dog RV now 
[July 14, 2008] and will make other arrangements.")? Why is it that this "apology" is the one 
undisputed fact that Cordes fails to mention in a nine-page affidavit? Finally, why is it that Cordes 
states that Jacklin was the party from "which we would have otherwise sought approval" for the Blue 
Dog use, and yet produces no evidence that any such approval has been sought at any point in time, 
from the inception of the lease (July 1,2008) through the present?5 
9. Cordes states that he considers a three year lease with a two year additional option 




In his Rule 30(b )(6) deposition, Mr. Stoeser testified as follows: 
Has Jacklin ever received a request for approval in writing from Blue Dog as 
to any aspect of its current use on Lots 1-4? 
No. 
See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. D, p. 115. These pages 
were also omitted from the excerpts of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition transcript proffered by 
Defendants in opposition to Jacklin's motion. 
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authorized on the KLP property, pursuant to the 1990 Covenants incorporated by reference through 
the QCNJacklin Agreement, is a six (6) month temporary parking exception (to be used "prior to 
or during construction of improvements"). See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C, p. 4, §3.ll. It is 
undisputed that no improvements have been undertaken on the KLP property leased to Blue Dog 
since the inception of the lease (July 1, 2008). It is further undisputed that no request for any 
approval of any improvements has been submitted by KLP or Blue Dog to Jacklin for Jacklin's 
consideration under Articles II-VI ofthe 1990 Covenants. In short, the only allowable "temporary" 
use of the KLPlBlue Dog property is as stated, and it does not apply. 
10. Cordes similarly states at Paragraph 17 of his Affidavit: 
"[T]he 1990 Development Agreement [sic] does not set forth any use restrictions, 
and does not prevent the temporary use of any of the covered property for any type 
of use." 
For the reasons set forth in the paragraph immediately preceding, Mr. Cordes' professed 
interpretation is directly contrary to Article 3(11) of the 1990 Covenants. If not, why would Mr. 
Cordes, a sophisticated real estate developer, offer his apology for not being aware of the same? 
11. Cordes states that Jacklin never attempted "to work with KLP to address any concerns 
that Jacklin had with respect to Blue Dog's operation." See Affidavit of Cordes at ~8. Something 
is definitely wrong with this picture. KLP, as the owner of the property, is obligated under Articles 
II-VI of the CC&Rs in effect in November of 1990 (and incorporated by the QCNJacklin 
Agreement) to make application for potential uses so as to ensure that prior approval is given and 
that compliance is had with the applicable covenants. No request has been made, whether before 
or after execution of the lease. Does Cordes suggest that Jacklin should commission a plan of 
improvements that would be acceptable to it, run the same by KLP, and then submit it to itself on 
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behalf of KLP? Where is the accountability? Where is the compliance with any provision in 
Articles ll-VI ofthe Covenants? There is none. 
12. Cordes overstates when he claims that "Jacklin responded that any site plan submitted 
by Blue Dog and/or KLP would have been rejected, and no site improvements would be satisfactory 
to placate their opposition." See Cordes Affidavit at ~19. Nowhere is there any attribution by 
Cordes to any record evidence supporting this statement. In actuality, the use to which Blue Dog and 
KLP actually put the property, and for which no approval has ever been sought, is noncompliant and 
would not be approved. That is what Jacklin told Blue Dog and KLP. Jacklin advised KLP and Blue 
Dog on August 5, 2008 as follows: 
Specifically, and by way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, §6 of 
Instrument No. 1155779 (as incorporated by Instrument No. 1200512) limits 
permissible "uses and operation" on the owners' properties, including Lots 1-5 of 
Block 1 (the current Blue Dog RV site). Any use proposed under Section 6 must be 
submitted for prior approval by the project owner or its representative. No such 
approval was sought nor would it be given given the inconsistent nature ofthe Blue 
Dog RV Center. Further, Section 6 specifically requires that any use not "degrade 
the park -like environment" ofthe Riverbend Commerce Park. As noted, a circus-like 
RV center, on unimproved property, is hardly consistent with a "first class shopping 
center" or "high-end industrial park." 
See Complaint (as verified) at Ex. D (emphasis added). Stoeser's testimony is in accord: 
Q. That paragraph states, "no such approval was sought nor would it be given, 
given the inconsistent nature ofthe Blue Dog RV Center." Do you see that 
statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that, in fact, a correct statement of the company? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And by that are you referring to the site as it exists as of the date the letter 
was written or any attempt under any fashion by Blue Dog to utilize Lots 1-4? 
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A. That applies to the way it's operated today and has been operated in the past. 
See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B (p. 110). Stoeser 
further testified: 
Q. Is it the Company's position that an RV sales facility in and of itself as a use 
could never be a first class shopping center? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you explain for me what circumstances would lead you to conclude that 
a given RV sales center could, in fact, be a first class shopping center? 
A. It at a minimum would have to meet all of the CC&Rs. The facility would 
have to enclose a lot of its operations and screen things. It would have to be 
submitted and reviewed. 
Id. at p. 108. Again, neither Blue Dog nor KLP have ever submitted anything other than saying they 
would spend "upwards of$50,000 to make site improvements," which consisted of gravel rather than 
paving as required by the 1990 Covenants at §3.4. "The required number of parking and loading 
spaces, together with driveways, aisles and other circulation areas, shall be improved with asphalt 
and/or concrete surface."). See Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. C (p. 4). 
13. Cordes' last observation borders on the absurd. Specifically, Cordes states, "I find 
it more than ironic that Jacklin is complaining about Blue Dog's operation .... Jacklin uses its own 
four vacant lots across the street as a temporary parking area for heavy equipment auctions." See 
Cordes Affidavit at '21. Cordes' statement is a gross exaggeration and contrary to the contractual 
obligations that apply to KLP and Blue Dog. Stoeser testified that the Jacklin lots in the Riverbend 
Commerce Park (the orange lots on Exhibit A hereto) had been used for temporary parking for an 
equipment auction at the Greyhound Park (property not subject to the Covenants) for an estimated 
six days out of the last 20 years. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4) and Rule 56(c) 
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at Ex. B, p. 119 (another page from Mr. Stoeser's deposition transcript that was not submitted by 
Defendants). Further, as established by the QCAlJacklin Agreement and Mr. Stoeser's testimony 
cited above, the KLP property is not part of the Riverbend Commerce Park (since it is not subject 
to the Riverbend Covenants). 
14. In essence, Cordes complains about an alleged violation of covenants that apply 
uniquely to property that he doesn't own. KLP has no standing to enforce the current Riverbend 
Commerce Park Covenants. Moreover, even ifthey had standing, which they do not, their complaint 
about temporary parking over six days during the past 20 years would fail under the specific terms 
of the Covenants that apply to the Jacklin pro~erty (i.e., the orange property on Exhibit A hereto). 
Section 8.9 of the current Covenants, the ones that apply to the Jacklin property and not the KLP 
property, provide as follows: 
The failure to enforce any requirement contained in this Declaration shall in no event 
be deemed to be a waiver of the right to enforce that requirement or any other 
provision of this Declaration thereafter. 
See Hines Affidavit at Ex. D, p. 18, §8.9. 
B. Deposition of Dave Russell. 
1. Mr. Russell states that during his preliminary discussions with Mr. Leffel, that Leffel 
"expressed no concern about Blue Do g operating either a RV sales or service operation in Riverbend 
Commerce Park." This is true for three reasons. First, Jacklin couldn't lease that which it didn't 
own. Second, Jacklin's holdings (unlike KLP's property) were not subject to the QCAfJacklin 
Agreement. Third, any use of any Jacklin property subject to the Riverbend Covenants would need 
to comply with the paving, signage, landscaping, and related provisions of those Covenants so as to 
objectively ensure harmony with the remainder ofthe Commerce Park. As Stoeser testified, an RV 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT -- PAGE 15 
581 
operation in general is compatible with the Riverbend Commerce Park provided "it complies with 
the CC&Rs in Riverbend Commerce Park." See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4) and 
Rule 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 89-90. 
2. Russell states in paragraph 9 of his Affidavit: "At no time during our lease 
negotiations did Mr. Leffel ever raise any concerns or objections to operating a RV center in 
Riverbend Commerce Park." See Russell Affidavit, ~ 9. For the reasons set forth in the preceding 
paragraph, this statement is not true. 
3. Jacklin did make a lease rate proposal, as noted by Russell, of approximately $25,000 
per month for a ten-year term. See Russell Affidavit at ~ 11. In order to accomplish the 
improvements necessary under the current Covenants applicable to Riverbend Commerce Park, 
Jacklin would have to incur significant outlays resulting in a higher rental rate. Stoeser's testimony 
confirmed as much: 
Q. During the negotiations that Jacklin had as to its property with Blue Dog, 
what were the nature of the tenant improvements that Jacklin envisioned 
necessary to accommodate Blue Dog's intended use? 
A. Well, there were many iterations when they first came to us. It was a larger 
piece. They encompassed over $3 million of improvements to construct 
facilities according to the CC&Rs, asphalt, landscaping, irrigation, lighting, 
signage, all those aspects of it. And I don't think that once we pared it down 
below a minimum that we could still meet theirs. It was still over a million 
dollars of improvements to meet the CC&Rs. 
Q. Were you ever made aware that the dollar amount of improvements was 
something that was deemed outside of the reach or not cost effective by Blue 
Dog? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how was that? 
A. They made a statement that the one they wanted specifically, I believe, was 
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about $2.5 million - - I'd have to look it up. About a $25,000 a month lease 
payment, and they said that was too much. I believe they indicated to us that 
at the site in the heart of Post Falls that they are working at, that they were 
somewhere closer to $20,000 a month is where they were there. 
Id. at pp. 118-19. 
4. Russell states that Blue Dog accepted KLP' s proposed lease tenns because said tenns 
"were more favorable in large part because KLP offered a lower base rent and shorter lease tenn." 
See Russell Affidavit at 1 15. This should come as no surprise. In order to ensure compliance with 
the applicable Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants, Jacklin would need to fund improvements that 
resulted in a $25,000 lease payment on the part of Blue Dog. Since KLP perfonned virtually no site 
improvements, regardless of the requirements imposed under Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 
Covenants (including but not limited to requirements that pertain to paving, landscaping, lighting, 
signage, and setbacks), the lease rate was less. 
5. Russell further states that when he so advised Leffel that Blue Dog had entered into 
a lease agreement with KLP that Leffel, "Did not give any indication whatsoever that an RV 
shopping center was an incompatible use or restricted in any way in the Riverbend Commerce Park." 
See Russell Affidavit at 1 16. First, as set forth above, the KLP property is not subj ect to the current 
Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. Hence, it is a misnomer to blankedly refer to the KLP and 
Jacklin properties in the same manner. Second, it is undisputed that Leffel, unlike Cordes (who had 
actually received a title policy identifying the agreement three years earlier), had no prior knowledge 
of the 1990 QCAlJacklin Agreement. 
6. Leffel was first employed by Jacklin in March of 1993. See Leffel Affidavit (filed 
December 11, 2008). At that time, QCA had already purchased the property now owned by KLP. 
Id. at 1 10. As such, Leffel was unaware ofthe recorded limitations arising under the QCAlJ acklin 
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Agreement when he was negotiating with Russell (for Blue Dog) for a potential lease of Jacklin 
property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at ~ 10. Leffel testified that he was unaware of the 
existence of the QCAlJacklin Agreement until July 14,2008, two weeks after Blue Dog and KLP 
had entered into their lease arrangements. See Hines Affidavit at Ex. A (Leffel deposition 
transcript), pp. 102-105. The Defendants have not disputed this fact nor can they. 
7. Russell rhetorically posits in his Affidavit: "Why would Mr. Leffel refer me to the 
owner of a potential lease site if in fact that lease site could not house an RV shopping operation?" 
Perhaps the more appropriate question is why would the owner of the property, in possession of a 
title policy identifying the recorded agreement together with constructive k.'1owledge of the same, 
ignore the terms of the agreement, enter into a proposed lease, apologize for the error, and then do 
nothing to correct the problem? 
8. Russell's conclusion "that Jacklin now opposes Blue Dog's RV operations simply 
because Jacklin lost out on the leasing opportunity to a competing owner" constitutes rank 
speculation lacking in foundation and should be stricken. This statement simply doesn't square with 
the facts. Jacklin offered a lease rate of$25,000 a month because it intended to ensure that Blue Dog 
complied with the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. KLP offered $5,000 a month by ignoring 
Article 2 through 6 and the QCAlJacklin Agreement, thereby allowing Blue Dog to utilize the 
property in a manner with no compliance with the paving, lighting, signage, landscaping, and other 
requirements unambiguously imposed on the same under the 1990 Covenants. 
9. Russell further concludes that, "[ t ]he only option that Jacklin ever gave Blue Dog was 
to immediately vacate the premises or face legal action." See Russell Affidavit at ~ 20. Russell 
further states that, "Jacklin never even identified specific site use problems with Blue Dog's RV 
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operation .... " Id. This is nonsense. On August 5, 2008, Blue Dog and KLP were advised as 
follows: 
(1) The property could only be used for "a first class shopping center." 
(2) KLP was obligated to work with Jacklin "to achieve a mutually-acceptable 
design and appearance" so that the same "shall be aesthetically pleasing and 
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park .... " No plan 
had been submitted or provided. 
(3) There was no compliance with Articles 2 through 6 of the November 1990 
Covenants (Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779). 
(4) Prior approval of any use was required under Section 6 of the Covenants. 
(5) There was no compliance with the landscaping restrictions in Section 2 of the 
Covenants. 
(6) There was no compliance with the parking restrictions set forth in Section 3 
of the Covenants. 
(7) There was no compliance with signage restrictions set forth in Section 4 of 
the Covenants. 
(8) There was no compliance with the design restrictions set forth in Section 5 
of the Covenants. 
See Complaint (as verified) at Ex. D. 
10. Stoeser's testimony is particularly instructi ve. The use to which Blue Dog had put the 
property was not capable of being approved, regardless of the fact that neither Blue Dog nor KLP 
had ever submitted a request for approval. 
11. Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to undertake substantial 
site improvements on the four undeveloped lots, including landscaping and surface work." See 
Russell Affidavit at ~ 23. He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do "to satisfy 
Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." Id. Offering to pay $50,000 to put gravel on four 
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vacant lots without addressing the paving requirement, as clearly specified in the November 1990 
Covenants, together with the signage, lighting, setback, and landscaping requirements (ignoring for 
the moment the "first class shopping center" and "mutually-acceptable design" criteria) is hardly a 
proposal meriting serious consideration. Why should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one 
was never submitted) which is incapable of complying with the unambiguous provisions of 
Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is bound by? 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The OCA/Jacklin A&:reement Is Enforceable As a 
Matter of Law to Preclude the Uses to Which the Defendants 
Have Placed the Subject Property. 
1. Rules of Covenant Interpretation. 
Covenants that restrict the use of privately-owned real property are valid under Idaho law. 
In Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003), the Supreme Court set 
forth a summary of the analysis that applies in resolving issues of Covenant interpretation: 
Idaho recognizes the validity of Covenants that restrict the use of 
private property.... When interpreting such Covenants, the Court 
generally applies the rules of contract construction.... However, 
because restrictive Covenants are in derogation of the common law 
right to use land for all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by 
implication any restriction not clearly expressed .... Further, all doubts 
are to be resolved in favor ofthe free use ofland ... . 
Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829. 
Since Covenants are analyzed under generally accepted principles of contract construction, 
the process is twofold. First, the Court is to determine whether a given Covenant or term is 
ambiguous. To this end, the Court consults the plain language ofthe Covenant. Pinehaven Planning 
Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829; Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 193,923 P.2d 434 (1996). 
~ 
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In detennining whether or not a given Covenant is ambiguous or unambiguous, the Court 
must be cognizant of the following: 
Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use or 
settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous merely because 
they are not defined in the document where they are used. 
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995). Rather, a Covenant is 
ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on a given issue. 
Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829. Ambiguity in the first instance is a question 
oflaw. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 192. To detennine ambiguity, the Court must not only give 
words or phrases their common use or settled meaning, it must view the agreement as a whole. 
Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193. 
Turning to the second step, ifthe Covenant is detennined to be unambiguous by the Court, 
then the Court must apply the Covenant as a matter oflaw. City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 
127 Idaho at 201. "Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the plain 
meaning governs." Postv. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473, 475,873 P.2d 118 (1984). 
On the other hand, ifthere is an ambiguity in a given Covenant, then the interpretation is a 
question of fact. In this regard, the Court must detennine the intent of the parties at the time the 
instrument was drafted. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193. To detennine the drafters' intent, the 
Court looks to "the language of the Covenants, the existing circumstances at the time of the 
fonnulation of the Covenants, and the conduct of the parties." Id. 
2. Mischaracterizations Advanced by the Defendants. 
Certain of the rules regarding covenant interpretation, as set forth above, merit further 
emphasis. This is particularly true since the import of the same have been virtually neglected or 
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"glossed over" by the Defendants in their responsive Memorandum. 
First, words or phrases of common usage are not rendered ambiguous simply because they 
are not defined in the document. See,~, City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho, 198, 
899 P.2d 411 (1995). The tenn "first class" has a commonly-accepted meaning. Blacks Law 
Dictionary defines "first class" as "ofthe most superior or excellent grade or kind .... " Webster's 
similarly defines "first class" as "the first or highest group in a classification." 
Second, an ambiguity exists only if the covenant at issue is reasonably susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations. Since "first class" is generally and commonly accepted as a descriptive 
word implying the highest quality, is it "reasonable" to interpret the QCAlJacklin Agreement as 
allowing the Defendants to utilize Lots 1 through 4, in their unimproved state, for the situs of an RV 
center without even satisfying the minimum requirements imposed under Articles 2 through 60fthe 
1990 Covenants? lfthe 1990 Covenants, which are clearly applicable to the property, set forth the 
minimum standards, how then can a "first class shopping center" be located on bare ground that 
virtually ignores those obligations? 
Third, Defendants, in the argument section oftheir brief, continue to perpetuate the myth that 
the QCAlJ acklin Agreement is some sort of "development" agreement. As noted above, the word 
"development" does not appear in the Agreement. It only exists in the Defendants' brief. 
Fourth, the Defendants seek to invoke the doctrine of "interpretation against the drafter." In 
support, Defendants state, "On cross-examination, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)( 6) representative admitted 
that Jacklin drafted the Development Agreement [sic], not KLP's predecessor." See Defendants' 
Memorandum at p. 15, fu. 2. In actuality, Mr. Stoeser testified as follows: 
Q. The question was asked did Jacklin draft this Agreement [the QCA/Jacklin 
Agreement]. And your answer to that was yes? 
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A. That's correct. That's what I said. 
Q. The circumstances under which this Agreement came to be, did Jacklin 
unilaterally write out an agreement and give it to Quality Centers to sign, or 
was this the subject of negotiations? Or how did it come to be? 
MR. HINES: Object to fonn. Leading. 
A. Well, we had to pick their lawyer or our lawyer to do the writing. Our lawyer 
would do the writing, send it to them, they'd make changes, it would come 
back to us. So our lawyer was the one who, I guess, did the first draft to 
submit to them for review. Is that what you mean? 
Q. Well, let's talk about [the Agreement]. Do you recall who the lawyer was 
with whom Jacklin dealt that represented Quality Centers? 
A. Yeah. Sean Jackson ... I think it was Sean Jackson. I'd have to look at this. 
Q. I'll turn you back to [the QCAlJacklin Agreement] that you previously 
referenced .... 
A. Yeah. Sean Jackson was Benderson's attorney that we worked with. And 
Benderson was part of Quality Center Associates. 
Q. Do you know which part of [the Agreement] was, in its ultimate fonn, was 
written by your counsel as opposed to which portions were suggested by 
Quality Centers' counsel? 
A. I couldn't tell you, no. 
Q. [D]o you know whether one draft was prepared? 
A. No. No. There were many iterations of it preceded by the other agreement 
which you can tell had lots of negotiations in it. No. 
Q. When you answer the question, did Jacklin draft this Agreement, what do you 
understand the word "draft" to mean? 
A. Who actually did the typing of the changes. This was before all the Word 
documents with the redline ability and all that, you know. 
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See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 112-13.6 
Fifth, Defendants paint with an overly-broad brush when they state, "Jacklin's entire 
Complaint turns on the flawed assertion that the Development Agreement [sic] expressly prohibits 
Blue Dog's RV operation." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 15. Defendants unnecessarily seek 
to confuse and obviate the issue. Jacklin has acknowledged that an RV sales center, in concept, is 
compatible with other uses in Riverbend Commerce Park (excluding the Defendants' property) 
provided it satisfies the terms of the Covenants. See Hines Affidavit at Ex. B (Stoeser Deposition 
(Rule 30(b)(6» atpp. 89-90. Jacklin has also acknowledged that anRV center could be appropriate 
on the Defendants' property, notwithstanding the heightened standards of the QCAJJacklin 
Agreement, provided it meets Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants and is submitted and 
reviewed.7 It isn't that the "RV use" is prohibited by the QCAJJ acklin Agreement, in principle, it is 
that these Defendants have undertaken virtually no effort to comply with any requirement arising 
under the QCAJJ acklin Agreement or Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants. 
Q. Is it your position and that of the Company that the RV facility as it's 
currently in use on the Blue DoglKLP property would not be approved? 
A. It would not be approved. 
Q. And again, are there circumstances that you can envision under which an RV 
facility on that site could be approved? 
A. Yes. 
6 These pages from Mr. Stoeser's deposition transcript were also omitted from the copy 
of the transcript appended as Exhibit B to Mr. Hines' February 17,2009 Affidavit. 
7 Stoeser testified, "It at a minimum would have to meet all ofthe CC&Rs. The facility 
would have to enclose a lot of its operations and screen things. It would have to be submitted and 
reviewed." See Magnuson Affidavitpursuantto IRCP 32(a)(4) andIRCP 56(c) atEx.B,pp. 108-09. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- PAGE 24 
590 
Q. Is the problem this operation as opposed to another one? 
A. It is this operation. 
See Hines Affidavit (filed February 17,2009) at Ex. B, p. 109. "This operation," i.e., the KLPlBlue 
Dog "operation," has made no effort to comply with Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants or 
"to work together with [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually-acceptable design and appearance" so that the 
same is "aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within the Riverbend Commerce 
Park." 
3. The QCAlJacklin Ae-reement Specifically Precludes the Uses 
to Which the Property Has Now Been Put by Defendants. 
Defendants advance five (5) arguments, at pp. 16-19 of their Memorandum, in support of 
their claim of QCA/Jacklin Agreement does not prohibit Blue Dog's current use on the property. 
Each ofthese five (5) arguments should be rejected. 
First, Defendants argue that the QCA/Jacklin Agreement "is not a use restriction." See 
Defendants' Memorandum at pp. 16-17. Defendants state: "The Development Agreement [sic] does 
not state how the Lots are to be used or that certain purposes are prohibited." Id. at p. 16. Actually, 
the "Development Agreement," a moniker invented by Defendants since the word "development" 
does not appear in the Agreement, actually contains the word "use." 
In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block 1 .... Purchaser agrees: (ii) to 
work together with [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually-acceptable design and appearance 
for the [first class] shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and 
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park .... 
See Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G. 
The foregoing 0 bligations are ob ligations that encumber the Defendants' property, have been 
known to KLP since its purchase ofthe subject property in 2005 (the same being disclosed by its title 
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policy) and which Defendants have virtually ignored. The Defendants have made no effort to 
prepare or submit acceptable design and appearance standards for Jacklin's mutual acceptance. Even 
if Jacklin found the current use of Blue Dog "aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses 
within Riverbend Commerce Park," which it does not, it still couldn't consent to the present use as 
there has been no effort to comply with Articles 2 through 6 of the applicable 1990 Covenants. 
Second, Defendants argue that "the obligation to construct and maintain a first class shopping 
center has been satisfied." In essence, Defendants argue that since Quality Centers built the "Factory 
Outlet Shopping Center" on a portion of Lots 1 through 17 (excluding Lots 1 through 4), back in 
1991, that any remaining obligation under QCAlJ acklin Agreement has been satisfied. This argument 
ignores well-settled principles of contract in covenant interpretation. The QCAlJ acklin Agreement 
is a recorded encumbrance, binding upon QCA's successors (including the Defendants), and it 
applies to all of Lots 1 through 17. If anyone of these lots was sold individually, it would remain 
subject to the Agreement. There is no exception ifthe lots are held in aggregate by one party. There 
is no exception that excludes one lot (Lot 1 for example) if development has occurred on Lot 17 (for 
example). Simply put, there is neither a factual nor legal basis to claim that the appropriate use of 
one legal lot satisfies requirements that pertain to a separate legal lot. 
Third, Defendants incredibly claim that Blue Dog's current operation "is a first class 
shopping center." If parking untold dozens ofRV s on an unimproved patch of grass, dirt, and weeds, 
under the watchful eye of a giant, inflatable blue dog and fluorescent banners reminiscent of a 
liquidation sale is a "first class" anything, one would hate to see what the bottom ofthe barrel looks 
like. How can anyone with a straight face claim that Blue Dog's current operations (as depicted in 
the photographs appended to the Leffel Affidavit or as can be readily be seen from virtually anyone 
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who might drive by the property or consider Riverbend Commerce Park as a potential business 
location) constitute a "shopping center" let alone a "first class shopping center"? 
As previously noted, "first class" conotates a descriptive term of the highest order. It is a 
word of common understanding and meaning. This is a bench trial. The Court is the finder of fact 
ifthere is an ambiguity (which there is not). There is only an ambiguity ifthe QNJacklin Agreement 
is subject to one or more reasonable interpretations. While there may be a set of facts somewhere, 
someday that presents two reasonable interpretations, these aren't those facts. One need only look 
at what the Defendants' predecessor-in-title (QCA) did with the remainder of the property, consistent 
with the terms of the QCNJacklin Agreement, to obtain objective indicia of what "first class" 
means. In the performance of its obligations under the Agreement, as to those portions of the 
property it used, QCA sought approval from Jacklin (and obtained approval) for construction of the 
Factory Outlet Malls. That was a first class shopping center. RVs parked on the dirt willy-nilly, is 
neither a shopping center nor first class. 
Fourth, Defendants argue that the QCNJacklin Agreement does not prohibit "temporary 
uses." A five-year lease term is hardly temporary. Moreover, temporary uses are specifically 
precluded by the QCNJ acklin Agreement through the November 1990 Covenants (Kootenai County 
Instrument No. 1155779) which are specifically incorporated therein. Article 3.11 of said instrument 
specifically precludes temporary parking on any unimproved lot unless said parking is for use prior 
to or during construction of improvements and does not exceed a period of six (6) inonths. 
Defendants are already past the six (6) months and have submitted no plans for any construction of 
any improvements of any kind or degree on Lots 1 through 4. Indeed, as evident by their submittals, 
they have no intention of doing the same. 
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Fifth, Defendants argue that the "first class shopping center" requirement is only invoked 
when development occurs. See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 19. This is again an argument born 
of Defendant 's mischaracterization ofthe QCAJJ acklin Agreement as a "Development Agreement." 
Jacklin has acknowledged that the Agreement contains no time frame for the required construction 
of the necessary "first class shopping center." That does not end the inquiry. Not only are 
"temporary" uses such as the one at issue precluded by the Covenants consensually impressed upon 
the property, they are precluded by Subsection (ii) of the Agreement wherein the Defendants 
(through their predecessor-in-title QCA) specifically agreed "to work together with [Jacklin] to 
achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it shall be 
aesthetically-pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park .... " See 
Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G (emphasis added). Simply put, the Agreement 
is a "use" agreement through the limitations expressed therein. Defendants have not satisfied those 
use restrictions. Even ifthose use restrictions are ambiguous (a point not conceded), Defendants have 
offered no defense to the use restrictions that arise under Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants 
nor can they. 
B. Defendants' Use of the Subject Property is Clearly in Violation 
of Articles II-VI of the November 1990 Covenants. 
1. The Defendants' Ar~ument that Articles II-VI Do Not 
Bind the Subject Property is Le~ally Unsupported. 
Defendants argue that Articles IT-VI of the 1990 Covenants do not apply to the property at 
issue. This is a curious assertion. It is particularly curious since KLP purchased the subject property 
in 2005 and received a title policy specifically disclosing the existence ofQCA/Jacklin Agreement. 
See Magnuson Affidavit (filed December 11, 2008) at Ex. D. Apparently, after purchasing the 
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property, and being made aware of the limitations, but inferentially not reading the same, Defendants 
now seek to disavow themselves of responsibility. Not surprisingly, the argument doesn't square 
with the facts. 
On June 21, 1990, QCA and Jacklin entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of 
the subject property. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. F. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, 
Jacklin agreed to remove the subject property from the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. Id. 
The parties then agreed to contractually encumber the subject property, upon conveyance from 
Jacklin to QCA, with Articles II-VI ofthe same Covenants, through a contractual undertaking. Id. 
Consistent with its obligations under the foregoing Agreement, Jacklin thereafter caused the 
existing Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants to be amended so as to remove the subject property 
from the same. See Hines Affidavit (filed February 17, 2008) at Ex. E. That Agreement was 
recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200514 after the recordation of the QCAJJacklin 
Agreement as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512. 
In other words, the subject property was impressed with the terms of the QCAJJacklin 
Agreement (including Articles II-VI of the referenced Covenants as incorporated therein). See 
Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G. This occurred at 2:43 p.m. on November 7, 
1990. Id. Two minutes later, at 2:45 p.m., the existing Covenants were amended to delete the 
subject property from the same. This should end the inquiry. In any event, Defendants have shown 
no authority for the proposition that two arms-length parties cannot contractually incorporate, as 
obligations between the two ofthem, Covenant restrictions contained in anotherrecorded document. 
2. Articles II-VI Prohibit a Temporary Use of the Subject Property. 
Defendants state, "Nowhere in Articles II-VI is a temporary use of the KLP property 
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prohibited." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. This is plainly untrue. It is more than clear, 
and beyond dispute, that Defendants have used the subject property for the parking of dozens and 
dozens ofRV s. This use has continued since July of2008, a period now approaching eight months. 
Articles II-VI of the Covenants incorporated into the QCAlJ acklin Agreement (expressed in 
Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779) allow only one temporary use. That temporary use is 
defined in Article 3(11). See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C, p. 4. The only allowed temporary use is 
for temporary parking, for a period not longer than six months, as part of the construction of 
improvements pursuant to a submitted and accepted construction plan. Id. 
Defendants, not surprisingly since they are past the six month period, claim that the 
prohibition extends for 12 months. See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. The problem with 
Defendants' argument, including the Covenant language actually quoted at page 21 of their 
Memorandum, is that it doesn't exist anywhere in the set of Covenants (Instrument No. 1155779) 
that was specifically incorporated into the QCAlJ acklin Agreement. Other than this one allowed 
temporary use, there are no others. Finally, as to that one allowed temporary use, there is no material 
issue of fact that Defendants are in breach of the same. 
3. Articles II-VI Prohibit Blue D0l:'s Use of the Subject Property. 
Jacklin does not argue that Articles II-VI prohibit all RV sales operations. However, the 
minimum threshold standards are contained in said Articles and must be observed. There are no 
exceptions. 
Article 6(3)(A) specifically prohibits and precludes "storage yards." See Stoeser Affidavit 
(filed December 11, 2008) at Ex. C, pp. 1 0-11. Not all RV sales facilities necessarily constitute 
storage yards. However, this one does. At the very least, using four undeveloped lots for the parking 
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of dozens and dozens ofRV s, with no improvements, certainly appears to be a storage yard. If there 
is a question, Article 6(5) provides: "any use which is arguably in conflict ofthis Declaration (the 
CC&Rs) shall be submitted and approved." Id. at p. 11. No request of any kind or nature has been 
made for any approval by or on behalf of Defendants. 
Article N sets forth minimum requirements for signage on the subject property. Article 4(7) 
specifically provides: "Plans and specifications of all signs shall be submitted and approved. Plans 
shall include size, lighting, color, scheme, location, and relevant technical data." Id. at p. 6. No 
plans or specifications of any kind or nature, with respect to signage or otherwise, have been 
submitted by or on behalf of Defendants or approved by Jacklin. 
Article ill requires that any owner utilizing any lot for an appropriate purpose must submit 
a parking plan that meets with the approval of the Riverbend Property Owners' Corporation. Id. at 
p.3. Generally applicable requirements include landscaping (to encourage a park-like entrance). 
Id. at p. 4 (§3.2). In addition, parking areas acceptable to the Riverbend Property Owners' 
Corporation must be paved with asphalt or concrete. Id. at §3.4. Other requirements pertain to 
drainage, lighting, access, and striping. Id. at §§3.5-3.8. No request for approval of any parking plan 
with respect to the subject property has been made by or on behalf of Defendants. 
Temporary uses are additionally proscribed by Article V,which sets forth minimum design 
and construction standards. Id. at pp. 6-10. No submittals have been made by or on behalf of 
Defendants under Article V. 
Article IT pertains to landscaping. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, those requirements 
apply within sixty (60) days after the lot is occupied. Id. at pp. 1-2. No landscaping plan has been 
submitted nor has any landscaping been done by Defendants. 
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4. The Prohibitions Under Articles II-VI of the Applicable 
Covenants Are Not Tri~~ered by "Development." 
Defendants essentially argue that they can do what they wish with Lots 1-4, without regard 
to the requirements ofthe Covenants, since they haven't essentially built anything on the lots. This 
is a concept plainly foreclosed by Articles ll-VI. Consider the following. 
Articl e 2(1) provides that undeveloped areas for future expansion "shall be maintained in a 
weed-free and dust-controlled condition and shall be landscaped ifrequired by Declarant." Id. at p. 
1. 
Article 2(6), applicable to "vacant lots," provides that lots held for longer than one year 
without commencing construction "should be dust free and groundcover maintained so as not to 
detract from the aesthetics ofthe Development." Id. at p. 3. 
Article 3(11) only allows the use of an undeveloped lot for temporary parking if the same 
does not exceed six months and is done as part of an approved construction project. Id. at p. 4. 
Article 6(3) specifically precludes "storage yards," and mandates that all storage be indoors 
or totally screened. Id. at p. 10. If there is a question as to whether or not a given use constitutes a 
"storage yard," the issue must be submitted to and resolved by the Riverbend Property Owners' 
Corporation. 
Reading all of these Covenants together, or individually, it is clear, and beyond dispute, that 
there is no allowed "temporary use" of an undeveloped lot, without compliance with landscaping and 
parking requirements, such as the use now accomplished by Defendants. The same is clearly in 
violation by Articles ll-VI. Those Covenants are not triggered by "development." They stand alone. 
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5. Blue D01:'s "Efforts" to Make Site Improvements Were Not 
Rendered Futile by Jacklin. 
In lease discussions with Jacklin, Blue Dog was advised that in order to obtain compliance 
with the Covenants applicable to the Jacklin property (colored in orange on Exhibit A hereto), 
Jacklin would be required to fund leasehold improvements (asphalt, landscaping, irrigation, lighting, 
and signage) that would exceed $1 million. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32( a)( 4) and 
IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 118-119. In order to recapture its investment in site improvements, 
necessitated by the requirements of the CC&Rs, Jacklin would be required to charge Blue Dog 
$25,000 a month in rent (or $5,000 more than what Blue Dog was paying at its former location). 
Blue Dog went to the KLP site. After being immediately advised that the use was not in 
compliance with the QCAlJ acklin Agreement and the specific Covenants incorporated therein, Blue 
Dog offered to spend $50,000 to make site improvements if Jacklin was to consent. That offer was 
declined. The problem with the offer is that the $50,000 was to fund improvements (gravel) that 
wouldn't even comply with the CC&Rs (which require paving). Other than gravel, nothing was 
addressed or proposed by Blue Dog. If Jacklin concluded that it would cost $1 million to fund 
improvements necessitated by the CC&Rs on its property, why would it expect that those costs 
would be any different on the KLP property, particularly since Blue Dog only proposed to gravel the 
same (ignoring its obligation to pave the property)? 
In yet another example of twisting the facts, Defendants contend, "Jacklin's CFO further 
concedes that it would have been 'futile' for Blue Dog to make any site improvements because 
Jacklin's approval would still have been withheld." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. This 
is not consistent with Mr. Stoeser's testimony. Mr. Stoeser testified that given the requirements 
under the QCAJJ acklin Agreement and Articles II-VI incorporated therein, and given the present use 
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of the property by Blue Dog, that use (i.e., Blue Dog's existing use) was not capable of being 
approved as it did not comply with the stated standards. 
Q. Is it your position and that of the Company that theRV facility as is currently 
in use on the Blue DoglKLP property would not be approved? 
A. It would not be approved. 
Q. And again, are there circumstances that you can envision under which an RV 
facility on that site could be approved? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the problem this operation as opposed to another one? 
A. It is this operation. 
See Magnuson Pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, p. 109. There are no disputed 
issues of material fact to support the Defendants' "defense" of futility or "impossibility." 
6. The Defendants Wholly Misunderstand Which Covenants Apply. 
Defendants claim: "Jacklin's after-the-fact assertion that Blue Dog's RV operation violates 
Articles ll-VI flies in the face of Jacklin's four month solicitation of the same Blue Dog RV 
operation for its property." See Defendants' Memorandum atp. 22. First of all, it isn't an "after-the-
fact" assertion. It was asserted immediately and has been made known at all points in time to Blue 
Dog. See,~, Complaint at Ex. D. Second, Jacklin does not claim that an RV operation could not 
be appropriately done on the KLP property. However, if the operation was to be properly 
accomplished on the KLP property, it would, like the proposed operation on the Jacklin property, 
require compliance with the basic standards. That compliance comes at a cost. Defendants refuse 
to acknowledge responsibility for the necessary impro vements associated with the use. If Defendants 
want to operate Lots 1-4 as an RV sale center, then they can't be excused from compliance with the 
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CC&Rs and that compliance will cost more than $50,000 and require the payment of rent greater 
than $5,000 a month. It strains credulity for Defendants to now argue that Jacklin's efforts 
"demonstrate that Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permissible use" on the KLP property. 
7. Removal of Blue Dog, as Prayed for in the Complaint, 
Is an Appropriate Remedy. 
Defendants argue that Articles ll-VI, even if applicable to the subject property (which they 
are) do not authorize "eviction" as a remedy. Declaratory and injunctive relief are available remedies 
in Idaho. The declaratory reliefthat Plaintiff seeks, as set forth in its Complaint, is an adjudication 
that the uses to which Defendants have placed the subject property are in violation of the parties' 
contractual obligations and that said usage cease and desist both pendente lite and post judgment. 
Obligations with respect to real property, to which parties have voluntarily agreed, may be 
specifically enforced. These remedies arise at law rather than by contract. 
C. Jacklin Has Stated A Claim for Permanent Injunctive Relief.s 
The permanent injunction Jacklin seeks is consistent with the declaratory reliefto which it 
is entitled. That relief can be provided either by way of declaratory judgment or permanent 
injunction. The Idaho case law cited by Defendants (Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 
P.2d 988 (1984)) involved a request for preliminary injunctive relief, which requires a showing of 
"great or irreparable injury" given that the relief is entered during the litigation and prior to final 
judgment. Where a legal right is clear, as here, injunctive relief of a permanent nature can issue to 
ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain. That right may be also enforced 
8 Jacklin's Complaint originally included claims for a temporary restraining order and 
a preliminary injunction. In order to minimize the burden and expense on the parties, and given the 
uncontroverted facts, Jacklin has elected to proceed directly through summary judgment on its claims 
for declaratory relief and a corresponding permanent injunction. 
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through declaratory relief. 
In support of its citation of Mr. Stoeser's testimony, citations more appropriate in the context 
of a request for a preliminary injunction, rather than a permanent injunction, Defendants once again 
offer an incomplete perspective. 
Mr. Stoeser, on behalf of Jacklin Land Company, testified as follows: 
Q. Has Jacklin ever received a request for approval in writing from Blue Dog as 
to any aspect of its current use on Lots 1 through 4? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any basis to believe that Blue Dog intends to undertake any 
improvements on Lots 1 through 4 or that KLP intends to undertake any 
improvements on Lots 1 through 4 other than what exists there today? 
A. No. 
Q. . .. Would it be a fair characterization to say that you have been 
involved with this Commerce Park since its inception? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you describe for me in general terms the nature of the tenant base that 
you have out there at the Riverbend Commerce Park as its been developed? 
A. Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premier commerce park in North 
Idaho with success. We've landed nationally-acclaimed tenants in there .. . 
. We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives from California ... . 
Generally, people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park want to acquire 
land there with the hope of appreciation because of the quality of the Park. 
Q. Based on that knowledge and experience, do you have an opinion one way or 
another as to whether or not the continued maintenance ofthe Blue Dog RV 
Center in its current form for the remaining term of the lease that we 
understand exists would cause any damage to Jacklin Land Company? 
A. I personally feel it would. 
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Q. Why do you believe that? 
A. Because as I stated before, most people come to Riverbend Commerce Park 
because it is the premier commerce park in the area. Many tenants have the 
option to locate in commerce parks that are less restrictive, have lower priced 
land, and allow a lower level of building design. So those that come to 
Riverbend are basically paying a premium for their facilities over many lower 
end parks. 
See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 115-18. 
D. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair DeaIinl,! 
Has No Applicability to the Pendinl,! Motion. 
Defendants contend that Jacklin's claims were foreclosed by Jacklin's alleged breach ofthe 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In support of the same, Defendants have filed an untimely 
motion for cross-summary judgment and! or seek to raise purported issues of fact sufficient to defeat 
Jacklin's request for relief. Both efforts should be rejected. 
Jacklin has neither breached any specific term ofthe Agreement nor the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants claim that Jacklin breached the Agreement by failing to 
work towards a "mutually acceptable design." It is hard to fathom Defendants' argument. Is Jacklin 
obligated to go out, envision what Defendants want, engage third-party professionals to prepare a 
site plan that will work with Jacklin, and then submit it to itself on behalf of Defendants? 
Defendants have never made any submittal of any kind under the QCAlJ acklin Agreement or the 
applicable Covenants. Defendants only effort is to propose to spend $50,000 to throw some gravel 
on lots that require paving if parked on for greater than six (6) months. When Jacklin discussed Blue 
Dog's use of Jacklin's property, and Blue Dog was made aware of the .costs that would be 
necessitated to obtain compliance with the Covenants, Blue Dog walked away. There is no breach 
of any specific term of the Agreement to which Defendants can cite. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- PAGE 37 
603 
As to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff acknowledges that the law imposes 
that term in all contractual undertakings. However, what Defendants don't note, is the fact that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override express provisions in a contract negotiated 
and executed by independent parties. See Idaho First Natl. Bank v. David Steed & Associates, 121 
Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992). See also Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 
223,939 P.2d 542 (1997). Jacklin has required that Defendants perform in accordance with the 
terms of the QCAlJacklin Agreement and the applicable Covenants. Even if Defendants are 
somehow successful in creating an ambiguity in the QCAlJ acklin Agreement as to these facts, there 
is no such ambiguity under the applicable Covenants. How can Jacklin be claimed to have acted in 
bad faith if it simply stands on its rights under consensually-negotiated agreements which the 
Defendants apparently didn't read until after they had put their property to an improper use? If such 
bad faith was present, why would Mr. Cordes, an individual with sophistication in real estate, 
immediately advise Jacklin "[P] lease accept our apologies for not knowing this information or being 
aware ofthe CC&R restrictions for this parcel. I will notify Blue Dog RV now and will make other 
arrangements"? See Cordes Affidavit at Ex. C. 
E. Defendants Have Shown No Facts to Support the Defenses of Waiver or Estoppel. 
The Defendants seek to raise material issues of fact through the affinnative defenses of 
waiver and estoppel. Both defenses have no applicability given the undisputed material facts at bar. 
First, as to waiver. Waiver requires "a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right that 
is relied upon by an adverse party and which alters their position." A&B Irrigation District v. 
Aberdeen- American Falls Groundwater District, 141 Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005). 
Apparently, Defendants claim that since Dave Russell (on behalf of Blue Dog) asked Leffel 
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(J acklin's property manager) who owned Lots 1 through 4 of Block 1, and since Leffel gave Russell 
KLP's contact information, that somehow Jacklin has "waived" any rights under the QCAlJacklin 
Agreement or the Covenants incorporated therein. The facts suggest otherwise. 
There is no disputed issue of material fact that Leffel, who was first employed by Jacklin in 
1993, some two years after the execution and recordation ofthe QCAlJacklin Agreement, had no 
knowledge of the same. Hence, Defendants have failed to show an "intentional relinquishment of 
a known right," since Leffel, the only person who dealt with Blue Dog (and who had no contacts 
with KLP), didn't even know the Agreement existed. 
As to KLP, KLP had no contact with Leffel prior to executing the lease with Blue Dog. KIP 
did, however, have a copy of its title policy which readily disclosed the existence ofthe Agreement 
(an Agreement KLP later confessed to have not been aware of). Given the foregoing, two of the 
requisite elements sufficient for waiver have not been shown and cannot be shown.9 
Second, the defense of estoppel should likewise be rejected. The defense, as cited by 
Defendants, requires proof that the offending party "took a different position than his or her original 
position .... " See A&B Irrigation District v. Aberdeen- American Falls Groundwater District, 141 
Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005). To this end, Defendants argue that, "Jacklin repeatedly 
assured BIue Dog that its RV sales operation would be a compatible use in Riverbend Commerce 
Park." See Defendants Memorandum at p. 27. Jacklin thought that an RV sales operation could be 
an allowed use in the Riverbend Commerce Park (to the exclusion ofthe subject property) provided 
compliance was had with the applicable Covenants. To that end, Jacklin proposed leasehold 
9 This ignores for the moment the fact that the parties' contractual undertakings (the 
QCAlJ acklin Agreement) were in the form of a written and recorded instrument that, under the equal 
dignity rule, could only be modified by a writing of equal import. 
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improvements to Blue Dog, as part of the lease under discussion, that would have complied with 
those requirements. 
When Blue Dog asked for the contact information for the owner of Lots 1 through 4 of Block 
1, Jacklin gave Blue Dog KLP's contact information. Jacklin does not dispute that an RV sales 
operation can, under certain circumstances, potentially constitute "a first class operation." However, 
Jacklin never advised Blue Dog, nor has any claim been advanced by the Defendants, that either KLP 
or Blue Dog did not need to adhere to the applicable Covenants (those that would apply to the 
Jacklin property), or to those that would apply to the KLP property (the Covenants in effect in 1990). 
Jacklin's position has, based on the record evidence, remained consistent throughout. Defendants 
do not allege, nor can they prove, that Jacklin ever told anybody at Blue Dog that Blue Dog did not 
need to conduct its operations in a manner compliant with the Covenants. Further, no one has argued, 
nor have they proved, that Jacklin had any discussions with KLP until after KLP had already signed 
the Blue Dog lease. 
In this regard, KLP would be hard-pressed to claim that it was induced to change any 
position. KLP had its title policy, chose not to read the documents noted in the exceptions, and 
entered into a lease that it later acknowledged was in error. Yet it won't act accordingly. The longer 
the litigation draws out, KLP benefits by receiving rent and Blue Dog benefits by paying an amount 
of rent less than that which would otherwise be required if compliance was had with the applicable 
instruments. These are hardly the clean hands required for invocation of equitable remedies. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
KLP purchased the subject property with actual knowledge of the limitations impressed 
thereon. As for the Covenants incorporated therein, those limitations preclude the use of vacant lots 
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for the purposes to which they have been placed by Blue Dog. The only temporary use potentially 
allowed is for parking for six (6) months as a corollary to approved construction. Those facts do not 
exist. Nor does the word "develop" exist in the QCAlJacklin Agreement (which Defendants have 
retitled "Development Agreement"). 
The relief requested can and should be granted solely upon the Covenants incorporated in the 
QCAlJ acklin Agreement and the Defendants' obdurate refusal to comply therewith. Yet summary 
judgment is equally appropriate under the specific language contained in the Agreement that requires 
the use ofthe property in a manner "mutually acceptable" to Jacklin, so that "it shall be aesthetically 
pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park," as well as the restriction 
limiting the property to "a first class shopping center." Common sense should not be checked at the 
door. The term "first class" has generally-understood connotations. While the term could be 
ambiguous under a given set of facts, these are not the facts. Under no stretch ofthe imagination can 
the current Blue Dog operations be characterized as "first class" anything. 
Jacklin has repeatedly advised both KLP and Blue Dog, since first being made aware of the 
lease and at all times subsequent, that the use was unauthorized. The fact that KLP and Blue Dog 
chose to put their collective heads in the sand is not a problem of Jacklin's creation. Moreover, it 
strains belief for Defendants to now chastise Jacklin for refusing to accept a proposal to put $50,000 
worth of gravel on four lots that are required, under the applicable Covenants, to be paved (not to 
mention the corollary landscaping, lighting, parking, and signage requirements). 
Jacklin respectfully requests that its motion for summary judgment, on its claims for 
declaratory relief and a corresponding permanent injunction, be entered as requested and that 
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Defendants' motion for cross-motion be stricken as untimely or, in the alternative, denied for the 
reasons set forth herein. d1-
DATED this ~ ;-ofFebruary, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ofFebruary, 2009, I served a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael J. Hines 
Michael Schmidt 
Lukins & Annis, P.S. 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, WA99201-0466 
JACKLIN-BLUE DOG.BRIEF REPLY-COMBINED. wpd 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
X Hand Delivered 
X Facsimile 
FAX: 5091747-2323 
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BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
mE PATTERSON F ,AMaY2000 TRUST 
CREATED Urr/A DATED FEBRUARY 25, 
2000; GAYLENC. PATI'ERSON. TRUSTEE; 
l1IE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED UrrlA DATED JANUARY 13, 
2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; KL 
PROPERTIES, INC., a Califomia corporation; 
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M. 
CORDES, husband and wife; DAVID 
BARNES and MICHELLE BARNES, husband 
and wife; GARYL. PATTERSON and 
ELIZABEmPATTBRSON, husband and 
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KlMBERL Y L. 
DION, husband and wife; and ANDREW J. 
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH, 
husband and wife. 
Defendants. 
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Defendants hereby respe,tfully submit this reply (1) to Plaintiff's Objection to and 
Motion to Strike Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) to Plaintiff's Motion 
to Supplement the Record; and (3) in support of Defendants , Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
L REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOnON FOR.sVMMARY JUDGMENt. 
The Court should deny plaintiff's motion to strike because, as set forth in defendants' 
Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Defendants' Cross-Motion/or Summary Judgment, Idaho 
courts authorize entry of summary judgment for the party it deems entitled to prevail. 
Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Com., 103 Idaho 310,647 P.2d 766 (Ct.App. 1982). 
Critically, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment addresses the same legal and 
factual issues as does plaintiff's motion: to wit: Does the 1990 Development Agreement 
prolu'bit Blue Dog's operation? The Comt should deny plaintiff's motion to strike and hear 
both summary judgment motions simultaneously in order to preserve judicial economy and to 
avoid the risk of inconsistent rulings. 
Notably, plaintiff fails to cite any authority contrary to Barlow's.lnc. and bases its 
motion to strike solely on a claim that defendants t cross-motion for summary judgment and the 
supporting affidavits deprive plaintiff of its ability to conduct additional discovery or 
meaningfully respond with affidavits. However, any deprivation is a result of plaintiff's own 
rush to have its summary judgment motion beard on an unrealistic time table which anowed 
insufficient time to take depositions, as well as plaintiff's election not to take any depositions 
which defendants agreed to facilitate on short notice. ~ Reply Affidavir of Mu:hae1 J Hines. 
Plaintiffs assertion that defendants had six weeks of notice prior to filing the cross--
motion for summary judgment miscbaracterizes the time1ine of events. Significantly, since the 
first notice defendants received regarding plaintiff's intention to file a motion for summary 
judgment, defendants consistently asserted that such a motion was premature until depositions 
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could be taken. Reply Hines Aff., ~, 24. Defendants could not prepare its response papers 
l.U1ti1 depositions had oCCWTed. jg. at 1f 3. Accordingly, once defendants received plaintiff's 
summary judgment papers, defendants noted depositions for the first available dates that met 
the attorneys' and deponents' schedules, which wasn't until the third week of January. Id. at 'If 
,6, 7. This resulted in the original hearing date of January 3 to be continued to February 18. 
The hearing was later continued to March 3 (which defendants accommodated and did Dot 
oppose). IS. at ~ 5. Defendants then took the depositions of Pat Leffel on January 20, 2009, 
and Jacklin's Rule 3O(b)(6) cmporate representative and Thomas Stoeser on January 23, 
2009-0n the earliest available dates Itt at ~ 7. 
At this time, defendants I counsel informed plaintifrs counsel that representatives of the 
defendants were available for their depositions if Jacklin so desired. hi at 1f 7. Plaintiff 
initially informed defendants that it planned to take the deposition of Dave Russell, Blue Dog's 
operation manager. l!!. Defendants voluntarily agreed to produce Mr. Russell, who lives in 
Oregon, without resort to subpoena on January 30. Id. at'tMJ 7-8. After concluding the last of 
Jacklin's depositions on January 23, 2009, defendants were waiting for Mr. Russell '5 
deposition to occW' before preparing their motion papers. Id. at" 9, 3. Plaintiff then notified 
defendants that it was not going to ~e Mr. Russell's deposition. l§L at 18. At this point, with 
no more depositions to be taken, defendants were in a position for the first time to prepare their 
summary judgment papers and immediately proceeded to do . so. hi- at n 3, 9, 10. 
Notably, plaintitfhad the same amO\lIlt of time as defendants in order to take 
depositions, although it was restricted window created by plaintiff's own haste. Plaintiffs also 
knew that defendants would be supporting their response to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, in whatever form, with deposition and affidavit testimony. As a result, it is 
disingenuous for plaintiff to now claim that it didn't have time to conduct additional discovery. 
Similarly, pJaintiff's claim that it cannot meaningfully respond with affidavit submissions is 
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without merit because defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment raises the same legal 
and factual issues addressed in plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Alternatively, if the Court :finds that plaintiff needs more time in order to take 
depositions (even though defendants have not raised any new legal issues and it was the 
plainti£fwho eJected not to take any depositions), then the bearing date on the cross·motions 
for summary judgment could be continued. Defendants maintain that a continuance is not 
necessary because defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law based on 
the legal construction of the 1990 Development Agreement Under no circumstance, however. 
should defendants' cross·motion for summary judgment not be heard. Defendants' cross-
motion for summary judgment is authorized under Idaho law. ~ ]Rep Rule 56(b) and (c); 
Barlow, 103 Idaho 310. 
fi. REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT IRE RECORD 
Plaintiff asserts that in their summary judgment papers, defendants failed to include 
portions of the deposition testimony and exhibits cited in defendants' briefing, implying that 
defendants purposely left out those portions of the deposition transcript. See Plaintiff's Motion 
to Supplement the Record on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assertion is 
categorically false, and is simply another attempt by Jacklin to misrepresent the record. 
Critically, plaintifffails to identify a single deposition page or exhibit which defendants 
cited to in its briefing which was not attached to one of the submitted Affidavits. Indeed, all 
portions of the deposition transcripts <:ited to in defendants briefing were attached to the 
Affidavit of Michael 1. Hines. Rather, the deposition pages and exhibits Jacklin identifies in the 
Affidavit of Jolm F. Magnuson Submitted Pur,uant to Motion Under IRep 32(a)(4) and !Rep 
56(c) were not cited by or relied upon by the defendants~ and therefore, were not submitted. 
Defendants had no obligation to attach uneited exhibits and deposition testimony to a record 
that was already quite substantial. 
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While this issue certainly does not . dress substantive issues ot stake in the swnmary 
judgment motion, it is telling of plaintiff's. hant for misrepresenting the record. No where 
. epresentations that the 1990 Development 
Agreement contained express use restriotio . For instance, in Jacklin's e-mails to KLP (e-
mails that were ghost-written by Jacklin's a omey), not only did. Jacklin cite to inapplicable 
CC&Rs, but Jacklin also mischaracterized , e Development Agreement by asserting use 
restrictions that did not exist by placing qu: . on marks around language not contained in the 
Development Agreement See Memoran : in Support o/Defendants' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Pat Leffe ' Jacklin' s Property Manager, further perpetuated 
this misrepresentation in his Affidavit by putting in quotations use restriction language that 
is not found in the Development Agreemen: See AjJido.vit of Par Leffel, Re: Plainriff's Motion 
Fol' Summary Judgment ~ 15. 
At this point, the credibility of J "s arguments and positions should be seriously 
questioned. 
m. REPLY IN SUP ORT OF DEFE; 
JUDGMENt 
Plaintiff claims that there are no eli: uted issues of material facts, and then spends 20 
pages of its reply brief countering defen . ts' outline of the facts of this case. The bottom line 
is that this is a case that can be decided on; ummary judgment in favor of the defendants 
because the Development Agreement and : . cles 2-6 of the tenninateci CC&R.s simply do not 
prohibit Blue Dog's RV shopping center .. urtbermore, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction 
beeause it has not suffered any irreparable; as a result of Blue Dog's RV shopping center. 
However. even if the Court decid : not to enter summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, at a minimum, the defendants~ afl:irmative defenses of waiver and estoppel raise 
genuine issues of material fact that precl : summary judgment in favor of the p)aintifI 
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In addition to using inflammatory rb tonc, which d nothing but suggest a weak legal 
argument, it is notable that plaintiff claims . ' matter is sui Ie for summary judgment, then 
proceeds to spend 20 pages of a 42 page r but the facts set forth in affidavit 
testimony. Despite plaintiff's rebuttal pt, this case is c able of a legal determination that 
the Development Agreement and the tel1l'1l$tled CC&R.s do ot prohibit Blue Dog's RV 
shopping center. 
The fact section ofplaintifi"s reply regurgitates e baokground faots set forth in its 
original motion, including additional refere ces to the eats at issue. Although it is a 
non-i ..... liom defendants' perspective, PI: 1iff1akes excefon to the way In wbich 
defendants refer to the 1990 Development . cement betw KLP's predecessor and Jacklin. 
Defendants have consistently referred to ; document, ev before litigation commenced, as 
the development letter or agreement. See R ply HineJ A./f., hibit F. Notably~ plaintifi'refers 
to the Development Agreement as a"use ; term is found no where in the 
agreement ~ Plaintiffs Reply MemorQ . in Support Summary Judgment (hereafter, 
"Plaintiff's Reply Memo"), pp. 8-9, Plain. s allegation defendants loosely c;haracterize 
the agreement serves no purpose than to di I ert the COllrt fro the pertinent issues. 
Plaintiff misunderstands the impo ' ce of Mr. Cord • reference to Jacklin's use of its 
I 
four vacant lots for temporary parking. Se: Plaintiff', Repl· Memo, pp, 14 - 15. KLP is not 
trying to enforce the Riverbend Commerce: Park CC&Rs ag 'nst Jacldin. Defendants simply 
point out that the same substantive C, ... ~ .... ".' covenants that ~ legedly apply to KLP's property 
also apply to 1acklin' s four vacant lots, an, that it is disinge uous of Jacklin to complain about 
Blue Dog's operation when 1acklin solici : the same Blue og operation for its property, 
In sum, plaintiff spends an extrao~ .' ary amount of ace attempting to rebut the facts 
contained in the Affidavits of Richard Cor, es and Dave Ru sell, but there is no conflicting 
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deposition testimony that plaintiff can point the testimony. The Affidavits 
stand on their own. Thus, plaintiff'S Ion . ded rebuttal to e factual issues regarding waiver, 
estoppel, good faith, and futility simply va , dates defendan argument that, at a minimum, 
there are factua1 disputes on these issues ; prevent s~ judgment in plaintiffs favor. 
c. REP ,~ ARGUMENT 
1. THE 1990 DEVELOPMENT AC . EMENT 
PROHIBIT BLUE DOG'S RV S . OPPING """,,lI .. ~'n 
Both parties outlined the rules for' . erpreting res1l'i ve covenants in their initial 
briefing. This is an important issue becaus : when the expr1 terms of the Development 
Agreement are considered in conjunction ,Ih the requi,lhat all doubts regarding the 
scope of the restrictive covenants are to be ; rpreted in fav of the free use of land, and all 
ambiguities are to be interpreted against th drafter (Jacklin) of the restriction., plaintiff's 
Complaint should be dismissed as a matter; flaw. 
The Development Agreement and : . cles 2-6, even f applicable, do not prohibit any 
uses on the property, and significantly. as ~ 
prohibit a RV sales operation. Hines A.ff., . xh. B, p. 33. F ermore, the Obligation to 
construct a "first class shopping center" w met with the truction of the Outlet Mallon 
lots 7·17. The Development Agreement d ; es not require a ' first class shopping center" on 
each and every lot. Plaintiffreferences ''w'll-settled princi es of contract in covenant 
interpretation" for its proposition that the ent applies to all the lots owned 
by KLP. See Plaintiff's Reply Memoran : in Support of otionfor Summary Judgment, p. 
26. However, plaintiff faiis to cite any au , ority to support ts argument, and fails to address 
why Jacklin bas not previously addressed P's alleged fai ure to put a "first class shopping 
center" on Lots 1-4. 
Blue Dog's RV shopping center is: "first class sh ing center" that sells high-end RV 
ret the meaning of "first class." 
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Regardless of what a dictionary might say, i is undisputed t when asked under oath, Jacklin 
(the drafter of the Development Agreement' could not ans what constituted a :first class 
center. Hines Aff., Em B, pp. 42-45. 47. 1 oreaver, plainti 
RV shopping center doesn't meet the dicti definition 0 "first class." Plaintiff relies on 
hyperbole in order to characterize Blue Do . s RV shopping.' nter as less than ''first class." 
Blue Dog's RV shopping center is not a st : ge yard, altho : h plaintiff absurdly cJaims as 
. 
much. ~ Plaintiff's Reply Memo, pp. 30- 1. The RV's at . e shopping center are inventory 
that is sold in the due course of business. 
If Blue Dog's RV sbopping is not idered a "first. lass shopping center" (which 
defendants dispute), it is because plaintiffr' fused to work ~ Blue Dog in ordr:r to address . 
site concerns. It is also noteworthy that the: evelopment :, eement and Articles 2·6, even if 
applicable, do not contain a time deadline 
center/' nor do they prolubit Blue Dog's ra:ry three· . use prior to the construction of a 
"fIrSt class shopping center." Moreover, J : ldin admits that a "first class shopping center" only 
has to be constructed when the property is : eveloped. HinesiAff., Exh. BJ p. 27. Because 
Jacklin concedes that Blue Dog has not dev: Joped the prop., ,Blue Dog does not have to 
meet the purported :requirements contained; the Developm I 
offer any COmpelliIlg response to these leg issues. 
Lastly, a threshold issue which pI .; 'ff skirts is the .1 validity of Articles 2 - 6 
referenced in the Development Agreement. I The fact tbat th CC&Rs were already terminated, 
! 
and therefore inapplicable to defendants, n: ates all of pi ~ . s arguments. Jacklin 
termiIlated all CC&Rs on the property own! by KLP on 0 ober 16, 1990. Hines Aff., Exh. E. 
Thus, when the Development Agreement ; weeks later on November 7$ 1990, 
the referenced CC&Rs, including artlcles2r6, bad already , n tenninated. Id. Articles 2·6 
therefore have no legal applicability to rai,s use of its pl'I' y. Contrary to plaintiff's 
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argument, the title policy' 5 reference to the, C&Rs does not a.k.e them valid. Notably, the 
: ; 
Development Agreement does not set forth ; h allegedly BP, licable article of the CC&Rs; 
rather, the Agreement merely referen~s C; Rs that were II 11 and void at the time the 
Agreement was executed and recorded. 
i 
2. JACKLIN BREACHED TlIi DE; LOPMENT: GREEMENT AND REFUSED 
TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH T . DEVELOP A' ITE PLAN. , . 
While conceding that Blue Dog's Ri shopping cen, could be an.appropriate use on 
the defendants' property, plaintiff claims th: the operation' d not comply with Moles 2· 6. 
, . 
Sr:ePlaintiff's Reply Memo, pp. 24.2S! Pl : tiff takes issue' ·th Mr. Cordes' statement that 
Jacklin never attempted to work with KLP' address con regarding Blue Dog's operation. 
,; i 
J4.. at 12-13, Plaintiff also argues that defe ts made no e:ffon to submit acceptable site 
plans, and that Jacklin did not breach the : velopment Agrebent by refusing the work with 
defendants to work toward a "mutuallyacc: table design." t. at 26,37-38. Plaintiff's 
arguments are not persuasive. 
Initially, the CC&Rs were null;and : oid at the time ey were incorporated by reference 
into the Development Agreement, so they : not applicable i the defendants' property. 
, 
Moreover, Blue Dog's efforts to comply', h the CC&Rs w e rebuffed by Jacklin. It is 
.: I 
evident, based on deposition testimony fro : Mr. Stoeser, th' Jacklin would have withheld 
approval of Blue Dog's RV sbopping Cent : no matter what· ite improvements it made. Hines 
Aff.J Exh, C, pp. 33-34. 
In regard to working with Jacklin, that he didn't question the 
legitimacy of Blue Dog's RV shopping een, er because Blue' og was referred to KLP by 
: : 
JackJin. Cordes Aff., 1 ) 4. Because of the : ferral, KLP no reason to believe that Blue , , 
, ' 
: ' 
Dog's shopping center was not approPriate: JfJacklin belie ed the operation was not 
appropriate, JackJin should have contacted: or Blue Do so that they could work together 
, I 
to achieve a mutually acceptable desi~ an: appearance. s is .a particularly important fact 
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because Jacklin's own actions in offering t : lease to Blue D show that Blue Dog's RV 
I 
shopping was pennissible under Artic~es 2 : ,the same sub nve CC&Rs that applied to 
Jacklin's property. 
It remains undisputed that Jacklin not attempt to: . ork with Blue Dog, but rather 
i 
the Development Agreement or 
Articles 2-6. Jacklin's complete refus~ to : ork with defen ts breached the Development 
Agreement andlhe implied covenant Qf go 'd faith and fair ling contained in every con1l'act. 
!! : 
Steinerv. Ziegler Tamura Ltd,,·Co., 1~8 I : 0238,242,61 .3d 595 (2002). Plaintiff's 
: ; 
argument that the implied covenant o(:·g faith and fair d ing does not apply to a resuictive 
covenant is Dot supported by legal authon 
contract, including a restrictive'coveD.1J.I1t. . oreover, this' lied covenant does not conflict 
with the express provisions of the Dev.el : on! Agreement, ~ also requires laeklin to 
work in good faith with defendants.:; ! 
Contrary to plaintiff' s position~ defi: dants' futility ,gument is based on, and is 
absolutely consistent with, the testimopy : vided by Mr. Strer. Mr. Stoeser states that no 
matter how defendants develop'ed Blue Do: IS shopping :, it would have been . . . , 
unacceptable to Jacklin. HinesAjf.J E~. B: p. 88. Mr. Sto even uses the term "futile," 
. ! 
testifying that it wouJd have been futile for ~ 1ue Dog to any site improvements because 
Jackljn's approval wouJdhave been ~tbh.el: d regardless of ~lue Dog's efforts. Hines .4.ff., Exh. 
c: pp. 33-34. i . 
Plaintiff argues that Blue Dog'is 0 : to make site i ovements were inadequate, that 
: ! 
the problem was Blue Dog's operation. an : that Blue Dog's I hopping center could have been 
.' 1 . . 
approved on the site if it came into co~li: ce with the Dey. lopment Agreement and CC&Rs. 
SeeP1ainnffs Reply Memo, pp.33-3~. H , ever, plaintifr argument does not address the 
\U1deniable fact that Jacklin repeatedl~ refu ed to work with iBlueDog on a site plan. The 




undisputed facts are tbatBJue bog offered' make site imp vements, that Jacklin rejected the 
· . 
offer out of hand, that Jacklin refused ~ w k with Blue Do ,and that no matter what Blue 
i 
Dog did to improve the site, Jacklin wbuld ot approve the ue Dog operation. Jacklin 
· . · . 
demanded immediate eviction lather than a owing Blue Do ' time to make site improvements, 
· . 
even though there is no time requirement' the Developmen Agreement or CC&Rs. 
3. THE RULES OF J:N'ttRPRETA ION DE4W ........ '..., 
RESOLVED IN TBEiDEFEND S' FAVOR. . 
~ . 
If there is any questionias to ~ 
CC&Rs require, then any doubt must ~ in eted in favor fthe free use ofJand Gabriel v. 
~. 130 Jdaho 171, 173, 9gS Pold ~209 . 1987). Notably' plaintiff completely ignores this 
rule in its reply. 
Furthermore, all ambigUities aie to e interpreted T. the drafter (Jacklin) of the 
. . Ass'n. I,Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148 
(1994). laoklin dzaftod the ~lopment A eement and 80 i Y ambiguities tcgarding the 
sam.ab:,b:::::::t: :!. =f: c~~ depootion 
testimony that laoklin drafted !he Develop • CDt Agre~J eo Plaintiff's Reply Memo, pp. 
::~H::'s::=a~: :::~~==J::~the 
Development Agreement It is unequi~oca. from Mr. StoesJ,s initial, non-coached deposition 
testimony that Jacklin was the ~after ~fth Development A . ent Hines Aff, Exh. B, p. 




, . . 
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4. AT A MINIMUM, THE TIVE DEFEN ES OF WAIVER AND 
ESTOPPEL CREATE GE~: ISSUES OF TERIAL FACT THAT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY ~G IN P , TIFF'S FAVOR. 
I 
As stated above, most of Pl~ff'S r1y memorand, is spent attempting to rebut the 
Affidavit testimony of Mr. Cordes an&:Mr. sell. Most ofi laintifrs rebuttal is therefore 
spent addressing the factual issues tha~: sho plaintiff waiv - its right to enforce the 
, , 
plaintiff takes issue with Mr. Russen'~ affi ~t testimony re arding the lease negotiations 
between Russell and Leffel. SGa Plaintiff's eply Memo, pp: IS-17. However, the facts 
regarding the lease negotiations and re:fe as set forth by - . Russell and Mr. Cordes (and 
disputed by plaintifi), are the very factS .in i sue regarding 'ver and estoppel that would 
prevent summary judgment in plaintiffs fa or. 
Defendants have submitted ~s in evidence that rae in repeatedly assured Blue Dog 
, 
that its RV sales operation would be a:Co 
; 
i 
referred Blue Dog to the KLP property bo 
site for RV units. Jacklin then reverse9 its 
atible use in R.i+: - end Commerce Park. Jacklin 
as a potential} _ ~ e site and as a tempomry staging 
- I 
pproval of Blue og's RV shopping center only 
after it lost out in the lease negotiationS to P. l~ldin's : duct squarely fits the affirmative 
defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel. I _ 
If the Court determines that defenJts are not entitl to summary judgment after 
reviewing the e>qm:SS terms oilbo * 10r AgretmentF' dlor applying the cannons of 
contract interpretation that support a niling r defendants' fa Of, then the Court should deny 
plaintiff's motion based on the disP~ iSSr of material ~ regarding waiver and estoppel. 
s. AN INJUNCTION CANNO'1;' ISS E BECAUSE- LAINTIPF HAS NOT SHOWN 
THAT IT WD..L SUFFER - ~LE JU.l'1~;I'£ 
in order for the Court to issue 
an injunction. Idaho courts, the NinthjC' it, and the U.S. - upreme Court all recognize that a 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORAND : 12 
1 
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claimant must show :irreparable injury :in er for an in~1on to issue. Harris v. Cassia, 106 
Idaho 513,518,681 P.2d 988 (1984); No em Cheyenne Tnbe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843 
(9" Cir. 2007) (g1wting eBay me. v. ~ L.Lic.;t U.S.388, 391 (2006». 
Plaintiff has completely failed to plead or ~ve ineJ>aralfle. ' a prima filcie element for an 
injunction to issue. Id. Jacklin's Rule 30cij)(6) testimo~y cJuld not be more clear that Jacklin 
has suffered DO injUl)' to dale, let alone ;,J..able banD.! Iif ... Ajf., Exb. B. pp. 89, 121. 
Critically~ Plaintiff fails to cite any thority to SrPf its position that an injunction 
should issue, notwithstanding the absence 0 irreparable injun'. Further, p1aintiff does not 
_ Udell v. Idaho State Bd orLand m. 1l91d~ 1018, 1019.812 P.2d 325 (1991). 
where the Idaho Court upheld a determinati n that the p '. . had not established a right to 
; . 
injunctive reBef where they failed to demo trate irreparable injury which could not be 
; .' 
compensated by monetary damages. , 
i 
For the reasons set forth above and defendants( . r submittals, defendants 
, 
respeetfullyrequestthe Court to (1) grant efendants' CfoSSi-Motion for Summaty Judgment 
dismissing p1a:in.tifrs Complaint in full wi prejudice, ~d;t deny plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 




Mle LJ. S 
ISB;#6876 
MlCIYJEL O. SCHMIDT 
ISBi#69.11 
A~m~s for Defendants 
622· 
ION FOR STJMMAR. IUDOMENTo022609--TlU'·mr.DOCX 312J09 
i I 
--' -.. ' _ ... _- -_._- ... - --- ... -- ----
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 
foregoing document was served upon the foJ 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
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~ [1'] Hand Delivery 
:. [ Federal Express 
! [. Fax: (208) 667-0500 
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MICHAEL J. HlNBS 
ISB #6876 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT 
ISB#6911 
LUKlNS &. ANNIS. p.s. 
1600 Washirmton Trust Financial Center 
717 W S1ml2Ue Ave 
Sl)olcane. WA m01-0466 
TeJenhone: (509) 455·9555 
Facsimile: (509) 747·2323 
Attornevs for Defendants 
LUKINS & ANNIS. eDA 
l~ ~ , • ~ Kee tgJ 001 
\, :~l: 
STArE OF IUAHO } SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTEI'lA.1 
F~ 
2009 ~1AR - 2 AM 10: 03 
CLERf< DISTRICT COURT 
,~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F.IRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND'FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintift 
v. 
BLUE DOG RV, lNC., an Idaho cotporation; 
11IE PATTERSONFAMIL Y 2000 TRUST 
CREATED Uff/ADATBD FEBRUARY 25, 
2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE; 
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED VITIA DATED 1ANUARY 13, 
2000; 10HN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; XL 
PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation; 
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M. 
CORDES, husband and wife; DA VlD 
BARNES and MICHELLE BAKNES, husband 
and wife; GARY L. PATTERSON and 
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husbamt and 
wife; PHlLL1P r. DION and KIMBERLY L. 
DION,husband and wife; and ANDREW 1. 
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
REPLY AFFlDA VIT OF MICHAEL 1. HlNES: 1 
NO. CV·08-6752 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT OFMICHAELJ. 
HINES 
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STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
: ss 
COllI1ty of Spokane ) 
I 
MICHAEL I. HlNES, being first duly sworn on 01. clopo ... and says: 
I 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, of sound ~ and am competent to testify in this 
. I 
matter. l make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and/or belief. 
2. On October 3,2008, I leamed from Jacklin Land Company's ("Iacklin'') 
attorney, 10hn Magnuson, that he had unilaten11y set Jan~ 8, 2009 as a bearing date for 
1acklin's Motion for Summa:ry Judgment. In response, 1 Jrormed Mr. Magnuson that January 
I 
8,2009 was a premature hearing date because depositions land other discovery had Dot yet 
I 
ocOUlTed. See Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the N,rJVember 6, 2008 lette,. from Michael 
J. Hi1U!s to John F. Magnuson. Indeed, at this POint. no di~VCIY bad oecurred-no wriltlm 
discovery or documents produced, and no depositions takf. Sigaificantly, depositions in this 
I 
case could not occur until plaintiff had answered outstanding Intetrogatories and Requests for 
I 
Production. Plaintiff did not produce the outstanding writ1:en discovery and documents until 
December 2, 2008. Thus, in response to Mr. Magnuson's ~'l also inquired at this lime 





3. Notwitbstandingmyrequest, Mr. Magnusoh then filed plaintiff's summary 
I 
judgment motion papers on December 11, 2008, and piCk~ January 8, 2009 as the hearing 
date. Upon reviewing plaintiff's motion papers, it was sel~.evident that deposition discoveI)' 
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had filed multiple affidavits raising issues of mawnal J which needed to be rebutted. 
. I 
Defendants could not prepare its response to plaintiff s mbtion for sununary judgment until the 
I 
necessary deposition discovery had occurred 
4. Accordingly, my office responded that same day and advised Mr. Magnuson 
I 
that the January 8, 2009 hearing date would not work bduse of the need to take depositions, 
I 
and the likely inability to take those depositions on such short notice over the Xmas holiday 
period. See Emibit B, ;, Inte <I1Jd correct copy 0/ the *ber 11, 2008, email from Trevor 
I 
Pincock to John Magnuson. Mr. Magnuson initially rerJed to move the hearing date. At that 
point, 1 indicated to Mr. Magnuson that defendants would be forced to file a Rule 56(1) motion 
for • COIIIinuance given that Jacklin had submitted aflidaits in support of its summary 
judgment, but was refusing to allow depositions to occur ror to the hearing date. I then also 
I 
advised Mr .. Magnuson that I would proceed with taking qepositions of plaintiff's 
representatives the week of December 22, 2008. See EXh~blt C, a true and correct copy of 
December 16, 2008 email from M'Ike Hines to' John Majon. Also, ~ Exhibit D, Q true 
I 
and co"ect copy o/December J 7, 2008 email from Mike fIines to John Magnuson. 
I 
S. In response, Mr. Magnuson ultimately rele~ted and agreed to reschedule the 
I 
summary judgment hearing date for February 18,2009. 1ihere was a subsequent request to 
move this hearing date to March 3, 2009, which I did not ~ppose. 
I 
6. Defendants then proceeded to schedule the/depoSitiOns of Pat Leffel (Jacklin's 
Property Manager), Jacklin's Rule 3O(b )(6) representativd~ and Tom Stoeser (Jacklin's CFO). 
I 












end of January based on the witnesses' unavailability, scJlleduling contlicts, as well as the epic 
I 
I 
snow stann that all but shut down the eouer d'Alene and fpokane area over the Xmas period. 
7. Accordingly, I took the depositions ofPwktifl"s representatives as elU'ly as 
I 
. I 
reasonably possible, which occurred on January 20th and ~anuary 23tO• At this point, Mr. 
I 
! 
Magnuson had also requested to take the depositions ofrdpresentatives from the defendants, 
I 
whom I agreed defendants would voluntarily produce without resort to subpoena. ~ Exhibit 
E, a true and CO"ect copy o/the JrmutJT)l20, 2009 email ~om Mike Hines to John Magnuson. 
I 
8. We then made arrangements to produce DJve Russell, Blue Dog's leasing and 
I 
. ! 
operations manager who lives in Oregon, for his depositiqn in Couer d'Alene on January 30, 
I 
I 
2009. Id. Mr. Magnuson subsequently cancelled that deppsition. 
9. 
I 
Thus, with defendants' depositions ofJaclclin's representatives completed, and 
I 
plaintiff's decision not to take any depositions of defen~ts' representatives, the end of 
I 
I 
January was the first time that defendants were in a PDSititn to commence preparing their 
summary judgment papers. At that point, no longer havin~ to wait for Mr. Russell' 5 deposition 
which would have impacted defendants' summary judgmlt analysis and submittals, we then 
I 
proceeded to finalize defendants' summary judgment pap+rs which were timely completed and 
i 
filed on February 17, 2009. Defendants summary judgm~t papers included a cross-motiOD. for 
I 
summary judgment based on the same legal issues raised tpy plaintiff ttl its SllDlIllaIY judgment 
I 
motion; to wit: Does the 1990 Development Agreement Rfohibit Blue Dog's operation. 
Defendants sUbmit it does not as a matter oflaw. 
10. Based on the need to take depositions 1n ,S case and the inability to take those 
depositions until the end of January, defendants were not in a position to complete their 
I 
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I 
i 
SIII1lI!W)' judgment papers ~ to mid·Felmwy, 2009 .1ccordingly, d.1imdanls did not delay 
I 
in filling their summary judgment papers, including their Jross-mouon seeking summary 
I 
i 
judgment dismissal. I 
11. Attached hereto as Euibit F is a true and ~ect copy of the July 24, 2008 
email form Gary Patterson to Pat Leffel. 





My appointment expires .3 - :l" -f:l 
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1250 Northwood Center Ct. 
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November 6, 2008 
John F. Magnuson 
Attomey At Law 
1250 Northwood Center Ct., Suite A 
P. O. Box 2350 










Re: Jacklin Land Company 'D. Blue D~g RlI,:et aL. 
Ii: Dear John; ~: . 
11. .. ,,; Spnrgue Ave, Ste 1600 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 
t 509-455-9555 
fSlJ9.147-2323 luJdns.eom 
MJ:CHABL J. HINES 
AtbnUted In: Washblgton tmd Idaho 
trIhinesOlulcins.com 
f,i . . 
Thanks for your letter dated October 30,~t008. We're looking forward to receiving your client's 
response to the proposal we discussed, ~th winter: fast approaching, time is of the ess~e if 
we are to undertake landscaping woEk tiUB year. My client is prepared to proceed in that 
fashion i.mmediately if resolution can b~;!reached. . 
As to a January 8, 2009 hearing date for ~ur proposed summary judgment ~on, I believe 
that date is premature and cannot ~t to it at this time. I anticipate needing to take 
~I 
. 'deposttiOftS rJf'1a:tKliti"s tepresentatives-J,O respond-to -yout mol:iCm, whiCh cannofbe dOne until I 
receive complete and full answers to 0'*= outstanding c:l.iscovery. Given the realistic time 
parameters for receiving complete writ+n disCoverY, scheduling depositions, working around 
the christmas holiday, and accommoclcimg the summary judgment briefing sc:hedule, I believe 
I .. 
a January 8, 2009 hearing date is unrealiStic. Once we have a better feel as to a realistic: schedule 
timeline,.I wiU be happy to talk with yt about obtaining a hearing date. . 
We look forward to hearing your clienth~ response. ' 
W 
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12/11/2008 4:52 PM 
Jilddln v. etue Dog 
We received Jaddln's motion fOf summalY and were 5UrprIsed to see ~ yo\.l noted the hearln9 for 
January e. 
We Will not be able to COInPIV With that hearing request that the d* be contJnued until after depositions can be 
raken In thIS matter. 
Mr. Hines acMsed that we need to mke the of several Individuals Involved In this matter. Based on the hearing 
date vouw set, the upcomIng holidays, and Mr. calendar, we Will not be able to take the deposItIOns priOr to the 
response date. Mr. Hines advISed that he Is out of tOwn and otJ1erwise unavailable to mke deposItJons until JanualY. 
AclditlonaUV, we only recontIy received Jaddin's ansWers to the dIScoVery requests and are still In the process of Mluating 
Jaddln's answers and responses to ensure that ~ are not defident. 
Please let me !moW by tnmorrow (12112) whether jm WI" agree to contlnue (he hearing elate. If you do not ilgret, we wlU : ="'" PU,,","" Rule 56(1). }I 
Attorney 
Lukins & Annis, p.s. 
717 W. Spra9ueAve., Ste.1600 
Spokane, WA 99201 fi; 




























12/16(2008 S:36 PM 




I am surprised that you unUateral1y went forward ~ the January a, hea/1ng elate after I advised you that depositiOns 
would be necessary before any summary judgment motion could be vetb!d rendering that date Impractical. Such 
depositiOnS had tD wait until VOU answered our d~, whld1 we didn't rec:elve until the first of December. I then had an 
extensIVe work travel schedule ttle laSt two weeks. Ilean now proceed to take depositIons in this case. At a minimum, I 
need to take the depositions of Pat Leffel, Tom smnber, and 8 Rule 30(b){6). I would like to depose them December 22 
and 23 at my offlCle. Please advise ImmedIately if yOU will produce those witnes.seS on those dates. 
!/' 
























































From; Mike HInes ~ : 
To: John Meonuson i': 
CC: 1l'eIIor Pincocx Iii 
Date: 12/17/2D08 8:55 AM ;1' 
SUbject: Re: Jadclln v. Blue Dog ~: 
John, ~; 
The surprise is that you schedule a summa'Y judgmJbt hearing In a manner over the Xmas period where you submit 
declarations, thereby puttfng factual matt.ers at iSSUeV yet do not provide enough tim! to tate deposllons, nor make your 
declarants available for depOslUons. I: 
~i 
We are entitled to take the reQUested deposfUons, sO;1 again urge you to be reMOnilbie to re:hedule the hearrng 
voluntar1Jy .. We could resdledule it for later In lan~ or February whICh would allow the necessary ClepositJons to oa;ur 
the first part of January and maintzlln a normal b,.. period. You have stated that it Is your dient whO refuses to 
cooperate on this scheduling matter. unfortunately)j:vour dlent's apparent intransigence on thiS ISsue will necessitate 
bringing a Rule 56{f) motiOn, creating unneeessary cmts for the parties and Inconvenience for the Court. Given the 
demands of our respective litigation practices, we wJIIlikely have many SCheduling isSues In this case, and I suggest a 
course of cooperatiOn Will better serve all interests. ~; 
.j: 
I am not avall&bIe December 29 and 30. f . 
. g: 
Please advise by close of business b)day wtlether VQ.lI' client has agreed to move the January 8th hearing date 1D allow 




>>> "JOhn MagnL/50n" <jq!Jn@magnusononllne,com> 12116/2008 6:20 PM »> 
MIke- HI 
~: 
I am still perplexed why you are surprised at the ~,ng. You set forth 
your position, I set forth mine, and we disa9reed. 'I told you by tetter 
dare Nov. 7 that the heartng would go forwiIrd froJJ, my end and that we 
disagreed with your contention that the motlon was premature. 
~; 
The discovery was pl'Ollidecl to VOU 31 days alter itI~1$ serwd so that no one 
could dalm undue delay. ~! 
I adviSed last week that I would wort with you o~i ttte timing of your 
submiSSIons given the hoIIdaVS. I am stilI amenable to that. 
~; 
As set forth In the dlscove'Y responses, Mr. LeffeI~ retired and now 
lives In california. I cant compel hIS attendanc:e ~ deposlUon. 1 wIR 
make Inquiry of Mr. Stoeser, who would likely be ~ Rule 30(b)(6) designee 
(although this is a presumption since I cIont p~ know what your 
proposed subject areas of Inqul'Y are under Rule 30), as to hIS avallatJUily 
next week. We may have to amsIr:Ier his ~ (end the Rule 30(b)(6) 
depo) early the t'oIlowing week IS albmttives pe(idlng his availlbUity. I 
have iJ depoSitIon In another matter on Dec 23 a~Jlpm. 





John Magnuson II' 
- Original Message - ~: 
From: 'Mke HInes" <mblnes@l/Ylslns.mm> g; 
To: 'John Magnuson" <jphn@magDusongDline,cPm> 
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 5:36 PM Ii; 










r.: 633 EXHIBITD 
> I am surprISed that you unllatel1llv went forward WIth the January 8, 
> hearing date after I advised you that depositions wPUId be necessary 
> before anv summary judgment motion could be ~ rendering that clate 
'> impradical. Such depositions had to walt until yoU answered our 
> discovery, which we cfIdn't receive until the I'lr$t of~. I then 
> had an extensive work travel schedule the last twoIWeeks. I am now 
> proceed to mice depoSItIons In this case. At a mlnlf.i1um, I need to take 
> the depositions of Pat Leffel, Tom Storeser, and a p.ule 3O(bX6). I would 
> like to depose them December 22 and 23 at my offlc:e. Please attvlse 
> immediately I' you will produce those wttnesses ori):hose cI8\:eS. 
> ~ 
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> bution, or anv other use, Is striCtIV prohibited. 
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I received your phone message. We will proceed with both the 3086 and Mr. 5toeser'$ deposition this FridaV commencing 
In CDA at 8 am and going to 2 pm. We WIll not have/any deposltions tomorrow. 
I 
;1: 
[will work on Mr. Russell's scheduling for his depo 0& 1/30. Per our arrangement, you will agree to pay for Mr. RusseU's 





>>> "John Magnuson~ <jOhn@magllUSQDO!lllne.c;grri~ 1/20/2009 3:4S PM »> 
MIke- f; 
. i. 
January 30th works for me for Mr. Russelrs ~. Please advise as to the time. For his plannIng purposes, I dont think 
we need more than 2 to 3 hours. t: 
JOhn Magnuson 
ThiS message has been scanned for vtruses and 
dangerous content b'( MallScanner, and is 







From: Gary .Patterson [glpatt@klpproperti~~com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 24,20084:17 PM ,1: 
Pat Leffel . :1: To: 
Cc: 
'i; 
jblaek@lukins.com; 'Rick Coretes' 'j, 
Subject: FW:Blue D~ RV 
Hi Pat, 
'j 








Our counsel. lim Black of Lukins It. Amlis, $, has reviewed the original t 990 development letter mid 
CC&R.'s and has advised us that the infonna.Ubn of record does Dot restrict us from a land Jease to a 
temporary use on the vacant 1~t. Additionalli:, 'Vt ·would not be bound by any changes that occurred to 
the cc&:R's without our written approval after the 1990 version. Mr. Black has offered that 
your counsel may contact him directly ~ (SO~) 623 .. 2031 to discuss. 
Sincerely, 
Gary Patterson, President 




] 343 Locust Street, Suite 203 
·Walnut Creek, CA 94596 
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1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
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STATE OF I[/AHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
FILED: 
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BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; THE PATTERSON 
FAMIL Y 2000 TRUST CREATED 
UrrlA DATED FEBRUARY 25,2000; 
GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE; 
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED Urr/ADATED JANUARY 
13,2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, 
TRUSTEE; KL PROPERTIES, INC., a 
California corporation; RICHARD A. 
CORDES and SUZANNE M. CORDES, 
husband and wife; DA VID BARNES and 
MICHELLE BARNES, husband and wife; 
GARYL. PATTERSON and 
ELIZABETH P ATTERSON, husband and 
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERL Y 
L. DION, husband and wife; and 
ANDREW J. BRANAGH and ANNE C. 
BRANAGH. husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
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The above-referenced matter came on for hearing on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment all March 3,2009 at 3:00 p.m. Attached hereto for the Court's convenience is a copy of 
Sage Healthcare, PLLe v. Bushi, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4, 2009). The cited decision holds: 
"[C]ontract terms are not overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Bushi 
v. Sage Healthcare, 09.6 ISCR at 246 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). 
DATED this 31!7£y of March, 2009. 
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acc:oundng to be completed.. The coun rejected the request. Nancy 
renewed hcr request for family allowan~ at the district court; 
however, the coun made no mention of it. Mary bas Dot completed 
the occounting and has not paid any family allowance to Nancy. 
Nancy bas ~uested tbat this Court vacate the orders entered by the 
magistraLe judge alloWing Mary to' (iefer making the accounting and 
instruct the court to finally detennine and pay her family allowance. 
The Idaho legislature repealed the family allowance provision, 
I.e. § 15·2-404, in the last legislative session. 2008 S.L. cb. 182, § 
4. p. 550. However. new legislation is not given retroactive effect 
unless "expressly so declared." I.e. § 7",101. The legislation 
repealing I.C. § 15·2-404 does not provide for retroactive effect 
Accordingly, we address this claim. 
The granting of a family allowance punuant to I.C. § 15·2·404 
is eommlttecl to the discretion of the trial coun. MQu~r oJ Bowman 's 
Estate, 101 Idaho 131, 136,609 P.2cI663. 668 (1980) (holding no 
abuse of disorctioR by the trial court either in granting the famiJy 
allowance or in the amount thereof). Abuse of that discretion is 
tound when the reviewing coun is convinced tbat the award was 
clearly arbitrary and manif~stly unreasonable. Jd. 
By de~lining to set a deadline for the accounting to be 
completed. the magistrate judge effectively allowed Mary to 
withhold any allowance Nancy may have been entitled to throughout 
the course of these proc:eedings, effectively denying Nancy her 
statutory entitlement. The magistrate judge, rather than exercising 
his discretion in the matter. do1egated the resolution of me issue. 
Although MIIlY's attorney rcprcscntcd that the a~ounting would be 
complete sometime around the end of October 2005, Mary bas failed. 
to complete the accounting even now-threc years later. The 
magiStrate judge's refusal to act was an abuse of discretion, and the 
district court should have so held. We now remand with instructions 
to the district court to direct the magistrate judge to determine and 
award to Nancy such family allowance as she is enLitled to. if any. 
JV. CONCLUSION 
we affirm the district ~ourt's deeisioll vacating the grant of 
summary judgment against Nancy On the partnership issue. We 
revecse the district court's decision affinning the granl of summai;' 
judP'lent against Nancy on the omitted spouse issue. We remand 
with inslnlctions that the uial coun rule on objections prior to 
deciding the motions for summary judgment We affirm the district 
court's decision affirming the dismissal of the creditor's claim. 
FUlally. we insuuct the trial coun to determine what, if any. family 
allowance is due to Nancy. In view of tbe mixed result. no costS are 
awarded. 
Justices BURDICK, 1.10NES, W.I0NES and Iusti~ Pro Tern 
IODWELL, CONCUR. 
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SAGE HEALTIl CARE, PLLC. an Idaho limited liability company; 
CHARLES C. NOVAK, M.D.: DAVID A. KENT. M.D.; and. 
ROBERTO NEGRON, M.D .. 
Counterelaimants-Respondents, 
v. 
STEPHEN BUSHI, M.D., 
Co~nterdefendant·Appet1ant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho. Ada County. Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, 
District Judge. 
The deCision of the district coWt is affirmed in part, lIaclll~d in 
part, and remanthd for further l'1'0ceedings. 
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Halliley, Troxell, ennis & Hawley, Boise. for appellant. Steven 
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HORTON, Justice 
This is an appeal from a district couct's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Sage Health Care, PLLC (Sage), Charles C. 
Novak, M.D .• David A. Kent, M.D., and Robcno Negron, M.D. 
(collectively referred to as Respondents). Stephen Bushi. M.D .. 
(Buslli) appeals the district court's summary judgment ruling that 
Respondents acted properly in terminating Buslli's membership in. 
Sage and its award of attorney fees to R.espondents. We affirm in 
patt, vacate in pan, and remand this case for further protccdings. 
I. FACnJAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1994, licensed psychiatrists. Charles C. Novak. Stephen T. 
Bushi. David A. Kent, and Cantril T. Nielsen. formed The Sage 
Group. LLC, under the Idaho Umited Uability ACt-I.C. §§ 53-601 
ttt seq. In 1996, the members cbanged the limited liabilitY 
company's name to Sage Bebavioral Health Care, LLC. In 1997. 
the members again cbanged the LLC's name fO Sage Health Care. 
PLLC. Each of the original members contributed $2,000 8J'Id held 
a 25% interest in the LLC. Dr. Nielsen subsequently withdrew fr()m 
Sage. and Or. Roberto Negron acquired a 25% ownership interest in 
Sage. 
All the members of Sage were signatories to the operating 
agreement, including amendments. The agreement ~ested equal 
management rights in the members. It provided that to amend its 
tetms, consent of aU but one of the members was required.. It also 
addressed the grounds for dissociation of its members. MandatOt)' 
dissociation would occur if a member withdrew with the consent of 
the majority of the remaining members or with the deeth or decree 
of incompetency of a member. A member could be -dissociatc:d by 
a majoriry vote of the other' members upon me happening of the 
following: bankruptcy of the member: attachment or levy upon the 
member's interest; the member's loss of professional license; a 
finding by the member's professional society that the member is 
gUilty of an ethical violation; me member's inability to obtain 
professional liability insurance; or the member's conviction for a 
felony. The operating agreement also -provided a calculation for 
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Stllrting around 2002, Bushi began to date a nurse practitioner 
employed at Sage. This was not prohibited under the terms of the 
operating agreement; however, because the other members had 
concerns about potential liability stemming from the relationship. 
Sage arranged for Bushi to bave no role in supervising the nurse 
practitioner. 
In July 2003. Sage obtained a business line of credit loan from 
Wells Fargo Bank, which was intended (0 serve as a source of 
liquidity tot' Sage if and when it was needed. Sage never used the 
line of credit and never approved jts use by any member. In October 
2005, Respondents received correspondence from Wells Fargo 
indicating that nearly $45,000 bad been bOll'o'llled on tbe line of 
credit at 15.5% inLerest. Respondents learned lbat Bushi had applied 
for and received funds on Sage's line of credit based solely on his 
signature; Respondents had nOt consented to or known about this 
extension of credit. The name on lbe line of ctedit .account was 
listed as "Sage Health Care, PLLC Stepben Bushi," and Bushi 
maintains that be believed tha[ this line of credit was his personal 
lille of credit. not 8 business line of credit After Respondents 
confronted bim, Sushi admitted he had borrowed the funds on the 
line of credit and used them for his personal expenses. Respondents 
demanded be repay the funds to WeUs Fargo. 
At a members' ~ting on October 27,2005, Respondents, 
accotdingto Bushi, informed him they wanted him out as a member 
of Sage because he was dating t!'le nurse practitioner. The second 
item on the agenda for that meeting states "discuss NP." After this 
meeting, coneentecl about his future with Sage, Bushi joined another 
psychiatry group in November 200S. Bushi thought be was within 
his rights under the operating agreement to join the competing 
group. The minutes from a December 8, 200S members' meeting 
reflect that Respondents voted to deny Bushi profit sharing in 2006, 
and that "onc reasOn for him tlor being involved with tbe profit 
sharing was due to his connection with (Sage's) competitor." At this 
time, Respondents stopped schccluling Bushi to provide services for 
various Sage concr8CC/l in which he had previously been 
participating. 
At mac same December 8, 2005 meetill8, Respondents also 
offered to buy OUt Bushi's share in Sage for a figure prepared by 
Sage's accouotant anc tOld Sushi be needed to decide whether to 
accept the offer by Jarnwy 2006. Busbi thOUght the offer was 
"rjdiculous" and told Respondents he would not comment on any 
amouDt until he had spoken to his attorney. 
At a members' meeting on January 17, 2006, Respondeots 
presented Sushi with a non-eompete agreement that would have 
prohibited him from participating in any practice competing against 
them. In return, Bushi wou1£! be paid $15.000 for his withdrawal 
and dissociation from Sage lind relinquishment of any and all rights 
of ownership in Sage. Following this meeting, Bushi's counsel 
wrote a letter to Respondents rejecting their offer and explaining that 
Bushi would continue as a member and retain his rights, includiog 
his tight to a share. in the profits of Sage, until a mutually 
satisfactory agreement had been teached. 
On January 24, 2006, Respondents served Bushi notice that a 
members' meeting would be held on January 30, 2006. The notice 
stated that three items were on the agenda: an amendment to the 
operating agreement; following the amendment, the termination of 
the membership of a member pursuant to the operating agreement as 
amended; and continuation of the business. Bushi's counsel 
appeared at the meering by proxy in Busm's absence. At the 
meeting, Respondents voted to amend Ihe operating agreement to 
require mandatory dissociation of a m¢mber upon an affirmative 
vote by all but one of the members. FolloWing lhe amendment, 
09.61SCR 245 
effective immediately. Applying the formula in the operating 
agreement, Sage's accountant determined that the value of Bushi' s 
membership interest as of January 30, 2006 was $11,245. 
In a letter dated luly II, 2006, Respondents sent two checks to 
Bushi, one for 511,245 (for his membership interest) and one for 
55.138.27 (ror his 2006 pfofit share and for the remainder of his 
2005 profit share, the first part of which Bushi had directed be put 
towards paying off the Wells Pargo credit line). These were 
tendered as full payment upon Bushi's dissociation. By letter dated 
July 18,2006, Bushi's attorney refused tender of the two checks and 
retUrned them . 
As of June 6, 2006, Bushi had not paid off the Wells F8f$o 
credit line and Sage continued '0 be liable for tbat loan. 
Respondent.~ filed a civil action against Bushi in rh¢ Fourth Judic.inl 
District. After the SUit ",as filed, Bushi paid all ampunts due and 
o\iljng to Wells Fargo, and Respondents dismissed the lawsuit. 
Bushi filed lbe instant case on October 19,2006, assening 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of lbe implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment. breach of 
operating agreement. and seeking declaratOry reUef and an equitable 
~counting. Respondents filed an answcr and couDterclaim, 
asserting in the first lXlunt of the counterclaim that Bushi breacbed 
the operating agt'e¢meDt through his use of che Wells Pargo credit 
line and seeking in the second cO\lnt deelaratory relief related to the 
validity of their actions in amending the operating agreement. 
Bushi moved to dismiss count one of the counterclaim, which 
the district court granted 00 grounds that the claim was moot. This 
d~ision has not been appealed. Between the time Bushi filed the 
motion to dismiss and wben the court granted it, Respondents filed 
a motion for summaI}' judgment. As to the viable portion of the 
counterclaim that remained follOwing dismisso.l of the first COUDt. 
RespondeDts asked the 1Xl1.lrt to grant summary judgmetl[ as follows: 
cIeclaring that Bushi' s membcrship in Sage was properly terminated 
under the terms of the operating agreement as amended nnd [ne 
Idaho Limited Liability Company 'Act; declaring that the value of 
Bushi's membership was properly detennincd underthelenn5 of the 
operating agreement and in compliance with the tenns of the Idaho 
Limited Liability Company Act; declaring that the profits of Sage 
were properly determined and distributed among the membors ill 
accordance with the signed written agreements of the members 
regarding distribution of profits; and awarding attomey fees and 
costs to Respondents in the action as a prevailing plU'ty. 
The district COUrt granted Respondents' motion for summary 
judgmenc, finding that: RespondentS did not breach the contraCt with 
Sushi by amending the operating agreement to allow his involuntary 
dissociation; Sushi's allegations of breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing did not create an issue of material fact tbat 
precluded summ81Yjudgment: there were no issues of material fact 
precluding summ8I)' judgment on Bushi's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty; and the valuation provisions upon dissociation W(.,"Te 
clear and unambiguous and Sage's valuation followed those 
provisions. The court awarded Respondents $73,233.19 in attorney 
fees pursuant to I.C. § lZ.l20(3) as well as $$.665 in discretionary 
costS fot expert witness fees. ,. 
Bushi timely appealed the district court's decision. 
Respondents ask for attorney fees on appeal. 
n, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When ,his COUrt reViews a trial coun's decision on summary 
judgment, it employs the same smndard as that properly employed 
by the trial coun when originally ruling on the motion. Kolin v. 
6 ~btf Luke's Reg" Med. Cu., 130 Idaho 323,327,940 P.2d 1142. tt46, (1997) (citing Thomso'l '1'. Irklho Ins. Agency. Inc., 126 Idaho 
- - - - - - -
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construed in favor of rhe non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of 
the non-movins party. UJckheed Marlin Corp. v. Idaho SIDrg Tax 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 190, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). 
"Summ81y judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions. and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits. jf any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Id. 
Dl, ANALYSIS 
Bushi chal1enges the district court's grant of summlUy 
judgment as to his claims for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty. Sushi also asks 
that we reverse the district court's award of attorney fces and costs 
to Respondents. We affirm the district coUrt'S grant of summary 
judgment regarding Bushi's cJaim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair <iealiDg. vacate the district court's 
grant of summary judgment regarding Bushi' s claim for breach of 
fidUcilUy duty, vacate tbc district court's award of attomey fces 
below, and decline to award attorney fees on appeal. 
A. The district court did Dot err wbeD it aranted summary 
judgment ill fa.vor of RespondeQts on Dushi's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
The district court correctly decided that Respondents did not 
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fait dealing. The 
court noted that "[tJhe impJied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing arises only regarding terms agrud to by the partics." Taylor 
v. Browni7lg. 129 Idaho 483,491,92.'7 P.2d 873, 881 (1996) (clung 
ldaJu; First Nat" Bank, 121 Idaho 266,288, 824 P.2d 84), 863 
(1991)). Furthermore: 
No oovenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms 
of the contraCt negotiated and executed by the parties. 
The covenant requires "that the partieS perform in good 
faith the obligations imposed by their agreement," and a 
vioJation of the covenant occurs only when "either party 
... violates. nullifies or significantJy impaits any benefit 
of the ... contraet .... " 
Idaho First Nat'IBat1k v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 288, 824 
P.2d at 863 (citations omitted). Sl.lShi can identify no specific term 
wjtbin the operating agreement that RespondentS breached by 
amending the agreement in order to involuntarily dissociate him. 
Instead, Sushi argues that fte was denied the benefits of the 
original opcrating agreement, which did not expressly allow the 
other members of Sage [0 involuntarily dissociate him. In response 
to tWs contention, me district coun noted [hat: 
[W]hile Sushi claims he "relied" on the then existing 
dissociation provisions which tbe Members changed ... 
the Coon finds that the Operating Agreement also 
specificaJly provides "[oJo Member shalll1ave any vested 
rigbtS in the Company Agreement wbich may not be 
modified through an amendment to the Company 
Agreement." Article XIV, Section 1. Therefore. such 
reliance, to the extent reasonable at aU, was simply not 
justified and his argument is sp~ous. 
The COM reiterated that, in any case, "contract temlS are D.Q! 
overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 
(Citing Clement v. FQl'l'Mrs Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298, 300, 766 
P.2o. 768,770 (1988): Olson v. Idaho SUlce Un.iv., 125 Idaho 177, 
182,868 P.2d 505, 510 (Cr. App. 1994)) (empbasis in original). 
We agree with the district COutl. Sushi cannot show thal 
Respondents violated, nullified, or significantly impaired the 
operating agreement. and thus llis contention that R.espondents acted 
in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails to 
create an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
Bushi also argues that Respondents breached the covenant by voting 
to deny Sushi profit sharing in 2006. Despile their vote, 
RespondentS did (ender to Bushi his share of the 2006 ,profitS, and 
Bushi nas not aJleSed any further contract damages as a result of the 
vote. Thus. this claim also fails to 'Preclude summary judgment 
Consequently, we affmn the district court's grant of summary 
judgment regarding Sushi's assertion that Respondents breached che 
impJied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
B. The district court erred by concluding that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact pretluding summary 
judgment OQ Sushi's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
In Ol'der "[tJo establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, [a] 
plaintiff must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary 
duty and that the fidueilUy duty was breached." Tolley v. THI Co., 
140 Idaho 253, 261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004) (citation omitted). 
Respondents do not contend that they did not owe Sushi fiduciary 
duties; rather, they assert that tbey did nOl breach Lhose duties. 
Although tbis is not a disputed point of law, this COUrt has not yet 
directly addressed the question of whether members of a limited 
liability company owe each other fiduciary duties. Accordingly. we 
address this threshold question before conSidering whether there is 
a gcowne issue of material fact whether there was a breach of 
Respondents' fidueiary duties to Bushi. 
ldaho's origiDalsct governing llmitedliability companies, the 
Idaho Limited LiabiJity Company Act. is codified at I.C. §§ 53·601 
et seq. I Idaho Code § 53.622 identifi~ certain specific duties that 
members of an LLC owe to one another; 110wc\'er. it does not use 
the term "fiduciary." does not state that it is an exhaustive Ust of 
duties members owe one another. and does not address the conduct 
at issue in this case. In l008, the Iegislarute enacted c:omprehensive 
amendments (0 me statutory scbeme through the Idaho Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, LC. §§ 30·6-101 er seq. 2008 S.L. 
ch. 176, § I, p. 480. The new act states unequi vocally that members 
of an LLC owe each other me fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. 
I.C. § 30-6-409(1). Until My 1,2010, the origjnal act govems all 
limited liability-companies formed prior to July 1,2008 that do not 
elect to be subject to the new act. I.C. § 30·6·1] 04. Sage was 
formed prior to July), 2008, and tWs litigation began prior to the 
enactment of the new act. Thus, the original act governs this case. 
While the original act does not expressly state that members of 
an LLC owe one anoti1er ficluciasydulies, it does state thac "(u)nless 
displaced by particular provisions of this chaptet, the ptinciples of 
law and equity supplement the proviSions of this ohapter." I.C. § 
53-668(2). It appears that the majority of courts considering the 
issue have concluded that member.; of an LLC owe one another the 
fidudaty duties of trust and loyalty. See NTS Am. Jur. 2d Limited 
Liability Companies § 11 (2008) (citing McContUlll \I. Hunt SportS 
EnL, '72S N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio App. 1999) (holding a limited liability 
company, like 11 partnership, involves a fiduciary relationship); 
Purcell v. Sou/hem Hills Investmems, UC, 847 N.E.2d 991 and. 
App. 2006) (holding that common law fiduciary duties, similar to 
the ones imposed on partnerships and closely-held corporations, are 
applicable to Indiana u..cs). We conclude that, under Idaho's 
original LLC act, members of an LLC owe one another fiduciary 
I The leeislature repealed the Idaho Limited Liability Company Aot 






~UN LAW U~~l~t 
SUSHi v. SAOEHEALTH CARE 
dudes. 
Generally, wbether a fiduciaty has bteached his duty is a 
question of fact. See First Bank & Trust o/Idaho 11. Jones, 111 
Idaho 481. 484. 72S P.2d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 1986) {holding 
question of (eet precluding summary judgment existed as to whether 
there was breach of panners' fidudary duties regarding status of 
certain property as partnership propeny)j Musselman Y. Southwinds 
Realty, 704P.2d 814, 816 (Ariz. App. 1985) (noting rule of law that 
whether a fiduciaJY duty has been breached is a question ot tact for 
the jury). 
In addressing Bushi's claim for breach of fidueiary duty, the 
district coun stated; "Whether the other Sage Health Care Members 
owed a fiduciary duty to Busbi under these circumstances and with 
respect ttl IIIe buy-our offers is debacable." (Emphasis added). By 
this statement. llIe district coun seems to have been acknowledging 
that the question of whether Respondents breached their fiduciary 
duties to Bushi is a question of fact ana that the facts surrounding 
Bushi's termination are disputed. The coun Went on to State 
however that "breach of fiduciary duty is a ton claim and Bushi 
failed to introduce any case law that stands for lhe-proposition that 
a breach of fiduciary duty precludes enforcemenc of a contract." 
This latter statement appears to reflect the ttial court's view that 
summary judgment on this issue was appropriate as a matter of law, 
despite the existence of disputed facrs, because those facts were not 
material in light of the legal conclusion. This was etTOt. 
While it is uue that generally a member of an LLC is not liable 
to the LLC or any oCher member for actions taken in compliance 
witb che operating agreement. Che member must bave relied on the 
piOvisions of the agreem~t in good faith. Schafer v. RMS Rtflll)" 
741 N.E.2d ISS, 175-76 (Ohio App.2(00). In Schtifer, the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio considered ·whether Schafer. a mjnority partner jn 
a realty pl\J1llcrship, had ~ c.lnim fOt breach of fiduciary duty against 
tbe partnership and the other parme.rs when, in compliance with tbe 
partnership agreement, the other panners bsued a capital call that 
Schafer could not meet. [d. at 162. Schafer's failure to meet the call 
triggeted a provision in the partnership agreement that diluted the 
interest of any panner who could not meet a call. It Schafer'S 
interest decreased from twenty-five to nineteen percent pursuant to 
tbe dilution provision. and this result was, Schafer claimed, the true 
motivation for the call. [d. 
Like Respondents, the partners in Schafer urged that no breach 
of fiduciary duty had occurred since their actions were taken in 
compliance with the partnership agreement. Id. at 17S. The Schafer 
court began its analysis of this argument by loo.king to itS earlier 
decision in l.4igh \/. Crescent Square, Ltd .. 608 N.E.2d 1166 (Ohio 
App. 1992), in which one panner claimed the other partners 
breached their fiduciaIj' duties [0 him when tbey voted to expel him 
from the partnership without prior notice. [d. at 1167-68. The 
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partners, even though he acted in accord with the pannership 
agreement. ld. at 306. Specifically, the Labovit:z court stated. that: 
It is no answer (0 the claims that plaintiffs make in this 
case that partners have the right co establish among 
themselves their right$, duties and obligations, as though 
the exercise oC that right rcleas~s, waives or delimit$ 
somehow the high fiduciary duty owed to them by the 
general panner·a gloss we do nol find anywhere in our 
law. On the contrary, the fiduciary duty eXlst$ 
concurrently with the obligations set forth in the 
pannersbip agreement Whether or not expressed. therein. 
Jd. at 310. Applying this rule. the Scha/(JI' court affirmed tbe jury's 
fincling thac the other partners breached chelf fiduciary duties to 
Schafer when they caused his ownership interest to be diluted: 
(W]hile the partnership agreement allowed thl'. panner5 to 
voce for capital calls "as required for the purposes of the 
partnership," the majority's ability jn this regard was 
"encumbered by [the] supreme fiduciary duly of fairness, 
honesty, sood faith, and Joyalty" to their minority parmer. 
LabOvilz, 54S N.E.2d at 313. 
741 N.E.2d at 179. Similarly, even if Respondents' actions in 
dissociating Bushi were technically in compliance with the terms of 
the opetatiJag agreement, this does not necessarily bar Bushi' s claim 
for breach of fiduciary ducy if those actions were improperly 
motivated.2 
Responcient$ offer a number of reasons why they terminated 
Bushi, inCluding: their concern that Bushi's romance could subject 
chem to potential liability undet federal Jaw; their view that Bushi's 
association with a competitor of Sage breached the operating 
agreement; anel, finally, tbe fact that Sushi ran up approximately 
$60.000 in debt On Sage's line of credit without the knowledge 01 
authorization of the other members of Sllge, also in breaeh of the 
operating agreement. Bushi. however, aUcgc.s that Respondents 
were motivated by financial gain. He points out that each member 
of Sage, in applying for the line of credit with WeUs Parse, valued 
his membership interest at $250,000. In contraSt, Sage's accountant 
determined that Bushi's interest in Sage was $11,2A5 under the 
cenns of the operating agreement governing disso~iation of a 
member. 
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Bushi' s favor. this Courc 
cannot conclude that Ulere is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
Respondents' motivation in dissociating Sushi. A reasonable person 
Leigh COUrt held that the lack of norice of the ouster did not • Respondents cite to McConnell v. Hunt SpOriS Em., 725 N.E.2d ! J 93 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty because the expulsion was not (Ohio App. 1999), for their argument that compliance with an agrtcmcnt 
initiated in order fOT the remaining partners to extract financial gain. precludes a finding ofbl'¢ach of fiduoil\JY duty. Rospondents correctly note 
Jd. at 1170. The Scha/el· courc extrapolared Crom this holding that that in McConMII''the coun beld that there had been no breach of fiduciary 
"wbether a technical breach has occurred is not the sole duty because ... (u]nder the operating agreement, tile members wen: not 
consideration" because "actions talren in accordance with [an prohibited ftom engaging In a venture that was competitive with the 
operating] agreement can still bc a breach ot fiduciary duty if company's investing in ... a national hockey league franchise." This 
holding does not defeat Bushi', claim tha! Respondents breached their 
[members) have improperly taken advantage of their position to fiducl81l' duties to him by terminating his membcrJlhip in orderlo increase 
obtain financial gain." 741 N.E.2d at 175. their individual interests in Sage. The operating agreement in McCOIIflt!111 
The Schaf!!r court then turned [0 a case in which action taken specifically allowed the members 10 take the action complained ofin that 
in accordance with an operating agreement did result in a breach of case. Jd... 725 ~.E.2d at J.212 (hot~ing that it could not be considered a 
fiduciary duties. ld. at 177.78. In LAbovirz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d breach offid.uClary duty, an and ofltsclf, for a member ofan LLC to 
compete against the LLC because the operating agreement allowed sucb 
304 an',APp. 1~89), the court he~d ~at a general partne: who used 6 4 ~petition). 8yeonlrast, there is no provision in [he Sage agreementtbat 
econonnC coerCIon to make the lunl!ed parmers sell thear shares to -...duthorizcs removal ofmcmbcn in ordN 1.0 in~"..u,. thr III.hll' nrrh" 
MA~. j I. ~UU~ I: jurM U~UN LAW Urrj(,;t~ 
09.61SCR 24R 
could infer that Respondents acted in bad faith by removing Bushi 
from the LLC in order to advance their personal financial interests. 
If that were the cas~ Respondents would be liable to Bu&bi despite 
their technical compliance with the operating agreement 
Accordingly, we vacate the diStriot court's grant of summary 
judgment with respect to this issue and remand to the district coUrt 
for further proceedings. 
C. The award or attorney tees below is vacated nod no 
attorney fees are awarded on appeal 
Because we vacate the district court'S grant of summary 
judgment and remand for further proceedings with respect to 
Bushi's breach of fiduciary duty claim, Respondents can no longer 
be considered the prevailing party below. Thus. we vacate the 
district court's award of attorney fees. 
We conclude !hat thereis no prevailing pany on appeal because 
we bave affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as 
to Bushi's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and \'acated the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as to Busbi's claim for breach of fiduciary duties. 
Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fcos or costs on appeal. 
IV, CONCLVSION 
In ligbt of the fact that Bushi is unable to point to any breach 
of the operating agreement. wc affirm the disttict court's grant of 
sumnwy judgment as to his claim of breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. However, ·because Respondents, 
despite having technically complied with the operating agreement, 
may have acted in bad faith in temUnating Dushi. we vacate the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Respondents and 
remand for further proceedings on Busbi's claim of breacJl of 
fiduciary duty.) The district court's award of attorney fees is 
vacated. No attorney fees Or costs are awarded on appeal. 
Iustices BURDICK, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tern 
KIDWELL, CONCUR. 
1. JONES, 1., specially concurring. 
r concur in the Coun's opinion, particularly the Court's 
statement of the law. My concern relateS to the substanee of Bushi' s 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In my estimation, Bushi barely 
cleared !he hurdle for surviving summary judgment. The record 
contained a bare minimum of facts [0 back up Bush!' s assertion that 
the other members of Sage took the action they did in oreler to obtain 
improper gains at his expense. It is somewhat difficult to overlook 
the fact that Bushi improperly took advantage ofthe.company·s line 
of ctedit for his personal benefit. On tbe other hand, Sage did not 
aSSign major importance to this fact as a ground for dissociating 
Bushi until well after the dissociation. In any cVent, 1 agree that 
thete was just enough in the record to allow bim to survive summary 
judgment. leavins it to tbe trier of fact to sort OUt these matters. 
, The cfislrict court found that, because Bushl bad refused tender of his 
membenhip interest and outstallding share of profits as determined under 
the operating agreement, he suffered no damages. ihis is incolTect, and 
Respondents acknowledsed at oral argument that barring 8 diffmnt 
outcome upon remand to the district coun they must re-tender tbose: funds 
to Sushi. 
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J. JONES, Justice 
This class action lawsuit arises OUt of a decision by the Idaho 
State Insurance Fund (the Fund) to distribute dividends pursuant to 
i.C. § 72-915' only to those policyholders who paid more than 
$2,500.00 in premiums. The Plaintiffs - those policyholders whose 
annual premiums were .52.500.00 or less - sued the Pund, itS 
Manager, and its Board of Dil:cctors' for damages and injunctive 
relief. Both parties movrd for partial summary juelgment regarding 
the interpretation of I.e. § 7~915. The district court denied the 
Plaintiffs' motion and gran led the Fund's motion. We reverse anel 
remand. 
L 
The Fund was created in 1917 [0 provide worker's 
compensation insurance to Idaho employers. particularly chose 
employers who could Dot otherwise obtain insurance from private 
carriers. Set I.C. § 72-901. The Board of Directors sets the FundI, 
policies while the Manager conducts the Fund's day-to-day 
operations. I.C. §§ 72·901 & 902. Since the Fund's inception, the 
Manager has, on occasion, distributed a dividend to policyholders 
pursuant to 1.C. § 72·915. This dividend is different (rom 'he 
dividend issued to stockhOlders of a corporation and is instead more 
aptly described as a refund of unused premium. Set id. From at 
, This opinion will rcfI:r 10 the defendants collectively as "the Fund." 
OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAI )SS 
FILED & -15--01 
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Case No. CV 20086752 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, et al. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 




As part of plaintiff Jacklin Land Company's (Jacklin) development of the 
Riverbend Commerce Park, which was platted in 1988, Jacklin recorded an original set 
of covenants, "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Riverbend 
Commerce Park." Affidavit of Tom Stoeser, Exhibit B. These covenants were later 
amended in 1989. The amended covenants encumbered the property which is 
presently leased by defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc. (Blue Dog), which is the subject of this 
litigation. Affidavit of Tim Stoeser, Exhibit C. 
In 1990, Quality Centers Associates (QCA), the predecessor in interest of 
defendant KL Properties, Inc. (KLP), wished to purchase the property KLP now owns, 
and QCA asked Jacklin to remove the 1989 covenants then in effect, as a matter of 
title. Jacklin agreed on the terms and conditions memorialized in the QCA/Jacklin 
Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), dated November 7, 1990, which removed the 
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then-existing Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions in return for QCA 
agreeing: (1) to construct and maintain a first-class shopping center; (2) to work with 
Jacklin to achieve a mutually accepted design and appearance for the shopping center, 
and (3) to agree to comply with Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declarations of Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions recorded in 1988, as subsequently amended. Affidavit of 
Pat Leffel, Exhibit B. This agreement between QCA and Jacklin was unique to the 
property now at issue, Lots 1 to 4 (of Lots 1 to 17) of Block 1 of Phase I of the 
development, and differs from the covenants applicable to the Riverbend Commerce 
Park generally. After purchasing lots 1 to 17, QCA worked with Jacklin and achieved a 
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the Factory Outlets on Lots 5-17 of 
Block 1. In 2005, KLP purchased the property from QCA, including Lots 1 to 17 of 
Block 1. 
On July 1, 2008, Blue Dog entered into a lease with KLP for Lots 1-4 of Block 1. 
Jacklin filed its motion for summary judgment on December 11, 2008. Jacklin moves 
for summary judgment on its claims for a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of the 
property for an RV dealership/facility and for declaratory judgment that the uses the 
defendants have put the property to violate the QCAlJackiin Agreement. Defendants 
argue no interpretation of the Agreement would prohibit Blue Dog's RV Center. 
Defendants argue Jacklin has not made a showing of irreparable injury to support 
injunctive relief. Defendants argue Jacklin itself breached the Agreement. Finally, 
defendants argue defendants' waiver and estoppel defenses preclude summary 
judgment in Jacklin's favor. On February 17, 2009, defendants filed "Defendants 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment." Following extensive briefing and submission of 
affidavits by both parties, which the Court has considered, oral argument was heard on 
March 3, 2009. On March 31,2009, Jacklin filed a "Supplemental Citation of Authority 
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by Plaintiff." That supplemental authority is Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 2009 
Opinion No. 30, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4, 2009), a case concerning good faith and fair 
dealing. The cross-motions for summary judgment are at issue. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is mindful that 
summary judgment may properly be granted only where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 
56(c). In determining whether any issue of material fact exists, this court must construe 
all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, together 
with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P. 
56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 
1985). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Samuel v. Hepworth, 
Nungester& Lezamiz, Inc., 134, Idaho 84,87,996 P.2d 303, 306 (2002). Summary 
judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No.2, 
128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996). 
Where, as here, both parties file motions for summary judgment relying on the 
same facts, issues and theories, the judge, as trier of fact, may resolve conflicting 
inferences if the record reasonably supports the inferences. Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518-20,650 P.2d 657,661-62 (1982). Where both parties file 
motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the fact 
that both parties have filed summary judgment motions alone does not in itself establish 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 
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515, 518, 650 P .2d 657, 661, n. 1. This is so because by filing a motion for summary 
judgment a party concedes that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the 
theory that he is advancing, but does not thereby concede that no issues remain in the 
event that his adversary seeks summary judgment upon different issues of theories. Id. 
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
jUdgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id. 
III. MOTIONS PRIOR TO CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Jacklin's Objection to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is Denied. 
Jacklin objected to defendant's Cross-Motion for summary judgment as being 
untimely under I.R.C.P. 56. Affidavit of John Magnuson in Support of Plaintiffs 
Objection and Motion to Strike Defendants' Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. 
Jacklin moves this Court to strike the cross-motion for summary judgment as it cannot 
now timely conduct additional discovery and meaningfully respond. Id. Defendants 
urge the Court to deny the motion to strike because its cross-motion addresses the 
same legal and factual issues as Jacklin's motion for summary judgment. Defendant's 
Reply Memorandum, pp. 2-3. Defendants state they could not prepare responsive 
briefing until after depositions could be taken in late January. Id., p. 3. 
Idaho' Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires motions and affidavits for summary 
judgment and proceedings thereon to be filed 28 days before hearing, and responsive 
affidavits and answering briefs are to be served 14 days before hearing. "The court 
may alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this n:rle for good cause 
shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney's fees and sanctions 
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against a party, a party's attorney, or both." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment was set for March 3, 2009. Jacklin filed its motion and 
memorandum in support on December 11, 2008. Defendants filed their cross-motion, 
memorandum in support, and motion to shorten time on February 17, 2009. It will be 
noted that defendants failed to ask permission from this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court 
(scheduling clerk) to add hearing on defendants' motions. On February 25, 2009, 
Jacklin filed an objection to the cross-motion and motion to shorten time, along with its 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (addressing 
Defendants' cross-motion). Jacklin's reply memorandum is forty-two pages in length 
and thoroughly rebuts defendants' factual assertions. Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 7-20. 
Sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 are a matter left to the Court's discretion as 
evidenced by the Rule's "may" language. Similarly, evidentiary rulings, such as ones on 
the motion to strike before the Court, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,50,995 P.2d 816, 820 
(2000). Where, as here, a party has time to respond and address the arguments in the 
opposing party's untimely filing, it is unlikely that they are prejudiced. I.R.C.P.61 
instructs the Court that, at every stage of a proceeding, the Court "must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." I.R.C.P. 61; See McClure Engineering, Inc. v. ChannelS KIDA, 143 Idaho 
950, 155 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Ct. App. 2006). For example, the Court of Appeals has 
declined to reverse summary judgment merely because the summary judgment motion 
and supporting documents were not mailed to the opposing party at least thirty-one 
days in advance of the hearing as [then] required by I.R.C.P. 56(c). Ponderosa Paint 
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310,317,870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court 
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of Appeals held that technical error did not require reversal because the appellants had 
not demonstrated whether, if given additional time, they could have submitted evidence 
or legal argument that would have prevented summary judgment against them. Id. The 
only party arguably prejudiced here is the Court, who received Jacklin's objection on 
February 26, 2009, and Defendants' Reply Memorandum on March 2, 2009. This Court 
denied the objection and motion to strike brought by Jacklin on the record on March 3, 
2009. 
B. Jacklin's Motion to Supplement the Record is Granted. 
Jacklin moved this Court for an Order allowing it to supplement the record 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and 56(c) because defendants opposed its motion for 
summary judgment and had submitted extensive excerpts from Pat Leffel's and Tom 
Stoeser's deposition transcripts. Leffel is a former employee of Jacklin, and Stoeser is 
a current employee and the I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deponent. Motion to Supplement the 
Record, pp. 2-3. Jacklin's proposed submissions, attached to the Affidavit of John 
Magnuson Submitted Pursuant to Motion Under I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and I.R.C.P. 56(c), 
were proffered because the excerpts submitted by defendants "did not include portions 
of the referenced deposition transcripts, and certain exhibits referred to therein ... " Id., 
p. 3. As set forth by Jacklin, I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) states, "[i]f only a part of a deposition is 
offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require the party to introduce any 
other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any 
party may introduce any other parts." Whether portions of depositions should or should 
not "in fairness" be admitted is a matter for the discretion of the Court. Slack v. Kelleher, 
140 Idaho 916,924,104 P.3d 958,966 (2004) (citing State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 
180,687 P.2d 570 (1984». 
Defendants argue Jacklin has not identified any deposition pages or exhibits 
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cited to in defendants' briefing which was not attached to a submitted Affidavit. 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum, p. 4. The deposition pages Jacklin identified in its 
motion to supplement were not referenced by defendants and were therefore not 
submitted. Id. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the Court has discretion to 
determine whether portions of transcripts ought in fairness be considered with portions 
already introduced, and either party may introduce any other parts of depositions. See 
I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4). This Court granted Jacklin's motion to supplement the record at the 
hearing on March 3, 2009, recognizing the decision to be a matter of discretion. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The QCA/Jacklin Agreement is Enforceable Against Defendants. 
1. This is a "Use" Agreement. 
As a starting point, the two parties cannot agree as to whether this is a use 
agreement or a development agreement. Defendants in their brief call the agreement a 
"Development Agreement" on more than twenty occasions in five pages of briefing. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 15-
20. Defendants claim that the term "use agreement" is found nowhere in the 
Agreement. Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 6. While the Agreement does not 
contain the phrase "use agreement", it does contain the word "use". While the 
Agreement does not contain the phrase "development agreement", it also does not 
even contain the word "development." This Court finds, as Jacklin correctly points out: 
"Actually, the 'Development Agreement,' a moniker invented by Defendants since the 
word 'development' does not appear in the Agreement, actually contains the word 'use'. 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 25. The 
November 6, 1990, Agreement between Jacklin and QCA reads in pertinent part: 
The parties agree as follows: 
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In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block one, Riverbend 
Commerce Park, Phase I, City of Post Falls, County of Kootenai, Idaho 
("Purchased Property"), by Purchaser and the removal of record on even 
date herewith ofthat certain Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions (as amended) as it affects the Purchased Property, and other 
good and valuable consideration, Purchaser agrees: (i) to construct and 
maintain upon said Purchased Property, a first class shopping center 
which shall be in compliance with all state and local building codes and 
ordinances; (ii) to work together with Seller to achieve a mutually 
acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it shall 
be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend 
Commerce Park; and (iii) despite its removal of record as to the 
Purchased Property, Purchaser agrees to comply and conform to Articles 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in those Declarations of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions recorded * * * which are incorporated herein 
by this reference in its use and maintenance of the Purchased Property 
excepting those which are inapplicable to a retail shopping center (as shall 
be mutually agreed upon) or which violate applicable local building codes 
and ordinances. 
Purchaser's obligations under this Agreement shall terminate in the 
event it no longer owns the Purchased Property, but said obligations shall 
inure to and be binding upon Purchaser's successors and/or assigns. 
Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit G; Cordes Affidavit, Exhibit B. (bold added). 
2. Incorporation of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. 
Jacklin argues the Agreement specifically incorporates Articles 2-6 of the 
covenants in force at time of QCA's closing on the property (and binding on QCA's 
successors). Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 12. 
Defendants argue the Articles were previously terminated as the Amendment to the 
Covenants, dated November 7, 1990, terminates the restrictions of the 1990 and prior 
CC&Rs. Affidavit of Hines, Exhibit E. Jacklin responds this termination was made 
pursuant to the Agreement and at the time the Agreement was filed, two minutes prior 
to the filing of the Amendment, the 1990 CC&Rs were still in effect. Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 29. Jacklin also points 
out defendants cite no support for the proposition that parties cannot contractually 
incorporate covenant restrictions found in another recorded document. Defendants 
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reply the Agreement merely references CC&Rs that were null and void at the time the 
Agreement was executed and recorded." Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 9 .. 
However, despite the fact that the Agreement was executed on November 7, 1990, and 
the Amendment was executed on October 16, 1990, the Agreement was filed before 
filing of the Amendment and the Agreementexplicitly states, " ... on removal of record on 
even date herewith of that certain Declaration of Covenants, Condition, and Restrictions 
(as amended) as it affects the Purchased Property ... " Affidavit of Leffel, Exhibit B. It is 
without question that the property was removed from the Riverbend Commerce Park 
Covenants as part of consideration for sale and that Articles 2-6 were intended to 
remain binding. 
Defendants argue Articles 2-6 do not prohibit Blue Dog's use as its use is a light 
industrial and commercial use and is not one of the specific uses prohibited. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 20. 
Jacklin responds that storage yards are specifically prohibited by Article 6, and while 
not all RV sales facilities constitute storage yards, this one does. Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 31. Further, if there is any question as 
to whether using four unimproved lots to house RVs is appropriate, Jacklin argues 
Article 6(5) provides, "any use which is arguably in conflict with this Declaration ... shall 
be submitted and approved." Id. To this, defendants reply its use is not that of a 
storage yard; the RVs are inventory which are sold in the due course of business. 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 8. However, as Jacklin has filed suit seeking relief, 
clearly there exists a conflict as to use, and no request for approval has been made by 
defendants. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 
31. As to Articles 4 (signage), 3 (parking), 5 (lot usage and 5 ft. parking setback), and 2 
(landscaping), defendants argue they are only triggered when the property has been 
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developed, which Blue Dog has not done. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21. Jacklin urges the Court to read all 
portions of the Articles in conjunction and consider the requirements that undeveloped 
areas be maintained in a weed-free and dust-controlled condition, be landscaped if 
required, and have groundcover maintained so as not to detract from the aesthetics of 
the Development. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 
32. Jacklin also states no requests for approval of conflicting uses, signage, parking 
plan, landscaping, or temporary uses have been submitted for approval by defendants. 
Id., p. 31. 
Defendants argue Blue Dog made efforts at site improvement which were 
rendered futile by Jacklin's refusal to work with defendants on site issues. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 21- 22. In 
response, Jacklin points out the only offer of improvements made was to fund providing 
of gravel, which Jacklin argues does not comport with the paving requirement found in 
the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Jacklin also argues its Rule 30(b)(6) 
deponent only stated the current use of the property was not capable of being 
approved, not that no RV park would ever be approved. Id., p. 34. Defendants' 
argument still does not provide the Court with definitive evidence of its attempts 
(beyond the gravel) to work together with Jacklin or to submit for approval uses which 
arguably conflict with the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. 
Defendants argue Jacklin breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by refusing to work with defendants to develop a site plan and thereby has 
breached the Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 24. Defendants argue violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
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dealing occurs when either party nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the 
contract. Id., p. 25. Jacklin responds that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot override express provisions in a bargained-for contract. Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 38. Although defendants point to the 
testimony of Jacklin's Property Manager, Leffel, stating that Jacklin categorically 
refused to work with defendants to address concerns about "Blue Dog's shopping 
center operation," (Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 26), this testimony presupposes that Jacklin had mutually agreed to the design and 
appearance of the RV shopping center location. The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this opinion. 
This Court finds as a matter of law that the Agreement specifically incorporates 
Articles 2-6 of the covenants in force at time of QCA's closing on the property (and 
binding on QCA's successors). 
3. Violation of the Agreement by Blue Dog/KLP. 
Jacklin argues the Agreement is enforceable as covenants restricting use of 
privately-owned land are valid under Idaho law. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 4. Jacklin states because restrictive covenants are analyzed 
under the principles of contract construction, the Court must determine if a given 
covenant is ambiguous. If the covenant is not ambiguous, the Court applies the plain 
meaning. If the covenant is ambiguous, the Court determines the intent of the parties 
at the time of drafting. Id., pp. 4-5. While Jacklin argues "first-class shopping center" 
has a common meaning and is unambiguous, defendants argue the term is never 
defined, that even Jacklin admitted it does not know the distinction between a first, 
second, or third-class shopping center, and that its RV shopping center does not violate 
any definition of first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
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Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. Jacklin argues that no matter what 
definition is given the term, defendants' "circus-like flea market" certainly would not 
equate to a first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 8. Jacklin goes on to argue defendants made no effort to "work 
, 
together" with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance. 
Defendants respond that it made efforts at site improvement, offering to spend in 
excess of $50,000, but Jacklin categorically rejected its efforts. Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21. 
As argued by the parties, Idaho recognizes covenants restricting the free use of 
land as valid and enforceable, 
[h]owever, since restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common 
law right to use land for all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by 
implication any restriction not clearly expressed. Further, all doubts are to 
be resolved in favor of the free use of land. 
Berezowski v. Schuman, 141 Idaho 532,535, 112 P.3d 820, 823 (2005). Courts apply 
the general rules of contract construction to covenants. Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. 
Brooks, 138 Idaho 826,829,70 P.3d 664,667 (2003). A covenant is ambiguous if 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation; if a covenant is unambiguous, the 
court must apply its plain meaning as a matter of law. Id. If a covenant is ambiguous, 
its interpretation is a matter of fact. Intermountain Eye and Laser Centers, PLLC v. 
Miller, 142 Idaho 218,221,127 P.3d 121,125 (2005). Ambiguity is not established 
simply because parties present differing interpretations to the court. Rim View Trout 
Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,823,828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992). Thus, this Court must 
view the agreement as a whole to determine the intent of the parties at the time of 
contracting. See Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813,817, 172 P.3d 1088, 
1092 (2007). 
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The Agreement at issue, despite defendants' argument to the contrary, clearly 
binds them to construct and maintain a first-class shopping center, to work with Jacklin 
to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and 
to conform to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Defendants argue the Agreement is not a "use" 
restriction and does not state how the lots are to be used. Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. This Court disagrees, and 
finds the Agreement does concern how the property is to be used. 
What is crystal clear to this Court, and beyond doubt, is that the Agreement 
requires defendants to work with Jacklin to ensure the first-class shopping center to be 
compatible with other uses within the Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit of Pat 
Leffel, Exhibit B; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 
25. Defendants next argue its obligation to construct and maintain a first-class 
shopping center was complied with because QCA constructed the Factory Outlets and 
no further development was required. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 17. But this argument does not take into account 
that only lots 5-17 encompass the Factory Outlets, and Blue Dog, on lots 1-4, has not 
complied with the requirements of the Agreement. See Reply memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 26. Defendants argue its operation is a first-class 
shopping center as it is a retailer selling high-end RV units. Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. But defendants made no 
attempt to work with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance 
for the shopping center compatible with other uses, and even if Blue Dog's RV sales 
could be a fist-class shopping center, to date there has been no working together to 
achieve a "mutually acceptable" design and appearance. Reply Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 26. Defendants argue Blue Dog's use is 
temporary and the agreement does not prohibit temporary use prior to construction of a 
first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 18. Jacklin responds that a five-year lease is not temporary 
and the only reference to temporariness in the Agreement (Article 3 on parking 
incorporated by reference thereto) precludes temporary parking on unimproved lots 
unless prior to or during construction and not to exceed six months. Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27. Defendants' final 
argument on this issue is that a first-class shopping center must only be constructed 
after development of the lots, and Blue Dog has never developed the property. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 19. 
Jacklin responds the Agreement is a use agreement and defendants never worked 
together with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable aesthetically-pleasing design and 
appearance for the shopping center compatible with other uses in the Riverbed 
Commerce Park. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 
28. 
Ultimately, any interpretation of the use of "first-class shopping center" is left to 
the Court as the trier of fact. This will be a Court trial, not a jury trial. It appears from a 
plain reading of the Agreement and the Articles of the Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions incorporated therein, that Jacklin sought the purchaser 
(and thus the successors now before the Court) to build a shopping center which all 
parties found aesthetically pleasing and which was compatible with the uses already in 
place at the Riverbend Commerce Park. The approval of QCA's Factory Outlets 
provides the Court with an idea of what Jacklin found acceptable. This Court agrees 
with Jacklin's argument: "the First phase of the Factory Outlet Malls, as constructed 
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and as depicted on Ex. H, constitutes irrefutable objective evidence of the parties' 
understanding as to the use of the phrase 'first-class shopping center." Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10. Although the parties 
dispute what "first-class" is and whether Blue Dog's RV sales is first-class, a large 
difference exists between the QCA's Factory Outlets approved by Jacklin in the past, 
and Blue Dog's business, and the reason for that difference was QCA's adherence to 
the Agreement. Jacklin states QCA worked with it to achieve a mutually acceptable 
design and appearance and operated consistent with the Agreement. Plaintiffs 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, p. 8,11 23 (citing Affidavit of Tom Stoeser, p. 8, 
11 20). Jacklin claims defendants made no effort at any time to take corrective action. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11. Certainly there is no 
evidence in the record of the defendants' working together with Jacklin to achieve a 
mutually acceptable design. Defendants point to their offer to spend $50,000 to make 
site improvements, but this offer relates specifically to its obligations under the Articles. 
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgemnt, pp. 21-22. Jacklin 
states it refused Blue Dog's offer to spend $50,000 as the offer would only provide 
gravel while the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions required paving. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. 
Defendants argue: "It is further undisputed that Jacklin categorically failed to 
work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns that Jacklin had or to work 
on an acceptable plan. Russell Aff. 11 20; Cordes Aff. 11 19; Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 63-
65; Exh. B. pp. 65, 67, 126." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 11, see also p. 24-26. Cordes' Affidavit reads: 
19. Moreover, at no time did Jacklin ever attempt to work with KLP 
to address any concerns that Jacklin had with respect to Blue Dog's 
operation. The only option Jacklin ever gave KLP was to have Blue Dog 
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immediately vacate the property or be sued. Exhibit C. Jacklin never 
made any attempt to work with Blue Dog or KLP on a site plan or to 
address any site concerns with Blue Dog's operation. KLP even offered 
to spend upwards of $50,000 to make site improvements, which Jacklin 
summarily rejected. In fact, Jacklin responded that any site plan 
submitted by Blue Dog and/or KLP would have been rejected, and no site 
improvements would be satisfactory to placate their opposition. 
Cordes' Affidavit, p. 8, 1f 19. As pointed out by Jacklin, there is no citation to any part of 
the record to support Cordes' claim. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. The only citation is to Exhibit C, a string of 
emails in which at one time Pat Leffel of Jacklin wrote on July 15, 2008: "Not sure if 
you gave Blue Dog RVa date when they would need to move but we would like Blue 
Dog RVoffthe site within the next 10 days." In context, that string of emails shows it 
was the use to which Blue Dog and KLP made of the property to which Jacklin 
objected. That use, to which Blue Dog had already made of the property, for which no 
prior approval had ever been sought by Blue Dog and KLP, was non-compliant, and as 
such, Jacklin was pointing out it would not be approved. See Plaintiffs Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. A few weeks after 
this email string, on August 5, 2008, Jacklin advised Blue Dog and KLP: 
Any use proposed under Section 6 must be submitted for prior approval 
by the project owner or its representative. No such approval was sought 
nor would it be given given the inconsistent nature of the Blue Dog RV 
Center. 
Id., Complaint, Exhibit D. The point is, given the terms of the Agreement, approval 
needed to be sought by Blue Dog and KLP in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog 
simply started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from anyone. 
Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement. Thus, defendants' argument that 
" ... Jacklin categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site 
concerns that Jacklin had or to work on an acceptable plan", ignores the fact that Blue 
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Dog's business, which was already existing, at that time failed to conform with the 
Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 11. Blue Dog put itself in violation by starting its business without 
checking (or if it checked, then disregarding) the terms of the Agreement. When Blue 
Dog is already in violation of the Agreement, through only its own fault, why would 
Jacklin have a duty to "work with" Blue Dog on an acceptable plan? Keep in mind the 
Agreement at subsection ii, reads: "[QCAlKLP's predecessor agrees] to work together 
with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the 
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses 
within Riverbend Commerce Park." There was no "mutually acceptable design" to be 
worked toward because Blue Dog had already implemented its business. This Court 
finds Jacklin's following argument persuasive: 
Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to 
undertake sUbstantial site improvements on the four undeveloped lots, 
including landscaping and surface work." See Russell Affidavit at 11 23. 
He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do "to satisfy 
Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." !!1. Offering to pay 
$50,000 to put gravel on four vacant lots without addressing the paving 
requirement, as clearly specified in the November 1999 Covenants, 
together with the signage, lighting, setback, and landscaping requirements 
(ignoring for the moment the "first class shopping center" and "mutually-
acceptable design" criteria) is hardly a proposal meriting serious 
consideration. Why should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one 
was never submitted) which is incapable off complying with the 
unambiguous provisions of the Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is 
bound by? 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 19-20. 
While there may be an ambiguity in what constitutes a "first-class" shopping 
center, this Court finds there is no ambiguity that Big Dog's RV sales lot is not a 
"shopping center." Accordingly, this Court finds part "i" of the Agreement has been 
violated. 
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Even more clearly, this Court finds no dispute of fact that there was absolutely no 
effort by Blue Dog or KLP, prior to Blue Dog's RV park materializing, to "work together 
with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the 
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses 
within Riverbend Commerce Park." Thus, part "ii" of the Agreement has been violated 
by Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog and KLP's argument that Jacklin has 
not "worked together" with them to be unavailing, for the reasons set forth above. 
Finally, this Court finds no dispute that part "iii" of the Agreement has been 
violated in that "Articles ... 3, (and) 4, contained in those Declarations of Covenants", 
have been violated. Article 3 pertains to parking, and requires any owner utilizing any 
lot for an appropriate purpose must submit a parking plan that meets with the approval 
of the Riverbend Property Owners' Corporation. Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit C, p. 3. 
This includes landscaping (to encourage a park-like entrance (ld., p. 4, § 3.2), and 
parking areas must be paved with asphalt or concrete. Id., § 3.4. There are 
requirements for lighting, access and striping. Id., § 3.5-3.8. There is no dispute that 
there has been no request for approval of any parking plan with respect to Blue 
Dog/KLP's property. Stoesser Affidavit, p. 1 0, ~22. Compliance with this provision is 
crucial, as parking is essentially all of Blue Dog's business ... parking RVs as inventory 
waiting for them to be sold. Article 4 pertains to signage, and requires: 
All signs shall be properly maintained and kept in a neat and proper state 
of repair. To assure sign quality and design format, all signs shall be 
submitted and approved by the Owner's corporation. 
Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit C, p. 5. There is no dispute that Blue Dog has not complied 
with or made any request for approval under Article 4. The remaining Articles (2, 5, 6 
and 7) may have been violated, but at this juncture, this Court finds such Articles to be 
ambiguous and/or disputed as to Blue Dog's violation. 
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As pointed out by Jacklin, if this Court determines that any of these terms of the 
Agreement are unambiguous, enforceable and have been violated, summary judgment, 
at least as to the violation should be granted. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. This Court finds the Agreement is 
applicable and binding on Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog/KLP have 
violated part i, ii, and iii (via Articles 3 and 4 of the Declarations of Covenants), and 
summary judgment is granted in favor of Jacklin on these issues. 
4. Jacklin Has Not Breached the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing. 
As mentioned above, defendants argue Jacklin breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by refusing to work with defendants to develop a site plan 
and thereby has breached the Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 24. Defendants argue the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is violated when either party nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the 
contract. Id., p. 25. Jacklin responds that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot override express provisions in a bargained-for contract. Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 38. Although defendants point to the 
testimony of Jacklin's Property Manager, Leffel, stating that Jacklin categorically 
refused to work with defendants to address concerns about "Blue Dog's shopping 
center operation," see Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 26, this testimony presupposes that Jacklin had mutually agreed to the 
design and appearance of the RV shopping center location. 
There is no evidence that Jacklin has breached either a term of the Agreement 
or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing cannot override express provisions in a contract. Bushi v. Sage Health 
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Care, PLLC, 2009 Opinion No. 30, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4,2009). See also Idaho 
First Nat!. Bank v. David Steed & Associates, 121 Idaho 356,360,825 P.2d 79,83 
(1992). Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 
38. This Court agrees with Jacklin's question: "How can Jacklin be claimed to have 
acted in bad faith if it simply stands on its rights under consensually-negotiated 
agreements which the Defendants apparently didn't read until after they had put their 
property to an improper use?" Id. 
Defendants make essentially three arguments on this breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. First, defendants argue: " ... the CC&R's were null and 
void at the time they were incorporated by reference into the Development 
Agreement..." Defendants' Reply Memorandum, p. 9. The Court has already rejected 
this argument and has found the CC&R's apply to the Agreement (not a "Development 
Agreement" as consistently, but errantly, argued by defendants). Second, defendants 
argue Jacklin referred Blue Dog to KLP (and why would Jacklin do such a thing jf 
Jacklin knew Blue Dog could never satisfy the Agreement). Id. This Court finds 
Jacklin's argument persuasive: 
Apparently, Defendants claim that since Dave Russell (on behalf of Blue 
Dog) asked Leffel (Jacklin's property manager) who owned Lots 1 through 
4 of Block 1, and since Leffel gave Russell KLP's contact information, that 
somehow Jacklin has "waived" any rights under the QCAlJacklin 
Agreement or the Covenants incorporated therein. The facts suggest 
otherwise. 
There is no disputed issue of material fact that Leffel, who was first 
employed by Jacklin in 1993, some two years after the execution and 
recordation of the QCAlJacklin Agreement, had no knowledge of the 
same. Hence, Defendants have failed to show an "intentional 
relinquishment of a known right," since Leffel, the only person who dealt 
with Blue Dog (and who had no contacts with KLP), didn't even know the 
Agreement existed. 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 39. 
Third, defendants argue: "It remains undisputed that Jacklin did not attempt to work 
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with Blue Dog, but rather simply sought eviction ... " Defendants' Reply Memorandum, 
p. 10. This argument has already been resolved by the Court against defendants. 
Jacklin is entitled to summary judgment on defendants' allegations of Jacklin's breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
B. Blue Dog and KLP's Defense of Waiver and Estoppel. 
Defendants argue Jacklin waived its right to now enforce the Agreement 
because prior to leasing from KLP, Blue Dog negotiated with Jacklin and Jacklin 
repeatedly assured Blue Dog an RV sales operation would be compatible. Defendants 
argue that Jacklin only changed its position once KLP entered into a lease with Blue 
Dog (the "sour grapes" argument). Indeed, the first words in defendants' briefing is: 
"This is a case about sour grapes." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants also argue Jacklin should be estopped 
from changing its position. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 27. 
Jacklin argues its property manager had no knowledge of the QCAlJacklin 
Agreement and never had contact with KLP, although KLP had record notice of the 
Agreement. (See the discussion by this Court regarding good faith and fair dealing 
immediately above). Thus, there was no "intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 38-39. 
Importantly, the record does not reveal Jacklin ever assured defendants that Blue Dog's 
RV sales operation would be a compatible use regardless of compliance with the 
Agreement. Absent such a specific showing (that defendants could ignore written and 
recorded restrictive covenants to the contrary), Jacklin should not now be estopped for 
having allegedly waived its right to rely on the written, recorded restrictive covenants. 
But the most important reason waiver and estoppel do not apply in this case is 
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the parcels defendants discuss are not at all the same. KLP's Richard Cordes in his 
affidavit swears that Lots 1-4 of the KLP property which are leased to Blue Dog "are 
nearly identical in location and condition" to lots 1-4 of the Jacklin property, which were 
the subject of the lease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog. Affidavit of 
Richard A. Cordes, p. 3, ~ 6. That sworn statement is simply not true. As noted by 
Jacklin, the KLP property is not subject to the RCP Covenants, but is subject to Articles 
2-6 of the Covenants in effect in November 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779), via 
incorporation under a consensually agreed to contract. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. "The KLP property is subject to the 
property-unique limitations arising under the QCAlJacklin Agreement ("first class 
shopping center" and "mutually acceptable design and appearance")." Id. Finally, "the 
Jacklin property, which actually remains in the Riverbend Commerce Park, is subject to 
a wholly separate set of restrictions, in the form of the current covenants and any 
subject amendments thereto." Id., pp. 7-8, citing Hines Affidavit, Exhibit D. (emphasis 
in original). Estoppel and waiver cannot apply when the subject matter of the 
comparison is so vastly different. 
C. Declaratory Relief. 
This Court has found Blue Dog has breached the Agreement and the Articles. 
The question remaining is whether in light of that breach, at the summary judgment 
level, can this Court grant Jacklin the relief sought: eviction of Blue Dog and 
permanently enjoining its business on the property? 
One of the prerequisites to a declaratory judgment is an actual and justiciable 
controversy. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). A 
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties 
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who have adverse legal interest. Welson v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 
31,36,855 P.2d 868,873 (1993) (quoting Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516, 
681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). In Harris, the Idaho Supreme Court stated a right sought to 
be protected by declaratory relief "may invoke either remedial or preventive relief; it may 
relate to a right that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a status 
undisturbed but threatened and endangered; but in either event, it must involve actual 
and existing facts." 106 Idaho 513,516-17,681 P.2d 988, 991-92. "We have also 
stated that a declaratory judgment must clarify and settle the legal relations in issue, 
and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy which gave rise to the action." 
Harris, 106 Idaho 513, 517, 681 P.2d 988, 992. Again, all doubts about restrictive 
covenants are resolved in favor of free use of land. Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 
Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667. In order for Jacklin to have Blue Dog evicted, the 
Agreement must have clearly stated such limitation, and the Court will not read into the 
Agreement and find such relief by implication. See Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of 
Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584,590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007). "Courts do not possess the 
roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." Smith v. 
Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (1988). 
Thus, declaratory judgment in this matter would relate to the fact that defendants 
breached the Agreement and the applicability and validity of the Agreement and Articles 
it incorporates. 
The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the 
authority to evict Blue Dog. However, the declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would 
provide Jacklin the authority to have this Court order Blue Dog cease its business as it 
presently exists, since it is in violation of the Agreement and the Articles. However, 
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Blue Dog would still be entitled to its leasehold interest with KLP and could make use of 
that property if such use conformed with the Agreement and the Articles. 
D. Injunctive Relief. 
Jacklin seeks an Order of the Court permanently enjoining the use of the 
property as an RV dealership/facility and ordering removal of items associated with that 
business by a date certain. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 15. Defendants reply this claim fails for Jacklin's inability to prove irreparable injury; 
Jacklin did not plead any irreparable injury in its Complaint and Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) 
deponent could not testify to any harm or injury caused by Blue Dog's RVoperation. 
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. Jacklin 
replies it seeks a permanent injunction and states "injunctive relief of a permanent 
nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain." 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary JUdgment, p. 35. However, no 
authority is cited for this proposition. Jacklin cites to Stoeser's testimony (which it seeks 
to supplement pursuant to I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4» in which Stoeser opines Blue Dog's 
continued operation would cause damage to Jacklin because tenants that come to 
Riverbend Commerce Park pay a premium for their facilities over less-restrictive, lower-
priced commerce parks. Id., pp. 36-37, quoting Affidavit of Magnuson Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and I.R.C.P. 56(c), Exhibit B, pp. 115-118. 
A District Court's decision to grant a permanent injunction is both a question of 
law and fact. D & M County Estates Homeowner's Ass'n v. RomrieJl, 138 Idaho 160, 
163-164, 59 P.3d 965, 968-69 (2002). On questions of fact, the Court's decision will 
not be set aside unless findings of fact are clearly erroneous; questions of law are freely 
reviewed. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997). The 
Agreement at issue here unambiguously requires three things of defendants: 
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construction and maintenance of a first-class shopping center, working with Jacklin to 
achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and 
conforming to Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Although "first-class" is arguably ambiguous, 
"shopping center" is not. Most importantly, defendants have not worked with Jacklin 
and have not conformed to the requirements of the Articles or the Agreement. 
Injunctive relief is granted as a matter of discretion of the trial court and an appellate 
court will not interfere absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Harris, 106 Idaho 513, 
517,681 P.2d 988, 992. The party seeking an injunction bears the burden of proving a 
right thereto. Id. Here, Jacklin bears the burden of proving I.R.C.P. 65(e) grounds for 
preliminary injunction, Jacklin must show: (1) it is entitled to the relief demanded, which 
consists of restraining continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period 
or perpetually; (2) the complained-of act would produce waste or great or irreparable 
injury to plaintiff; (3) the defendant is doing something in violation of plaintiffs rights, 
respecting the subject of the action and tending to render judgment ineffectual; (4) the 
defendant threatens to or is about to remove or dispose of its property with the intent to 
defraud. I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1 )-(4) (subsections (5) and (6) are not applicable to this matter). 
Jacklin has shown an entitlement to enjoin Blue Dog from continuing its business in 
violation of the Agreement. Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary 
judgment) with evidence of waste or great injury. Stoeser only testifies that tenants who 
operate in Riverbend Commmerce Park pay premiums to not operate in lower-end 
parks. Stoeser's testimony on this point was noted by Jacklin in its last brief: 
Q. Can you describe for me in general terms the nature of the 
tenant base that you have out there at the Riverbend Commerce Park as 
it has been developed? 
A. Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premier commerce park 
in North Idaho with success. We've landed nationally-acclaimed tenants 
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in there .... We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives from 
California .... Generally, people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park 
want to acquire land there with the hope of appreciation because of the 
quality of the Park. 
Q. Based on that knowledge and experience, do you have an 
opinion one way or another as to whether or not the continued 
maintenance of the Blue Dog RV Center in its current form for the 
remaining term of the lease that we understand exists would cause any 
damage to Jacklin Land Company? 
A. I personally feel it would. 
Q. Why do you believe that? 
A. Because as I stated before, most people come to Riverbend 
Commerce Park because it is the premier commerce park in the area. 
Many tenants have the option to locate in commerce parks that are less 
restrictive, have lower priced land, and allow a lower level of building 
design. So those that come to Riverbend are basically paying a premium 
for their facilities over many lower end parks. 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 36-37, 
citing Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Exhibit B, pp. 
115-18. There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony or even 
argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary award. The 
testimony of damage, while logical and understandable, seems speculative at the 
present time in that Jacklin has not pointed to a tenant that has left, is thinking about 
leaving, or a prospective tenant that has decided not to rent land as a result of the 
presence of Blue Dog. 
Another impediment is that this Court finds it is quite possible that declaratory 
judgment in favor of Jacklin would entitle it to essentially all the relief it seeks. A 
temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its effect is to give plaintiff 
principal relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Rowland v. Kellogg Power & 
Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869, 872 (1925); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big Creek 
Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720, 722(1936); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 
P.2d 194, 195 (1943). 
Jacklin has demonstrated that defendants are acting in violation of its rights 
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under the Agreement. Jacklin has not alleged defendants are removing or disposing of 
their own property with the intent to defraud Jacklin. Jacklin has not provided this Court 
with evidence at this time entitling it to enjoin Blue Dog's continued business on the 
subject property pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e). Those issues will be left for trial. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED 
in favor of plaintiffs on the following issues: 1) The QCAlJackiin Agreement is 
enforceable against defendants; 2) the Agreement is a "Use" agreement and not a 
"development" agreement; 3) Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions apply to defendants; 4) defendants have violated the 
Agreement. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED 
as to its entitlement to declaratory relief sought (eviction) and injunctive relief sought, at 
this time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
DENIED in all aspects, and specifically, this Court finds plaintiff has not breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and defendants are not entitled to the defense 
of waiver or estoppel 
Entered this 15th day of June, 2009. 
I certify that on the 1'3 day of June, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following: 
Lawyer Fax # I Lawyer (7 Fax # 
John Magnuson 1f"'1-0.fj0t> Michael Hines )J 5111-1L/-7-:J.-?O-3 
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Attorney at Law 
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1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208) 667-0100 
ISB #04270 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its 
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to IRCP 
11(A)(2)(b), for reconsideration of the following portion of the Court's June 15, 2009 
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, [that] Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED as to its entitlement to declaratory relief sought 
(eviction) and injunctive relief sought, at this time. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 27. Jacklin has alternatively moved the Court again for 
summary judgment on the issue of the relief to be afforded, by way of declaratory judgment or 
permanent injunction, as to the Defendants' impermissible uses of the subject property as previously 
determined by the Court on summary judgment. 
As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows: 
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and 
decreeing that the uses to which Defendants and each of them have 
placed the subject property [are] in violation of the terms of the 
recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff Jacklin is 
further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, 
as alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post -
judgment. 
See Complaint at ~ 39. 
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought: 
entry ofa permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that 
Defendants and each of them cease and desist from utilizing any and 
all portions of the subject property for purposes of a commercial RV 
sales and/or rental facility or business, and directing that Defendants 
and each of them take any and all steps necessary to comply with the 
terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited 
to the removal of any items of personal property that could or are 
utilized in the operation of such a business. 
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See Complaint at ~ 36. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the 
submissions previously filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the March 3, 2009 hearings on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
h-
DATED this /3 day ofJuly, 2009. 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its 
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to IRCP 56, for 
summary judgment as follows. 
On June 15, 2009, the Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment." Through the subject Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Jacklin, and against Defendants, on the following issues: 
(1) The Quality Centers Associates/Jacklin Land Company Agreement (Kootenai County 
Instrument No. 1200512) is enforceable against the Defendants named herein, and the real property 
owned by KLP Properties, Inc. ("KLP") and leased by Defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc. 
(2) The QCAlJacklin Agreement is a "use" Agreement and not a "development" 
Agreement. 
(3) Articles II, III, IV, V, and VI of the Declarations of Covenants, Conditions, and 
restrictions recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155659 (and re-recorded as Kootenai 
County Instrument No. 1155779), apply to the Defendants and their use of the subject property as 
that property is defined in Paragraph 3 of Jacklin's Complaint. 
(4) Defendants have violated the QCAlJacklin Agreement and Articles III and IV of the 
referenced Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15,2009) at p. 27. 
Jacklin's Complaint (filed August 22, 2008) included the following claims for relief: 
Declaratory Relief (Claim 4), and Permanent Injunction (Claim 3). 
As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows: 
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and 
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decreeing that the uses to which Defendants and each of them have 
placed the subject property [are] in violation of the terms of the 
recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff Jacklin is 
further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, 
as alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post -
judgment. 
See Complaint at ~ 39. 
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought: 
entry of a permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that 
Defendants and each of them cease and desist from utilizing any and 
all portions of the subj ect property for purposes of a commercial RV 
sales and/or rental facility or business, and directing that Defendants 
and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply with the 
terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited 
to the removal of any items of personal property that could or are 
utilized in the operation of such a business. 
See Complaint at ~ 36. 
The Court has determined, as a matter oflaw, that the Defendants' usage of the subject 
property is in violation of the recorded limitations thereon. Jacklin seeks, through this motion, 
summary judgment consistent with the claims for declaratory relief and permanent injunction as set 
forth above. In particular, Jacklin seeks entry of declaratory relief and a permanent injunction 
declaring and decreeing that the uses to which Defendants have put the property, as already 
determined to be in violation of the recorded limitations impressed thereon, cease and desist by a 
date certain. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the 
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Affidavit submissions previously filed by Plaintiffin conjunction with the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment heard March 3, 2009. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
'T2--
DA TED this/3 day of July, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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JACKLIN-BLUE DOG.2NDMSJ.wpd 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its 
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of its 
(1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Motion for Reconsideration (both filed herewith). 
This Memorandum is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the 
submissions previously filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the March 3, 2009 hearings on the 
parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
Jacklin's Complaint (filed August 22, 2008) included the following claims for relief: 
Declaratory Relief (Claim 4) and Permanent Injunction (Claim 3). As to the claim for declaratory 
relief, Jacklin requested as follows: 
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and decreeing that 
the uses to which Defendants and each of them have placed the subj ect property [are] 
in violation ofthe terms of the recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff 
Jacklin is further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, as 
alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post-judgment. 
See Complaint at ~39. 
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought: 
entry of a permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that Defendants 
and each of the cease and desist from utilizing any and all portions of the subject 
property for purposes of a commercial RV sales and/orrental facility or business, and 
directing that Defendants and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply 
with the terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited to the 
removal of any items of personal property that could or are utilized in the operation 
of such a business. 
See Complaint at ~36. 
The parties thereafter filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Those motions came on 
for hearing before the Court on March 3, 2009. On June 15, 2009, the Court entered its 
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"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." The Court 
determined, as a matter oflaw, that the Defendants' usage of the subject property is in violation of 
the recorded limitations thereon. 
Through its Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Jacklin seeks entry of judgment 
consistent with the claims for declaratory relief and permanent injunction as described above. In 
particular, Jacklin seeks entry of declaratory relief and/or a permanent injunction declaring and 
decreeing that the uses to which Defendants have put the property, as already determined by the 
Court to be in violation of the recorded limitations impressed thereon, cease and desist by a date 
certain. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS. 
The undisputed material facts pertinent to Jacklin's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion for Reconsideration are as previously determined by the Court in its June 15, 2009 
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." Those undisputed 
material facts are summarized as follows: 
(1) Quality Centers Associates and Jacklin Land Company entered into an 
Agreement (referred to herein as "the QCAlJacklin Agreement") which was 
recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 on November 7, 1990. 
(2) The property encumbered by the QCAlJ acklin Agreement includes Lots 1-4 
of Block 1 of Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park, City of Post Falls, 
County of Kootenai, Idaho. This specifically-described property is referred 
to herein as "the subject property." 
(3) The subject property is owned by the KLP Defendants as successors-in-
interest to QCA. On July 1,2008, KLP entered into a written lease of the 
subject property with Defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc. 
(4) The QCAlJacklin Agreement is a "use" agreement and not a "development" 
agreement. See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15, 2009) 
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at pp. 7-8. 
(5) The QCNJacklin Agreement incorporates Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs in 
effect at the time QCA closed on the purchase of the subject property. Id. at 
pp.8-9. Those CC&Rs were recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 
1155659 (and re-recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779). Id. 
at p. 11. 
(6) The QCNJackiin Agreement clearly binds Defendants to construct and 
maintain a first-class shopping center, to work with Jacklin to achieve a 
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and to 
conform to Articles 2-6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Id. at p. 13. 
(7) Under the QCAlJacklin Agreement, "approval needed to be sought by Blue 
Dog and KLP [from Jacklin] in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog simply 
started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from 
anyone. Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement." Id. at p. 16. 
(8) There is no ambiguity that Blue Dog's RV sales lot is not a "shopping 
center." Id. at p. 17. Accordingly, subsection (i) of the QCAlJacklin 
Agreement has been violated by Defendants. Id. 
(9) There was absolutely no effort by Blue Dog or KLP, prior to Blue Dog's RV 
Park materializing, to "work together with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a 
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it 
shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within 
Riverbend Park." Id. at p. 18. 
(10) Accordingly, subsection (ii) ofthe QCAlJ acklin Agreement has been violated 
by Blue Dog and KLP. Id. 
(11) Subsection (iii) of QCAlJacklin Agreement incorporates Articles 2-6 of the 
CC&Rs in effect at the time ofQCA's closing on the property (which binds 
QCA's successors, including the Defendants). ld. at p. 11. 
(12) There is no dispute that Blue Dog has not complied with or made any request 
for approval under Article 4 of said CC&Rs. Id. at p. 18. 
(13) There is no dispute that there has been no request for approval of any parking 
plan with respect to the subject property as is required by Article 3 of said 
CC&Rs. Id. "Compliance with this provision is crucial, as parking is 
essentially all of Blue Dog's business ... parking RV s as inventory waiting for 
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them to be sold." Id. 
(14) As summarized by the Court: 
This Court finds the [QCAlJacklin] Agreement is applicable and binding on 
Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog/KLP have violated part i, ii, 
and iii (via Articles 3 and 4 ofthe Declarations of Covenants), and summary 
judgment is granted in favor of Jacklin on these issues. Id. at p. 19. 
III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Court is well-acquainted with the applicable standards to apply in resolving motions for 
summary judgment. Those standards were fully set forth and summarized at pages 3-4 ofthe Court's 
June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order" and will not be repeated here. The Court's 
summarization is incorporated herein as though set forth in full. 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. Ar2ument re: Jacklin's Claim for a Permanent Injunction. 
1. The Nature of Jacklin's Claim. 
Jacklin has alternatively sought similar relief, in the nature of permanent injunctive relief, 
through both its claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.e. §10-1201, et seq.) and 
byway of permanent injunction. As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows: 
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and decreeing that 
the uses to which Defendants and each ofthem have placed the subject property [ are] 
in violation of the terms of the recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff 
Jacklin is further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, as 
alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post-judgment. 
See Complaint at ~39. 
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought: 
entry of a permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that Defendants 
and each of the cease and desist from utilizing any and all portions of the subject 
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property for purposes of a commercial RV sales and/or rental facility or business, and 
directing that Defendants and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply 
with the terms of said preliminary [ sic] injunction, including but not limited to the 
removal of any items of personal property that could or are utilized in the operation 
of such a business. 
See Complaint at 1[36. 
Blue Dog has leased the subject property from the KLP parties. The Court has correctly 
, noted that the validity ofthe lease itself is not an issue. It is the use to which Blue Dog has placed 
the property that is an issue. The Court has also correctly noted that Jacklin cannot per se seek the 
eviction of Blue Dog. However, Jacklin can seek entry of declaratory and/or injunctive relief that 
would allow the lease to remain in effect but require Blue Dog to cease its business as it presently 
exists (given the Court's findings that Blue Dog's use is in violation ofthe QCAlJacklinAgreement 
for the reasons previously set forth). 
The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the authority 
to evict Blue Dog. However, the declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would provide 
Jacklin the authority to have this Court order Blue Dog cease its business as it 
presently exists, since it is in violation ofthe Agreement and the Articles. However, 
Blue Dog would still be entitled to its leasehold interest with KLP and could make 
use ofthat property if such use conformed with the Agreement and the Articles. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15,2009) at pp. 23-24. As set forth above, 
Jacklin's claim for declaratory relief and permanent injunction seek entry of relief directing that the 
Defendant cease the uses to which they have currently placed the subject property as those uses are 
unquestionably in violation of the QCAlJacklin Agreement. This type of relief is available both in 
terms of a permanent injunction and declaratory relief. 
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2. The Concept of "Irreparable Iniury" or "Irreparable Dama~e" 
is Not Applicable to a Claim for Permanent Injunctive Relief 
That Seeks to Ensnre Compliance With Recorded Use 
Limitations as to Real Property. 
Through its original Motion for Summary Judgment, and through this Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration, Jacklin seeks entry of a permanent injunction 
granting the relief described above. In denying Jacklin's prior motion for summary judgment, the 
Court made the following observations. 
First, the Court observed that "Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary 
Judgment) with evidence of waste or great injury." Id. at p. 25. The Court further noted: 
There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony or even argument 
as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary award. The 
testimony of damage, while logical and understandable, seems speculative at the 
present time .... 
Id. at p. 26. 
Second, the Court held that Jacklin was not entitled to summary judgment as to a permanent 
injunction, notwithstanding the Court's finding that the Defendants were using the subject property 
in violation ofthe recorded limitations thereon, due to Jacklin's failure to comply with IRCP 65(e): 
Jacklin has not provided this Court with evidence at this time entitling it to enjoin 
Blue Dog's continued business on the subject property pursuant to IRCP 65(e). 
Id. at p. 27. 
IRCP 65(e) provides in pertinent part: 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(1) When it appears by the Complaint that the Plaintiff is entitled to the 
relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in 
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, 
either for a limited period or perpetually. 
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(2) When it appears by the Complaint or affidavit that the commission or 
continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, 
or great irreparable injury to the Plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the Defendant is doing, or 
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, 
some act in violation of the Plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject 
of the action, intending to render the judgment ineffectual. 
See IRCP 65(e)(1) through (3) (emphasis added). 
The stated conditions contained in Rule 65( e) applied to requests for preliminary injunctive 
relief rather than permanent injunctive relief. When a claim for permanent injunctive relief is 
sought, so as to enforce restrictive covenants consensually impressed upon real property, it is not 
necessary to show that an award of monetary damages will not afford adequate relief. I 
3. Permanent Injunctive Relief is an Available and Appropriate 
Remedy to Ensure Compliance With Consensual Covenants 
Impressed On Real Property Re&:ardless of the Complainin&: 
Parties' Ability to Prove the Inadequacy of an Award of Monetary Dama&:es. 
Injunctive reliefis equitable in nature, and is the most commonly requested remedy in actions 
to enforce restrictive covenants encumbering real property. See 20 Am. Jur.2d, Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions, §§274, et seq. The remedy may take the form of an injunction 
restraining someone from further violation of a restrictive covenant. 
A valid agreement that the use of the land conveyed shall be so restricted that no 
building shall be erected thereon within a specified number of feet from a definite 
line or object is susceptible of specific performance by the equitable remedy of an 
injunction to restrain the forbidden encroachment or a mandatory injunction to undo 
In its June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order," at p. 24, the Court 
addressed this argument in part as follows: "Jacklin replies it seeks a permanent injunction and 
states 'injunctive relief of a permanent nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains 
the benefit of its bargain.' However, no authority is cited for this proposition." The authority for 
this proposition is discussed infra. 
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what has been done in violation ofthe agreement. 
Levy v. Dundalk Co, 177 Md. 636, 652-53, 11 A.2d 476, 484 (1940). 
A showing that an award of monetary damages will not afford adequate relief is not generally 
required, in the context of actions or declaratory relief or permanent injunctions to enforce restrictive 
covenants. An independent showing of irreparable harm is not necessary to obtain injunctive relief 
for breach of a restrictive covenant because the damage incident to any such breach is generally 
incapable of monetary valuation and is thus irreparable per se. The following cases demonstrate this 
point. 
First, in Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 31 Kan. App.2d 889, 75 P.3d 278 
(2003), the Court dealt with a restrictive covenant prohibiting the construction of fences absent 
approval of the applicable homeowners' association and/or fences exceeding four feet in height if 
on a boundary line. The Association sued homeowners who had purchased property subject to the 
covenant. The District Court denied the requested injunctive relief solely due to a perceived failure 
by the Association to demonstrate irreparable injury. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed. 
The Court held as follows: 
In the context of the substantive law of restrictive covenants, Courts have 
generally recognized that damages are irrelevant to enforceability. 
"As a general rule, a restrictive covenant may be enforced irrespective 
of the amount of damage which would result from the breach, and 
even though there is no substantial monetary damage to the 
complainant by reason of the violation. The right to enjoin the breach 
of restrictive covenants does not depend upon whether the covenantee 
will be damaged by the breach; the mere breach is sufficient ground 
for interference by injunction. Thus, for example, restrictive 
covenants as to the nature, location, or use of buildings will be 
enjoined even though no substantial damage is shown. A landowner 
in a subdivision seeking to enjoin a violation of a residential-only 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
AND (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -- PAGE 9 
688 
covenant need not show irreparable injury where there has been a 
substantial breach of the covenant." 20 Am. Jur.2d Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions, §277, pp. 695-96; see also §283. 
Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 75 P.3d at 282. The Court further reasoned: 
Since money damages need not be shown, nor are they an element of a claim for 
relief based upon restrictive covenants, any inquiry into the adequacy of a money 
damage remedy is simply unnecessary in this context. This may explain why our 
cases discussing restrictive covenants reflect no analysis of irreparable harm. The 
injury sustained by the violation of such covenants is inherently irreparable in nature; 
i.e., one can generally never achieve a full, complete, and adequate remedy of the 
breach of restrictive covenants through recovery of calculable money damages .... 
Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 75 P.3d at 283. 
The Persimmon Court favorably cited consistent authority from a legion of other states, 
including Iowa, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
Wyoming. Id. The Court concluded by citing with favor the rationalization previously stated by the 
Georgia Court of Appeals: 
"[T]he violation of a restrictive covenant that is part of the development scheme 
affects the grantor and all other grantees, causing irreparable harm to the value of 
their respective property interests, because such restrictive covenant was part of the 
valuable contract consideration given and relied upon in the conveyance ofthe land. 
[Citation omitted.] Thus, irreparable harm automatically occurs as a matter oflaw 
arising from a violation of a covenant running with the land, the relationship of the 
parties as grantor/grantee, and the consideration of the conveyance ofless than a fee 
simple absolute for the burden imposed upon the land in the form of a restrictive 
covenant to protect the grantor and others who may wish to purchase the remaining 
land in the future." 
Id. (quoting Focus Entertainment v. Partridge Greene, 253 Ga. App. at 127-28, 558 SE.2d 440). 
Second, in Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d 1045 (1999), the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii similarly held: 
"Every covenant has a burden to the covenantor and a benefit to the 
covenantee." .... An individual may suffer a violation of his or her rights without 
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suffering actual damages. It follows, therefore, that a breach of a covenant alone may 
be grounds for injunctive relief, "even absent a showing of the amount of damage 
which has in fact been caused by that breach." Sandstrom, 59 Haw. at 501,583 P.2d 
at 979; see also 9 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property §60.07, at 60-120 
[1997] (injunctive relief may be granted for breach of covenant "irrespective ofthe 
amount of actual monetary damage" (emphasis added)); Cordogan v. Union National 
Bank of Elgin, 64 Ill. App.3d 248 (1978) (observing that "'it is well settled that 
equity would entertain bills for injunctions to prevent their breach although the 
breach would cause no substantial injury'" (citation omitted)). 
Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d at 1061 (citations omitted where indicated). 
Third, in Ridgewood Homeowners Assoc. v. Mignacca, 813 A.2d 965 (2003), the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island reversed a trial court's denial ofinjunctive relief. On appeal, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held: 
The trialjustice recognized that enforcing a restrictive covenant is important 
to all who are burdened and benefitted by the restriction. For precisely that reason, 
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce restrictive covenants need not establish money damages 
or any other hardship to receive equitable relief.... The trial justice therefore erred 
by denying enforcement of the covenant on the ground that Plaintiffs did not 
experience any hardship by the [Defendants] keeping a horse. Establishing that the 
[Defendants] violated covenant number 8 was sufficient for a court to provide the 
injunctive relief sought by the Association. 
813 A.2d at 975 (citation omitted). 
held: 
Fourth, in Houck v. Rivers, 450 S.E.2d 106 (1994), the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Having found [Plaintiff] is entitled to declaratory relief, we now tum to 
whether the master erred in refusing to grant [Plaintiff] an injunction restraining and 
enjoining [Defendant] from using her property to operate a bed and breakfast 
operation in the future. [Defendant] summarily argues, that because the award of 
damages would provide [Plaintiff] an adequate remedy at law, he is not entitled to 
the intervention of equity by way of injunctive relief .... 
Although an injunction, like all equitable remedies, is granted as a matter of 
sound judicial discretion, and not as a matter of legal right, ... the right of a Plaintiff 
to an injunction to enforce restrictive covenants has long received special treatment. 
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See Sprouse v. Winston, 212 S.c. 176,46 S.E.2d 874 (1948) (While it is true that the 
awarding of an injunction is addressed to the conscience of the Court, this rule is not 
applicable where it clearly appears that an injunction is necessary to prevent one :from 
violating the equitable rights of another where he has notice, actual or constructive, 
of such rights); 43 Ac. J. S. Injunctions §100 (1978) (Restrictions which are fixed, 
definite, and unambiguous should be enforced as written and should not be extended 
by judicial construction) .... 
450 S .E.2d at 418 (additional citations omitted). 
4. Althou2h Not Generally Required in the Context of Injunctions 
Related to Violations of Recorded Covenants, the 
"Balan cine- of the Equities" Favors Jacklin. 
In Jim Rutherford Inv., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Community Assoc., 25 S.W.3d 845 (2000), 
the Texas Court of Appeals heard an appeal :from a trial court summary judgment in favor of an 
association of subdivision homeowners who had alleged that the developer (who had purchased lots 
in the subject subdivision) had violated certain setback requirements. The Texas Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Trial Court's entry of a permanent injunction. In so doing, the Court held: 
The trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction was proper. First, the 
[Association's] summary judgment proof demonstrates [the developer] sub stanti all y 
breached the set back and prior approval of building specifications deed restrictions. 
[The Developer] admitted he never received approval for the set back violations .... 
Further, the record clearly demonstrates the home [the Developer] built ... has side 
set back lines ... violating the ten foot setback restrictions.... The record also 
demonstrates that when asked to stop construction ... because of deed restriction 
violations, [the Developer] did not stop. Instead, he contacted his attorney and 
sought his own injunction to enjoin [the Association] :from impeding his construction 
in the future .... 
Second, a balance of the equities demonstrates that those favoring [the 
Association] significantly outweigh any equities favoring [the Developer].... As 
discussed, [the Developer] purchased the property with knowledge of the restrictions. 
At [a meeting with the Association], he represented he did not have to follow the 
deed restrictions. Finally, when informed his property was subject to the deed 
restrictions, he refused to halt construction and sought an injunction to keep [the 
Association] at bay. By contrast, [the Association] consulted its legal counsel 
following the meeting and repeatedly informed [the Developer] he needed to comply 
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with the existing deed restrictions. Further, when it became apparent [ the Developer] 
would not willingly comply, [the Association] instituted legal action to force him into 
compliance with the deed restrictions. Thus, the equities of enforcing the deed 
restrictions favor [the Association]. 
25 S.W.3d at 850. 
In its June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order," the Court already held and 
determined why the "balancing of the equities," if necessary to implement the relief requested by 
Jacklin through a permanent injunction, favors Jacklin over the Defendants: 
The point is, given the terms of the [QCAlJacklin] Agreement, approval needed to 
be sought by Blue Dog and KLP in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog simply 
started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from anyone. 
Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement. Thus, Defendants' argument 
that " ... Jacklin categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any 
site concerns that Jacklin had or to work on an acceptable plan", ignores the fact that 
Blue Dog's business, which was already existing, at that time and failed to conform 
with the Agreement.... Blue Dog put itself in violation by starting its business 
without checking (or if it checked, then disregarding) the terms of the Agreement. 
When Blue Dog is already in violation ofthe Agreement, through only its own fault, 
why would Jacklin have a duty to "work with" Blue Dog on acceptable plans? Keep 
in mind the Agreement at subsection ii, reads: "QCAlKLP's predecessor agrees to 
work together with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and 
appearance for the shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and 
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park." There was no 
"mutually acceptable design" to be worked toward because Blue Dog had already 
implemented its business. This Court finds Jacklin's following argument persuasive: 
Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to 
undertake substantial site improvements, on the four undeveloped 
lots, including landscaping and surface work." See Russell Affidavit 
at '23. He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do 
"to satisfy Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." Id. 
Offering to pay $50,000 to put gravel on four vacant lots without 
addressing the paving requirement, as clearly specified in the 
November 1999 Covenants, together with the signage, lighting, 
setback, and landscaping requirements (ignoring for the moment the 
"first class shopping center" and "mutually acceptable design" 
criteria) is hardly a proposal meriting serious consideration. Why 
should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one was never 
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submitted) which is incapable of complying with the unambiguous 
provisions of the Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is bound by? 
See "Memorandum Decision and Order" (entered June 15,2009) at pp. 16-17 (emphasis in original). 
B. Areument re: Jacklin's Claim for Declaratory Relief. 
Jacklin's claim for declaratory relief essentially seeks the same form of prospective relief as 
Jacklin's relief for a permanent injunction. In other words, Jacklin does not seek an adjudication that 
Blue Dog has no right in the KLP property. Jacklin does not seek an adjudication that Blue Dog has 
no valid lease in the KLP property. Rather, Jacklin seeks a determination that the Defendants' 
ongoing and current use of the subject property is in violation of the terms of the QCAlJacklin 
Agreement. The Court has so held. 
Consistent with the authorities cited in the context ofthe availability of permanent injunctive 
relief in the covenant context, Jacklin seeks entry of an order that said use, as already determined to 
be in violation of the Agreement, "cease and desisL .. " See Complaint at ~9. 
The Court has already determined that the Defendants' current use of the subject property 
was not done with the prior consent of Jacklin as required in the QCAlJ acklin Agreement. 
Moreover, said use violates the parking, lighting, and landscaping requirements contained in Article 
3 of the CC&Rs. Finally, Defendants' use ofthe subject property, for storing RVs, is not within the 
scope of the phrase "shopping center." 
Accordingly, Jacklin is entitled to entry of relief, through this Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, whether characterized as permanent injunctive relief or declaratory relief, adjudging and 
decreeing that Blue Dog's current uses ofthe subj ect property cease and desist by a date certain, and 
that any future use of the subject property by Blue Dog, under its leasehold rights with KLP, be 
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undertaken in a manner consistent with the protections and procedures set forth in the QCAfJ acklin 
Agreement and the CC&Rs (Articles 2-6) incorporated therein. Should Blue Dog make request of 
Jacklin under the QCAfJacklin Agreement or the applicable CC&Rs, after complying with the terms 
of this Court's order directing that said current activities cease and desist, and if Blue Dog or KLP 
believe they are legally aggrieved by any determination made by Jacklin on any such proposal that 
does not now exist, then they will be free to pursue their own claims for legal redress in a separate 
proceeding. 
v. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company 
respectfully requests that the Court grant Jacklin's Second Motion for Summary Judgment and/or 
Jacklin's Motion for Reconsideration on Jacklin's claims for permanent injunctive relief and/or 
declaratory relief as to those violations already determined to exist by this Court through its June 15, 
2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." That relief 
should, at a minimum, consist of declaratory and/or injunctive relief ordering and decreeing that 
Defendants and each ofthem cease and desist from using the subject property for the storage and/or 
parking ofRVs by a date certain, and that any future uses ofthe subject property by either or both 
of the Defendants conform with the substance and procedures contained in the QCAfJacklin 
Agreement and Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs incorporated therein. 
DATED this /3 ~y of July, 2009. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
AND (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -- PAGE 15 
694 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,'2 ctl:: 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael J. Hines 
Michael Schmidt 
Lukins & Annis, P.S. 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 
JACKLIN-BLUE DOG. BRIEF SECONDSJ.wpd 
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Defendants respectfully move the Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
11(a)(2)(B) to reconsider its June 15,2009, Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment with respect to the decision to reserve for trial the issue of 
irreparable injury and/or damages. 
Defendants request the Court to reconsider this decision and enter summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants that 1) an injunction cannot issue because Jacklin has suffered no 
irreparable injury; and 2) Jacklin is not entitled to damages because it failed to request them in 
its Complaint or otherwise notify Defendants that it was seeking damages. 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum and Affidavit in Support filed herewith. 
~ 
DATED this 2:l day of July, 2009. 
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County of Spokane ) 
MICHAEL J. HINES, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, and am competent to testify in this 
matter. I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and/or belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
Deposition of the 30(b)(6) Representative of Jacklin Land Company taken January 23,2009. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Responses 
to Defendant K.L.P. Properties, Inc. 's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents. 
4. Jacklin has not identified an expert witness pursuant to Defendants' discovery 
request, and did not disclose an expert witness pursuant to the Court's case schedule order. 
5. Jacklin has not identified any individuals or witnesses with knowledge regarding 
~h1./~ 
 (Signature) 
Pe.,V\ V\,L{ W\. L~wJa 
(Print Name) 
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MR. HINES: Joan, would you read that back. 
2 (Reporter read back as requested.) 
3 BY MR HINES: 
4 Q. And I meant did Jacklin. 
5 A. Jacklin, yeah. That's what I thought you 
6 meant. 
1 Q. Did you ever tell Blue Dog that their 
2 operation was a prohibited use for operating on the 
3 Jacklin property? 
4 A. No because on our property it would have been 
5 put together with the CC&R's. On that property, it's 
7 Q. And that's what I intended to say. 7 
6 like apples and oranges, because it had a different set 
of CC&R's. It had to be mutually acceptable. And it 
had to be a first class shopping mall. 8 A. Good catch. 8 
9 Q. During the entire time period that Jacklin was 9 
10 negotiating to lease its property to Blue Dog, did it 10 
11 ever -- which is from the April to first of July 2008 11 
12 time period, did Jacklin ever advise Blue Dog that its 12 
13 R V operation would be in violation of any applicable 13 
Q. Didn't you communicate that no matter how Blue 
Dog attempted to develop the property on KLP's site, 
that it would still have been unacceptable in the eyes 
of Jacklin? 
A. Yes. 
14 CC&R's? 14 Q. How has Jacklin been injured or damaged as a 
15 A. Say that again. 15 result of Blue Dog's RV operation on KLP's property? 
16 Q. Sure. During the approximate four months that 16 A. We have already received complaints from 
1 7 Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease its own 17 tenants about Blue Dog's operation in Riverbend -. t 
18 property to Blue Dog for its RV operation, did it ever 18 Commerce Park. ~ 
19 communicate to Blue Dog that its use would be 19 Q. You received a complaint. How has that ~ 
20 prohibited under the applicable CC&R's? 20 damaged or injured Jacklin? it 
2
221 b A. We WOuldnth't have made ~tbrlePfiresentatiol ~ . h 2221 A: .~e ha~en'tBrelceivDed one in~uiry on land t.: 
ecause we were e ones responsl e or comp ymg WIt acqUISItIOns smce ue og came m. . 
;. 
23 the CC&R's as the landlords. 23 Q. Has anyone said to you that they did not -- i 
24 Q. You would not have been negotiating with Blue 24 they were not interested in a land acquisition because ~ 
2_5 __ ~D~0~gt~0~I~eas~e~J~ac_kl __ in~'s_0~w_n_~PI~~0~pcerty~~fo~r~I~'ts~R~V ________ -+_2_5 __ 0~f~B~I~u~e~D~0~)g~"s~aCQ~lu=is=it=io~n=?~ ________________ ~ __ ~f 
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1 operation unless Jacklin believed it would be a 
2 permissible use under the applicable CC&R's, correct? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. And with respect to Jacklin's understanding of 
5 Blue Dog's operation that they were going to put on 
6 Jacklin's property, did that differ in any material way 
7 to the operation that it currently has on KLP's 
8 property right across the street? 
9 A. Absolutely. Across all facets it differs. 
10 Q. How is the actual operation of that RV center 
11 on KLP's property different from what they were 
12 proposing to put on Jacklin's property? 
13 A. Okay. This will take a while to answer. So I 
14 want to make sure we've got it all. The current 
15 operation has no setbacks. It has no landscaping. It 
1 6 has no irrigation. It has no paved parking. It has no 
1 7 lighting. It has no proper signage. It has no 
18 screening, no enclosures. 
19 It doesn't -- I don't know -- it doesn't 
20 comply at all with anything we would have built. 
2 1 That's why the cheapest we could do it was $1.2 million 
22 and up to $3 million to improve that site to the 
23 standard of the Cc&R's where it was laughable that 
24 they'd throw some gravel down for $40,000 on the site 
.., 5 they're on and think that complied. 
Page 89 ~ 
1 A .. No. 
2 Q. Are you able to quantify for me any monetary 
3 damage or injury as a result of Blue Dog's RV 
4 operation? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Are you aware of any facts to indicate that 
7 Jacklin has been irreparably harmed as a result of Blue 
8 Dog's operation? 
9 A. As stated before, the current tenant. There's 
10 been inquiries as to what's going on because everybody 
11 else has had to.comply with the CC&R's, and they're 
12 wondering what's going on with Blue Dog. 
13 Q. But how has that caused any irreparable harm 
14 to Jacklin? 
15 A. It hasn't yet. 
16 Q. SO sitting here today you're not aware of any 
1 7 facts to suggest that Blue Dog's operation has caused 
18 any irreparable harm, correct? 
19 A. Not as of yet. 
20 Q. Correct? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Is an RV operation in general compatible with 







24 A. Yes, if it complies with the Cc&R's in. 
25 Riverbend Commerce Park. Now, by_ "Riverbend Commerce ~ . 
'"·'"··''',;,.~", ...... ,;-.,ftOl~:....v~IO· ... ~_~l!I''i.:a:I::!t.<;O.·;~~~·,~;(w.-''' :;'·':,,"~""'~~t<':'~"W'~.,\;.-'·~"'·M$Ioi· II:,~'~~.~.'. ~~ ....... ../Jt"~,;': 
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Park" I'm excluding lots 1 through 17 and I through 14 
2 because they have a different standard. 
3 Q. The different standard being what? 
4 A. That they have different CC&R's, and they 
5 have -- as a minimum. They also have to have a first 
6 class shopping mall, and it has to be mutually agreed 
7 upon with us. 
8 Q. Well, with respect to the CC&R's though, which 
9 is again Articles 2 through 6 that we've talked about, 
10 doesn't the 1988 CC&R's represent that uses need to be 
11 compatible with other uses within the Riverbend 
12 Commerce Park? 
13 A. I think 2 through 6 says that. You tell me. 
14 Q. And is an R V operation in general a compatible 
15 use with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park? 
16 A. Well, that's Articles 2 through 6. They have 
17 the additional requirement of the first class shopping 
18 mall. 
19 Q. I understand. But I'm talking about - that's 
20 your position. I'm just talking about Articles 2 
21 through 6, which talks about uses being compatible with 
22 other uses in Riverbend Commerce Park; and is an RV 
2 3 operation, in Jacklin's opinion, a compatible use with 
24 other uses in the RiverbendCommerce Park? 
2 5 A. If it complied with the CC&R's. 
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1 Q. Is an RV operation a -- does Jacklin consider 
2 it to be a light industrial or commercial use of 
3 property? 
4 A. I don't know the zoning definitions. I don't 
5 know if it's commercial or retail. I believe it's 
6 considered retail. 
7 Q. Well, is it compatible with light industrial 
8 and commercial uses? 
9 A. I don't know. I'd have to see what's 
1 0 submitted as a plan. 
11 . Q. Does Jacklin, sitting here today, have an 
12 opinion as to whether an RV operation is compatible 
13 with light industrial and commercial use? 
14 A. I have an opinion today. And once I saw how 
15 Blue Dog operated, I don't think that they could have. 
1 6 met our standards and complied. 
1 7 Q. During the four months that you were 
18 negotiating with Blue Dog, did you ever communicate 
19 that to them? 
20 A. We never got far enough along. 
21 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that the only reason that 
22 you did not continue to pursue leasing space to Blue 
23 Dog was because Blue Dog cut off the negotiations and 
24 said they had leased space with KLP? 
..... ') A. I think prior to that they indicated that they 
1 couldn't afford to operate under our proposal with the 
2 higher standards. 
3 Q. Isn't it true that it was Blue Dog who cut off 
4 lease negotiations with Jacklin as opposed to Jacklin 
5 deciding it didn't want to lease space? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Can you identifY for me specific property ~ 
8 owners who have complained about Blue Dog's operation? i 
9 A. They didn't complain to me. They complained i 
10 to the current property manager Bruce Cyr. And the one ~ 
t 
11 that I am aware of is W oodshop Specialties. . ~ 
12 Q. SO sitting here today you're aware of only one t 
13 owner within the Riverbend Commerce Park who has ~ 
14 complained; is that correct? 1 
15 A. That's all I'm aware of. ~ 
16 Q. Woodshop Specialties, where are they located ~ 
1 7 in the Riverbend Commerce Park? . i' 
18 A. Right here. 
19 Q. And you're pointing to? 
20 A. I can tell you the lot and block numbers. 





Q. Who at Jacklin made the decision, after Blue 
Dog came back and said that they were leasing space 
from.KLP as opposed to leasing space from Jacklin, who 
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1 made the decision at Jacklin to oppose Blue Dog's 
2 operation on KLP's property? 
3 A. I did. 
4 Q. When did you make that? 
5 A. As soon as I saw that they were there. ~ 
6 Q. That was after Blue Dog had informed Jacklin ~ 
7 that it was no longer interested in leasing space from ¥ 
8 Jacklin, correct? ~ 
9 A. I don't know the exact timing. It was right J 
10 around the 4th of July. I was on vacation when they i , 
11 moved on the site. And then subsequent to coming back, f 
12 I think Pat was on vacation. But as soon as we could f , 
13 get together and I saw it, we let them know through t 
14 Pat. £ 
15 Q. From a timing standpoint, that was after you 
16 learned that they were no longer interested in leasing i. 
17 space from Jacklin, correct? ~ 
18 A. Yes. ~~ 
19 Q. With respect to the property that you were 
20 proposing to lease to Blue Dog, lots 1,2,3, and 4, 
21 Phase I, Block 2, colored in orange on Exhibit 4, have 
22 you been able to lease that property to any other 
23 tenant? 
24 A. We have not leased it to any other tenant. 
25 O. And you haven't otherwise developed the 
- .. , ~,,~ • "';.(J'::!-~!:';.'. ""~::.·!"..,.;.;.'.;.: .... ,..: ... ·;: .. f'>r...,...., ... o<t.rR"",~,-"",:,t-~ ';:"·~'~'L':~;Y.·_~'-:~"""~'l!4I!IM'J:.~~~';"';;. i.·;~~i~ 
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that we worked with. And Benderson was part of Quality , 
Center Associates. 
Q. Do you know which part of Exhibit 10 was, in 
its ultimate fonn, was written by your counsel as 
opposed to which portions were suggested by Quality 
Centers' counsel? 
A. I couldn't tell you, no. 
Q. Was one -- do you know whether one draft was 
prepared? 
A. No, no. There were many iterations of it 
preceded by the other agreement which you can tell bad 
lots of negotiations in it. No. 
Q. When you answered the question, did Jacklin 
draft this agreement, what did you understand the word 
"draft" to mean? 
A. Who actually did the typing of the changes. 
This was before all the Word documents with the red 
line ability and all that, you know. 
Q. You're talking about Exhibit 10? 
A. Yes. Exhibit 10. At this time in 1990 we 
didn't have the capability of sending documents back 
and forth electronically and demonstrating changes. So 
I couldn't tell you who did what. And once we had a 
final agreement, all the back and forth draft 
documents, I just threw away back then. 
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Q. Has Jacklin ever received a request for 
approval in writing from Blue Dog as to any aspect of 
its current use on lots I through 4? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any basis to believe that Blue Dog 
intends to undertake any improvements on lots I through 
4 or that KLP intends to undertake any improvements on 
lots I through 4 other than what exists there today? 
A. No. 
Q. You indicated to a question about -- let me 
back up. Would it be a fair characterization to say 
that you have been involved with this commerce park 
since its inception? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you been involved in the screening, 
negotiation, or acceptance of the lease proposals with 
prospective tenants during the entirety of that period 
of time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you describe for me in general terms the 
nature of the tenant base that you have out there at 
the Riverbend Commerce Park as it's been developed? 
A. Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premiere 
commerce park in North Idaho with success. We've 




















































Corporation, their worldwide facility is in Riverbend 
Commerce Park on the water. 
We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives 
from California. On the front page of the business 
section this morning was an article about the high end 
facility that Alk Abello is putting in. Generally 
people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park want to 
acquire land there with the hope of appreciation 
because of the quality of the park. 
Q. Have you been involved in negotiation of the 
lease arrangements with the tenants that you've just 
described? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Based on --
A. Can I make a point of clarification? Either 
lease arrangements, meaning Buck Knives, we own the 
building and lease it to them. Or the sale of the land 
and then the compliance with the CC&R's as they build 
it, which is Alk Abello will be an exam pie of that. 
Q. That's a good point to note. And you've been 
in that process for 20 years? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that ultimately no 
tenant or prospective purchaser of a given nature is 
allowed in the Riverbend Commerce Park absent your 
Page 117 
prior approval? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Based on that knowledge and experience, do you 
have an opinion one way or another as to whether or not 
the continued maintenance of the Blue Dog RV Center in 
its current form for the remaining tenn of the lease '~ 
that we understand exists would cause any damage tOl 
Jacklin Land Company? ';1, 
A. I personally feel it would. 
Q. And by that counsel asked you some questions 
about damage that you could articulate as oftoday. 
I'm looking for your opinion based on your personal 
know ledge as a representative of the owner of the 
property, whether you expect to suffer irreparable harm 
in the next four and a half years if the Blue Dog RV 
Center continues in its current status. 
A. I do. I think we will either lose prospective 
tenants, or we'll be forced to -- I guess that's the 
.best way to put it - forego land sales because people 
won't want to buy in there. 
Q. Why do you believe that? 
A. Because as I stated before, most people come 
to Riverbend Commerce Park because it's the premiere 
commerce park"in th~ area. Many tenants have the 
option to locate in commerce parks that are less 
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.:. restrictive, have lower priced land, and allow a lower 
2 level of building design. So those that come to 
3 Riverbend are basically paying a premium for their 
4 facilities over many lower end parks. 
5 Q. During the negotiations that Jacklin had as to 
6 its property with Blue Dog, what were the nature of the 
7 tenant improvements that Jacklin envisioned necessary 
8 to accommodate Blue Dog's intended use? 
9 A. Well, there were many iterations when they 
1 0 first came to us. It was a larger piece. They 
11 encompassed over $3 million of improvements to 
12 construct facilities according to the CC&R's, asphalt, 
13 landscaping, irrigation, lighting, signage, all those 
14 aspects of it. And I don't think that once we pared it 
15 down below a minimum that we could still meet theirs. 
1 6 It was still over $1 million of improvements to meet 
1 7 the Cc&R's. 
18 Q. Were you ever made aware that that dollar 
19 amount of improvements was something that was deemed 
20 outside of the reach or not cost effective by Blue Dog? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And how was that? 
23 A. They made a statement that the one that they 
24 wanted specifically, I believe, was about $2.5 
25 million -- I'd have to look it up. About a $25,000 a 
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1 on Exhibit 4 have been used for parking? 
2 A. That's my best estimate. 
3 Q. What was the amount of money - do you know 
4 the amount of money that Jacklin made as a result of 
5 those parking arrangements as you've described them? 




















Mr. Leffel thought it was like $750 per event. 
MR. MAGNUSON: I don't have any further 
questions. Counsel? 
MR. HINES: I have some follow-up questions. 
RE-EXAMINATION 
BY MR HINES: 
Q. During the approximate four months from April 
through July that Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog f 
to lease its property to Blue Dog and have Blue Dog put • 
on its RV operation, was the Riverbend Commerce Park i 
marketed during that time period as a premiere commerce ~ 
i park? 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. During the course of those negotiations, with ~ 
the intent that Blue Dog would operate an RV center. i 
ii within Riverbend Commerce Park, did you ever reach the ~ 
conclusion that the existence of an RV operation was ! 
going to be contrary to a premiere commerce park? .. ~ 
A. No. ! 
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1 month lease payment, and they said that was too much. 1 Q. And, in fact, had you thought that, you would 
2 I believe they indicated to us that at the site in the 2 have discontinued lease negotiations, correct? 
3 heart of Post Falls that they are working at, that they 3 A.Correct. . i 
4 were somewhere closer to $20,000 a month is where they 4 Q. With respect to alleged damages caused by the r 
5 were there. 5 RV center operation, that operation has been going from ~ 
6 Q. Lastly, the parking that was testified to by 6 July 2008 until today, correct? 
7 you and Mr. Leffel on lots 1 through 4, the orange 7 A. Correct. ~ 
8 property, as depicted on I believe Exhibit 4? 8 Q. Can you identify a single perspective tenant i 
9 A. Yes. 9 who Jacklin has lost as a result of the operation? . ~ 
10 Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many times 10 A. No. l 
11 those four lots -- first of all, when they were used 11 Q. Can you identify a single land sale that was ~ 
12 for parking, were they always all four used, or was a 12 foregone because of the operation? t 
13 smaller portion used? 13 A. No. ! 
14 A. I believe it was a smaller portion. I believe 14 Q. Have you done any -- have you commissioned any i 
15 it was more like lots 1 and 2. I'd have to say. There 15 study or analysis to determine whether the Blue Dog . i 
16 was no, here's the lot line, put it out. 16 operation would have a negative impact on prospective t 
1 7 Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many times 1 7 tenants or prospective land sales? f 
18 that occurred? 18 A. Don't need to. I know it does. 
19 A. I would say it happened maybe two or three 19 Q. Didn't answer my question. 
20 times for two or three days each. So days, six to ten 20 A. No. 
21 days total. 21 Q. Have you undertaken -- strike that. Have you 
22 Q. Over how long of a period of time? 22 engaged an expert to assess whether or not the RV 
23 A. Since the inception of the park. 23 operation would cause Jacklin to lose tenants or to 
24 Q. You would estimate for six days of the last 20 24 forego land sales? 
..... ') years those portions oflots I through 4 colored orange 25 A. No. We're the expert. i 
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1 Q. And do you think that the real estate market 1 
2 in the Post Falls area is currently depressed because 2 
3 of the economic climate? 3 
4 A. I would say no, not ours. We have still had 4 
5 strong commercial sales with rising prices up until 5 
6 maybe earlier this year. So it might be happening now. 6 
7 I mean, right now it's starting to wane. Commercial 7 
8 land tends to lag residential in general. 8 
9 Q. Do you think that the depressed economic times 9 
10 that the nation as a whole is suffering, that the 10 
11 region is suffering, is having any impact on land sales 11 
12 within the Riverbend Commerce Park? 12 
·13 A. Yes. 13 
14 Q. Is it fair to say for the time period from 14 
15 1990 through the present that this is probably the 15 
16 worst economic time with respect to selling commercial 16 
17 property that this area has ever faced? 17 
18 A. By "this area, It you mean Riverbend Commerce 18 
19 Park? 19 
20 Q. For the Post Falls area. 20 
21 A. Post Falls in general? Probably. 21 
22 Q. You referred to an Exhibit F to your 22 
23 declaration, which wasn't marked as an exhibit. 23 
24 MR. HINES: But if you don't mind, counsel, if 24 
25 I could take a look at it. 25 
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.l MR. MAGNUSON: Absolutely. 1 
2 BY MR. HINES: ' 2 
3 Q. The first page of Exhibit F is a letter, cover 3 
4 letter, and then there's an attached agreement. Do you 4 
5 see that, sir? 5 
6 A. Yes, sir. 6 
7 Q. When Mr. Magnuson examined you, this is what 7 
8 your testimony concerned, correct? 8 
9 A. ,Correct. 9 
10 Q. This agreement, was it ever a recorded 10 
11 agreement? 11 
12 A. That agreement was not recorded. 12 
13 Q. Was it ever a recorded encumbrance on the 13 
14 property at issue in this lawsuit? 14 
15 A. Not that agreement. 15 
16 Q. And, in fact, the only recorded encumbrance is 16 
17 Article 10- 17 
18 MR MAGNUSON: Exhibit 10 you mean. 18 
19 BY MR. HINES: 19 
20 Q. Exhibit 10, which we have talked about 20 
21 extensively, correct? 21 
22 A. Exhibit 10 was recorded. 22 
23 Q. You testified that an RV sales center could be 23 
24 a permissible use within the Riverbend Commerce Park, 24 
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Q. And would that -~ and could constitute a first 
class shopping center, correct? 
A. It could. 
Q. And as such it could then be a permissible use 
for KLP's lots I through 4, correct? 
A. It could. 
Q. Was that ever communicated to KLP? 
A. They had the CC&R's. Anybody who buys a piece 
ofland, we don't track them down and say, hey, by the 
way. We don't have that obligation, no. " 
Q. I didn't ask why you didn't do it. I asked i 
did you ever communicate to KLP or Blue Dog that an RV ~ 
sales center could, in fact, be a first class shopping ! 
center and be a permissible use on lots I through 4. I 
MR. MAGNUSON: Objection. Asked and answered. , 
A. I didn't hear what you said. ." ~ 
MR. MAGNUSON: You can go ahead. I objected. ~ 
A. We never specifically stated that. ! 
BY MR. HINES: 
Q. And, in fact, you personally, and your 
individual deposition is going to follow here, but you 
personally had no discussions with Blue Dog or KLP with 
respect to the R V operation; is that correct? 
A. No, that's not correct. I believe it was Dave 
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Russell who called me from his cell phone while I was 
in Portland on my cell phone while Mr. Leffel was on 
vacation, and I indicated that what they were doing on 
the KLP property wasn't in compliance with the CC&R's 
and didn't meet the first class shopping mall standard. 
Q. When was that communication? 
A. It had to be in early july. I don't have the 
date, and I'm not even sure 'if it was Dave Russell. 
But I can't imagine it would be anybody but Dave 
Russell because that was the only contact Pat had. And 
Pat had given Dave Russell my contact information. So 
it was kind of a callout of the blue. 
Q. Was it after Blue Dog's RV operation was in 
place? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Other than that one contact, did you ever have 
any communications with Blue Dog or KLP with respect to 
the RV operation? 
A. No. 
Q. AU other communications would have been 
between Mr. Leffel and KLP, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And in the one conversation that you had, did 
you ever offer to sit down and work with KLP or'Blue 
Dog to come up with'an acceptable configuration of the 
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Inc. 's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, to Plaintiff, dated 
October 22, 2008. 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify each and every individual participating in 
answering the discovery requests contained herein. 
ANSWER: Tom Stoeser, President and CEO, Jacklin Land Company, 4752 West Riverbend 
Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho 83854; Bruce Cyr, Property Manager-Riverbend, Jacklin Land Company, 
4752 West Riverbend Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho 83854; and John F. Magnuson, attorney for Jacklin 
Land Company, P.O. Box 2350, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-2350. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please state the name and address of each person known to you 
who has knowledge of the facts and circumstances at issue in this lawsuit and the substance of the 
knowledge each individual is believed to possess. 
ANSWER: 
Tom Stoeser. Mr. Stoeser's address and current relationship with Jacklin Land Company is 
set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 1. Mr. Stoeser was formerly CFO of Jacklin Seed 
Company. Mr. Stoeser held that position in 1990. Mr. Stoeser was also property manager for 
Riverbend Commerce Park in 1990. In that capacity, Mr. Stoeser negotiated the terms of the 
Agreement between Jacklin Land Company and Quality Centers Associates which is recorded as 
Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint on file 
herein. Mr. Stoeser also has knowledge of the consensual encumbrances placed upon the property 
now owned by the Defendant owners and leased to Defendant Blue Dog. Mr. Stoeser also has 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the allegations in this Complaint, to wit, that 
Defendants are in breach of the recorded and consensual limitations that pertain to the use of the 
property owned by the Defendant owners and leased by Defendant Blue Dog. 
Bruce Cyr. As set forth in response to Interrogatory No.1, Mr. Cyr is the current Property 
Manager for Riverbend Commerce Park and is employed by Jacklin Land Company. Mr. Cyr began 
his employment with Jacklin Land Company in September of2008. Mr. Cyr has knowledge that the 
current use of the property owned by the Defendant owners and leased to Defendant Blue Dog is in 
violation of the recorded limitations that pertain to the same. Mr. Cyr also has general knowledge 
ofthe recorded limitations that pertain to the remainder of the Riverbend Commerce Park properties. 
Pat Leffel. Mr. Leffel is currently residing in the State of California. Mr. Leffel can be 
contacted through Plaintiff s counsel. Mr. Leffel is the former Property Manager for Riverbend 
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Commerce Park. In that capacity, he was employed by Jacklin Land Company between March 29, 
1993 and his retirement in approximately September of2008. Mr. Leffel has knowledge of certain 
contacts by or between Jacklin Land Company on the one hand, and Blue Dog, RV and/or the 
Defendant owners, on the other hand, which pertain to Blue Dog's efforts to find a leasehold and the 
knowledge provided to Blue Dog and the Defendant owners that the current use of the subject 
property is disallowed under the recorded limitations that pertain thereto. Mr. Leffel's contacts with 
the Defendants are as further described in response to Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12. The 
answers set forth in response to said interrogatories are incorporated herein as though set forth in 
full. 
Shaun Jackson. Mr. Jackson, at the time of the negotiation of Kootenai County Instrument 
No. 1200512 (the Agreement) between Jacklin Land Company and Quality Centers Associates, was 
in-house counsel to Benderson Development Company, Inc., one of the parties to Agreement. Mr. 
Jackson was last known to be at 570 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202-1284 (phone 716-
886-0211). Mr. Jackson has knowledge of the negotiations leading up to the execution and 
recordation ofInstrument No. 1200512 and the fact that the uses to which the Defendant owners and 
Blue Dog have placed the subject property are inconsistent with the terms of said Agreement. 
Quality Centers Associates. Quality Centers Associates was a joint venture with offices at 
570 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202. Quality Centers Associates, through qualified 
agents, which possibly include H. Gary Stetson, Randall Benderson, and David H. Baldauf(signators 
to Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512), has knowledge ofthe facts and matters attributed to 
attorney Jackson in the paragraph immediately preceding. 
The Defendant Owners. The Defendant owners (i.e., all defendants named herein exclusive 
of Blue Dog RV, Inc.) have personal knowledge that the subject property at issue in this proceeding 
was purchased with actual and constructive knowledge of the recorded limitations that pertain 
thereto (including those arising under Instrument No. 1200512), that the uses to which the property 
has been put by said owners (Blue Dog RV, Inc.) are unauthorized, and that said unauthorized uses 
were knowingly made and perpetuated, continuing to this date. 
Blue Dog RV, Inc. Blue Dog has knowledge that the uses to which it has placed the subject 
leasehold (i.e., the Defendant owners' property) is impermissible under the terms of recorded 
limitations that pertain thereto, including those set forth in, or otherwise incorporated into, Kootenai 
County Instrument No. 1200512. 
Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery 
merits. 
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INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please state the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 
those individuals you intend to call as witnesses at the trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to those individuals it intends to call 
as witnesses at trial. The identities of said individuals will be seasonably disclosed in conformity 
with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial Order as may hereafter be entered by the Court. Plaintiff 
notes, however, that it is reasonable to presume that those individuals identified in response to 
Interrogatory No.1 will likely be called to testify at trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify and set forth the name and address of each 
person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial. With respect to each person, please 
state: 
a. the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify. 
b. the subject matter of the facts and opinions to which each expert is expected testify. 
c. a summary of the grounds of each opinion. 
d. the names and addresses of any treaties, books, articles, essays or other writings, 
published or unpublished by the expert relating in any way to the subject matter to 
which he is expected to testified. For each published article and essay, state the title 
of the book, journal or the work in which it can be found and the name of the 
publisher. For each unpublished article and essay, attach copies of such article or 
essay to these Interrogatories. 
e. state the title of each case, the court in which filed and the docket number of each 
case in which said witness has testified at trial or in deposition. 
f. set forth the qualifications of said witnesses. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to those individuals qualified as 
"expert witnesses" whom it intends to call to testify at any trial in this proceeding. The identities of 
said individuals will be seasonably disclosed in conformity with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial 
Order as may hereafter be entered by the Court or a determination to call said witnesses has been 
made. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce all documents identified in, 
supporting or otherwise relating to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, including without 
limitation each expert's entire expert file, all expert reports (including drafts), all written 
communication between the expert and counsel, and all documents relied upon by the expert in 
forming the expert's opinion or generating expert reports. ("Expert") is defined to include all 
persons who worked with or on behalf of the expert who is expected to give testimony even if such 
person(s) is/are not expressly identified as an expert in this matter. 
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RESPONSE: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to the identities of any expert 
witnesses it expects to caIl to testify at trial in this proceeding. Accordingly, there are no 
"documents," at present, responsive to Request for Production No.1. The identities of said experts, 
if any, wiIl be seasonably disclosed in conformity with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial Order 
as may hereafter be entered by the Court. Upon said disclosure, if any, Plaintiff wiIl seasonably 
produce any discoverable material encompassed by Request For Production No.1. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and any 
of the defendants named in your complaint regarding their use of the Subj ect Property. 
ANSWER: 
Pat Leffel 
On April 15, 2008, Dave RusseIl of Blue Dog, RV, phoned Pat Leffel. RusseIl asked if the 
three to four acres ofland westward of and adjacent to the Jacklin Land Company office was for sale. 
This property is generaIly depicted on the photograph produced in response to Request For 
Production No.2 (for identification purposes) and labeled "Jacklin." RusseIl indicated he was having 
a problem with his current landlord and was looking at his options. 
On April 17,2008, RusseIl came to the Jacklin Land Company office and asked if Jacklin 
Land Company would give him a lease rate on a 10,000 square building and six acres ofland (with 
5 of the acres paved). This is also property depicted on the map described in the preceding paragraph 
(and produced in response to Request For Production No.2) labeled "Jacklin." 
On April 18,2008, Leffel caIled RusseIl to discuss his response to the projected lease rates. 
RusseIl said the company (Blue Dog RV, Inc.) was "on hold" and would see if they could get any 
"action from their landlord" and if the landlord would not so act, RusseIl would caIl Leffel back. 
On April 22, 2008, RusseIl caIled Leffel asking for the contact information on the "Factory 
Outlet" property and said he was "just keeping his options open." 
On April 29 ,2008, Leffel phoned Russell. RusseIl indicated that it looked like Blue Dog was 
going to work things out at their current location but that he would caIl Leffel first ifhe ran into any 
problems again. 
On May 13, 2008, RusseIl caIled and again wanted to talk about 4 acres (adjacent to the 
Jacklin Land Company office to the west (depicted in general terms as "Jacklin") on the photograph 
produced in response to Request For Production No.2, with just a sales office and a service facility 
in a different location. He suggested that the service facility could be in an existing structure on 
other Riverbend Commerce Park property in the Phase 4 area. RusseIl also indicated that he was 
checking on the property across the street (lots 1 through 4 of Phase 1) (the property at issue in this 
proceeding) to see if the owner expected to build anything in the next few years or if the owner 
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would sell. 
On June 19, 2008, Russell called Leffel again asking about space for lease in an existing 
building in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Jacklin Land Company checked into the cost to put in 
a bathroom, relocate the power, and put in a floor drain into the space (approximately 3,200 square 
feet) and provided the information to Mr. Russell. Russell indicated that he would talk with Blue 
Dog's owner and get back to Leffel. The anticipated cost was estimated at $15,000.00. Leffel 
advised Russell that this "may not be a good fit" but that the parties could talk more after Russell 
had talked with Blue Dog's owner. 
On July 7, 2008, Russell came to the Jacklin Land Company office and told Leffel that Blue 
Dog had leased property "from the Outlets" and was going to do site work the week of July 14. 
Russell indicated that Blue Dog would like to rent two acres west of the Jacklin Land Company 
office for seven (7) days just to park the trailers while the site work was being done. 
On July 10,2008, Rick Cordes, an agent for the Defendant owners, e-mailed Leffel. Cordes 
confirmed that a lease had been entered into by the Defendant owners with Blue Dog. The e-mail 
is produced in response to Request For Production No.2. 
Leffel responded bye-mail dated July 14, 2008. Leffel advised Cordes of the restrictions 
arising under Instrument No. 1200512, and the applicable CC&R provisions contained therein, and 
Jacklin's position that the proposed Blue Dog was in breach of said encumbrances and/or covenants. 
The e-mail is produced in response to Request For Production No.2. 
Cordes responded on July 14,2008 bye-mail, apologizing "for not knowing this information 
or being aware of the CC&R restrictions for this parcel." Cordes stated, "I will notifY Blue Dog RV 
now and will make other arrangements." A copy ofthe e-mail is produced in response to Request 
For Production No.2. 
On July 15, 2008, Leffel advised Cordes that Jacklin wanted Blue Dog off the subject 
property within ten (10) days. A copy of the e-mail is attached in response to Request For 
Production No.2. 
On July 15,2008, Cordes responded bye-mail (Request For Production No.2) stating that 
his attorney would review the CC&Rs and respond at a later date. 
On July 16, 2008, Cordes responded bye-mail (Request For Production No.2). Cordes 
denied the existence of a breach, going back on his representation of July 10, to wit, that he would 
tell Blue Dog to go to another location. The remainder of the referenced e-mail, produced in 
response to Request For Production No.2, has been redacted on the basis of the attorney/client 
privilege. In his July 16, 2008 e-mail, Cordes made no reference to the Agreement recorded as 
Instrument No. 1200512, instead referring solely to the CC&Rs. 
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On July 16,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes (Request For Production No.2), advising Cordes 
of the limitations contained in Instrument No. 1200512. The e-mail is produced in response to 
Request For Production No.2. 
Cordes responded on July 16,2008 bye-mail (Request For Production No.2), stating that he 
(the Defendant owners) were not aware of a written agreement between Jacklin Land Company and 
Quality Centers Associates. Cordes asked for a copy of the Agreement. 
On July 16,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes a copy of the Agreement. Cordes responded that 
he would review the agreement (Instrument No. 1200512) and respond. Copies of all confirming 
e-mails are produced in response to Request For Production No.2. 
On July 22,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes. Leffel had previously received no response from 
Cordes regarding Instrument No. 1200512 and Jacklin's claims that said Agreement had been 
breached by the Blue Dog lease. A copy of the e-mail is produced in response to Request For 
Production No.2. 
On July 24, 2008, a representative for the Defendant owners advised that they would not 
cause the removal of Blue Dog. A copy of the confirming e-mail, from Gary Patterson, is produced 
in response to Request For Production No.2. 
Contacts following that date, between Jacklin Land Company and Blue Dog and/or the 
Defendant owners were between Jacklin Land Company's counsel (John F. Magnuson) and counsel 
for the Defendant owners and Blue Dog RV. That correspondence began August 5, 2008 and has 
continued to date. Defendants are in possession of copies of that correspondence, in letter form 
and/or e-mail, as they were the recipients thereof. 
Tom Stoeser 
Tom Stoeser received one cell phone call in late June or early July of2008. The person who 
phoned was in Oregon. The person was calling on behalf of Blue Dog, RV. Stoeser fielded the call 
in Leffel's absence (Leffel was on vacation). Inquiry was made by the individual as to any CC&R 
restrictions on the property at issue in this proceeding. Stoeser advised them of the restrictions 
arising under Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and the CC&R provision incorporated 
therein. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Copies of the documents responsive to Request For Production No.2 are 
produced herewith and include the e-mails identified or discussed in the response to Interrogatory 
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No.5 as weIl as a one-page typed sheet of Pat Leffel's notes of verbal communications with Blue 
Dog and/or Rick Cordes. 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and any 
ofthe defendants named in your Complaint regarding any aIleged violations of the Agreement and/or 
any violations of any covenants, conditions, and restrictions you claim are applicable to the Subject 
Property. 
ANSWER: Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Please see documents identified and produced in response to Request For 
Production No.2. 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please identify all covenants, conditions, restrictions, or any 
other agreements that you claim apply to Lots 1 through 4 of Block Two of River bend Commercial 
Park Phase 1. 
ANSWER: The use restrictions that apply by consensual agreement to the property 
identified in Interrogatory No.7 include the foIlowing: 
(1) The restrictions arising under the Agreement recorded as Kootenai County Instrument 
No. 1200512; and 
(2) Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in Kootenai County Instrument Nos. 1135200, 
1155659, and 1155779. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced herewith. 
INTERROGA TORY NO.8: Please identify each Jacklin agent, em pI oyee, or representati ve 
that communicated in any way with Blue Dog RV, and for each person identified, set forth the 
specific topics of the communication. 
ANSWER: Pat Leffel, Tom Stoeser, and John F. Magnuson. Please see answer to 
Interrogatory No.5 for subject matter of discussions. 
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INTERROGATOR Y NO.9: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and Blue 
Dog RV, including any communications between either parties' representatives, agents, or 
employees. 
ANSWER: Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request For Production Nos. 
and 6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce all documents that refer to or 
involve Blue Dog RV, including without limitation, all documents regarding potentially leasing real 
property to Blue Dog. 
RESPONSE: Please see those documents produced in response to Request For Production 
No.2 as well as those produced herewith in response to Request For Production No.6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce all documents that relate to 
Jacklin's claims in its Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Request For Production No.7 is over broad, ambiguous, and 
unduly burdensome. In addition, Request For Production No.7 calls for information protected by 
the attorney-client privilege and the Attorney Work Product Doctrine. Without waiving said 
objection, and subject to the same, please see all documents produced in response to these discovery 
requests. INTERROGATORY NO.1 0: Please identify by Phase, Block and Lot Number, the 
property Jacklin offered to lease to Blue Dog RV. 
ANSWER: Discussions were had between Jacklin Land Company and Blue Dog RV as 
to a built to suit for Blue Dog's entire operations, and the lease associated therewith, on the 
following properties: Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park; and Lots 1 
through 2, Block 1, Phase II, Riverbend Commerce Park. 
Discussions regarding a potential lease for a service shop were also discussed with Blue Dog 
as a portion of a building on Lot 3, Block 1, Phase II, Riverbend Commerce Park. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
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RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request For Production Nos.2 
and 6. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please set forth each covenant, condition, and restriction, or 
other agreement that applies to the property you identified in your answer to Interrogatory No.1 O. 
ANSWER: Exclusive of easements or plat conditions otherwise made a matter of public 
record, please see Kootenai County Instrument No. 2066271000 and the provisions set forth therein. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Produced herewith. 
INTERROGA TO R Y NO. 12: Please identify all communications relating to Jacklin's offer 
to lease to Blue Dog RV the property identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 10. 
ANSWER: Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5 and the documents produced in 
response to Request for Production Nos. 2 and 6. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce each document relating to 
Jacklin's offer to lease to Blue Dog RV the property identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 
10. 
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request for Production Nos. 
2 and 6. 
INTERROGA TORY NO. 13: Please state whether any other lots in Riverbend Commercial 
Park Phase I are subject to the to the same or substantially similar restrictions as the Subject 
Property. 
ANSWER: Lots 1 through 17, Block 1, Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park, and Lots 
1 through 14, Block 4, Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park are subject to the terms of Kootenai 
County Instrument No. 1200512 and Articles 2 through 6 Kootenai County Instrument Nos. 
1135200,1155659, and 1155779. Every remaining lot in Phase I is subject to the same CC&Rs and 
any subsequent amendment thereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: If your answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, please identify: 
(a) The blocks and lots subject to the same or substantially similar restrictions; 
(b) Whether Jacklin sold or leased the identified blocks or lots; and 
( c) The person that owns or leases the blocks or lots. 
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ANSWER: Objection. Interrogatory No. 14 is unduly burdensome and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Many of said lots have been sold and 
resold by the parties purchasing the same. The current status of title is a matter of public record 
equally accessible to these Defendants as it is to the Plaintiff. Moreover, said information is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said 
objection, and subject to the same, Plaintiff states that the following lots have been sold: Block 1, 
Lots 1 through 20; Block 3, Lots 1, 2, 7 and 8; Block 4, Lots 1 through 14, and Block 5, Lots 1 
through 5. Jacklin Land Company still owns Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, and Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of 
Block 3. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 14 is unduly burdensome and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Many of said lots have been sold and 
resold by the parties purchasing the same. The current status of title is a matter of public record 
equally accessible to these Defendants as it is to the Plaintiff. Moreover, said information is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said 
objection, and subject to the same, Plaintiff states that the following lots have been sold: Block 1, 
Lots 1 through 20; Block 3, Lots 1, 2, 7 and 8; Block 4, Lots 1 through 14, and Block 5, Lots 1 
through 5. Jacklin Land Company still owns Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, and Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of 
Block 3. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: In regard to paragraph 26 of your Complaint wherein you 
claim that Blue Dog's use of the Subject Property is inconsistent with the requirement that the 
Subject Property be utilized solely for a first class shopping center, please identifY: 
(a) Each person that has knowledge of this claim; 
(b) The specific covenants of the specific document(s) that define a "first class shopping 
center;" and 
(c) Each document that supports this claim. 
ANSWER: 
(a) Please see those individuals identified in response to Interrogatory No.2. 
(b) The term "first class shopping center" is reasonably susceptible to common 
understanding based upon the actions contemporaneously undertaken by Defendants' predecessor-in-
title in developing such portions of the property encumbered by Instrument No. 1200512 as have 
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been developed for shopping center purposes, with the consent of Plaintiff. Said phrase is commonly 
understood not to include the unimproved use of the subject property for rental or sale purposes 
associated with RVs. 
(c) Please see Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and the documents produced 
in response to Request for Production No. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
ANSWER: Please see documents produced herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please state whether any other property in Riverbend 
Commercial Park is subject to a requirement that it be utilized solely for a "first class shopping 
center;" and if your answer is in the affirmative, please: 
(a) IdentifY each property subject to this requirement by block and lot number; 
(b) State whether the property subject to this requirement has been sold, or has been 
or is now leased; 
(c) IdentifY each owner or lessee of the property since Jacklin first sold or leased the 
property subject to this requirement. 
ANSWER: 
(a) Lots 1 through 17, Block 1, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park and Lots 1 through 
14, Block 4, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park. 
(b) All of said properties have been sold to third-parties. 
(c) Objection. Interrogatory No. 16 is over broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive. 
In addition, Interrogatory No. 16 ( c) calls for information not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence and seeks to place on Plaintiff a burden to obtain publicly-available 
information which is equally available to Defendants as to this Plaintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: In regard to paragraph 26 of your Complaint wherein you 
claim that Blue Dog's utilization ofthe Subject property "was done so without.,. 'working together 
with Jacklin, '" please identifY: 
(a) Each person who has knowledge of this claim; 
(b) The specific document that defines "working together;" and 
(c) Each document that supports this claim. 
ANSWER: 
(a) Please see those individuals identified in Response to Interrogatory No.2. 
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(b) The term "work together" is commonly understood and, by its own terms, requires 
the mutual consent of both the burdened and benefitted property owners. Otherwise, see Instrument 
No. 1200512. 
(c) See Instrument No. 1200512 and those documents produced in response to Request 
for Production No. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Please see Instrument No. 1200512 and those documents produced in response 
to Request for Production No. 12. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please identify the specific individuals who drafted the 
following documents: 
(a) The Agreement; and 
(b) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions you claim apply to the Subject 
Property. 
ANSWER: 
(a) Mike Nienstadt, attorney for Plaintiff, and Shaun Jackson, attorney for those parties 
to said Agreement other than Jacklin Land Company. 
(b) Attorneys at Wetzel & Wetzel Law Office in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Please identify all lawsuits involving Jacklin and property in 
Riverbend Commercial Park since 1988 by jurisdiction, caption, and file number; and for each 
lawsuit identified, please set forth the disposition of the lawsuit. 
ANSWER: Objection. Interrogatory No. 19 calls for information not reasonably 
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce all documents and/or tangible 
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, 
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal 
communications. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Request for Production No. 14 calls for information not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
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Dated this ~ ~ of December, 2008. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
TOM STOESER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: I am the President of 
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho limited liability limited partnership, the Plaintiff above-
named, and make this verification for and on its behalf; that I have read the above and foregoing 
answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, know the contents thereof, 
and believe the same to be true. 
. _J~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this~ay of December, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of tht;, foregoing document was served upon the 
following, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~ day of December, 2008: 
Michael 1. Hines 
Michael Schmidt 
Lukins & Annis, P. S. 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, W A 99201-0466 
Fax: 509/747-2323 
JACKLIN-BLUE DOG-RESPONSES TO KLPROGS.wpd 
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MICHAEL J. HINES 
ISB #6876 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT 
ISB #6911 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W Sprague Ave 
Spokane. W A 99201-0466 
Telephone: (509) 455-9555 
Facsimile: (509) 747-2323 
Attomevs for Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO \ S5 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlt 
FILED: 
2009 JUL 27 PM 2: 57 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
THE PATTERSON F AMIL Y 2000 TRUST 
CREATED U/T/A DATED FEBRUARY 25, 
2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE; 
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST 
CREATED U/T/A DATED JANUARY 13, 
2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; KL 
PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation; 
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M. 
CORDES, husband and wife; DAVID 
BARNES and MICHELLE BARNES, husband 
and wife; GARY 1. PATTERSON and 
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and 
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERLY 1. 
DION, husband and wife; and ANDREW J. 
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NO. CV-08-6752 
RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION: 1 
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Defendants hereby respectfully submit this response to Plaintiff's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which is alternatively noted as a Motion for Reconsideration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jacklin's current motions seek a court order, whether by declaratory relief or a 
permanent injunction, that Defendants "cease and desist from using the subject property for the 
storage and/or parking ofRVs by a date certain, and that any future uses of the subject property 
by either or both of the Defendants conform with the substance and procedures contained in the 
QCAJJacklin Agreement and Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs incorporated therein." See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) 
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 15. Jacklin's current motions encompass only one issue: 
Whether Jacklin must demonstrate an irreparable harm in order to receive the 
injunctive/declaratory relief it requests. 
The court has already decided this issue in its June 15,2009, Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment ("Decision and Order"), finding that 1) 
Jacklin must demonstrate irreparable damage in order for an injunction to issue, and 2) that 
Jacklin cannot demonstrate any irreparable injury at the summary judgment stage. The Court 
reserved for trial the issue of injury and damages. In its current motions, Jacklin still doesn't 
allege any irreparable damage, it ignores the on-point Idaho authority requiring a plaintiff to 
prove irreparable harm in order for an injunction to issue, it ignores the Court's discussion and 
decision on this issue, and it doesn't provide the Court with any binding authority that requires 
the Court to change its Decision and Order. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION: 2 
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If a trial court's conclusions are correct on the previous record, and it does not thereafter 
receive any infonnation that would change its previous ruling, there is no basis for it to 
overturn its initial decision. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001) 
(Supreme Court affinned district court's denial of reconsideration motion, stating that "the 
district court was provided with no new facts to create an issue for trial, and thus there was no 
basis upon which to reconsider its summary judgment order). 
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court to deny Jacklin's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment/Motion for Reconsideration. 
II. FACTS 
For purposes ofthe pending motions only, Defendants incorporate by reference the 
undisputed facts as set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions 
for Summary Judgment filed on June 15,2009. Specifically, Defendants incorporate herein the 
Court's findings that: 
1. The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the 
authority to evict Blue Dog. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 22. 
2. Jacklin failed to cite any authority for the proposition that injunctive relief of a 
permanent nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain. 
Id. at 24. 
3. Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary judgment) with 
evidence of waste or great injury, as required by I.R.C.P. 65(e). Id. at 25. 
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4. Jacklin provided testimony that it will be damaged, but did not provide 
testimony or even argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary 
award. Jacklin's evidence regarding damage is speculative because Jacklin has not pointed to a 
tenant that has left, that is thinking about leaving, or a identified a prospective tenant that has 
decided not to rent land as a result of the presence of Blue Dog. Id. at 26. 
5. Granting Jacklin a permanent injunction at the summary judgment stage would 
give Jacklin the principal relief it seeks without the case going to trial. Id. 
6. Jacklin has not alleged that defendants are removing or disposing of their own 
property with the intent to defraud Jacklin. Id. at 27. 
7. Jacklin has not provided the Court with evidence entitling it to enjoin Blue 
Dog's continued business on the subject property. Id. 
8. The Court denied Jacklin's motion for summary judgment as to its entitlement to 
declaratory relief sought (eviction) and injunctive relief sought. Id. 
III. ANAL YIS 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when all ofthe facts contained 
in all the applicable pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits have been construed 
most favorably to the nonmoving party, and it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bailey v. Ness, 
109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985); I.R.C.P. 56(c). The evidence must be construed in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 
899, 876 P.2d 595 (1994). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable 
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inferences must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851 (1991). If the evidence is conflicting on 
material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is 
not appropriate. Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120, 645 P .2d 350 (1982). A material fact is 
one upon which the outcome ofthe case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849, 
908 P.2d 143 (1995). 
B. JACKLIN MUST ESTABLISH GREAT OR IRREPARABLE HARM IN ORDER 
FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION TO ISSUE. 
As the Court set forth in its Decision and Order, LR.C.P. 65(e) requires a plaintiffto, 
among other things, demonstrate that the complained-of act would produce waste or great or 
irreparable injury. The Court determined that Jacklin did not provide evidence of waste or 
great or irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, and reserved the issue of injury 
and damages for trial. 
Jacklin contends that I.R. C.P. 65( e) sets forth the requirements for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction and therefore does not apply to its request for a permanent injunction. 
However, Jacklin fails to cite any case law that sets separate standards for the issuance of 
preliminary and permanent injunctions.! At a minimum, the irreparable harm element must be 
proven in order for either type of injunction to issue. In fact, case law has made it very clear 
that the "irreparable harm" element required by I.R.c.P. 65(e) is also required in order for a 
permanent injunction to issue. 
! It appears that Jacklin is actually seeking a preliminary injunction anyway because this matter 
has not gone to trial, and granting a permanent injunction at this stage of the proceedings would 
give Jacklin all the relief it seeks, which would be contrary to Idaho law. See Section E., 
below. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and United States Supreme Court have each 
held that irreparable harm must be shown in order for a permanent injunction to issue. See Ada 
County v. Fuhrman, 140 Idaho 230,91 P.3d 1134 (2004) (Idaho Supreme Court analyzed 
whether the plaintiff made an adequate demonstration of irreparable harm to determine whether 
the district court properly issued a permanent injunction); Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567 
(D.Idaho 1999) (requirements for issuance of a permanent injunction is the likelihood of 
substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law. Court 
declined to address plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction because plaintiffs did not even 
make an attempt to show the court that they meet the specific standards which permit the grant 
of a permanent injunction); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1495 
(9th Cir.1996) (permanent injunction may be granted to party that demonstrates the likelihood 
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law); 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2007); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.388, 391 (2006) (permanent injunctive relief only authorized 
when the claimant demonstrates that it has suffered irreparable injury). 
Despite the Court's decision and order specifically requiring Jacklin to establish 
irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, Jacklin's present motions do not address or 
even allege any irreparable injury that Jacklin may have suffered. Furthermore, Jacklin has not 
provided any binding authority contrary to the Court's previous decision regarding the 
requirement to prove irreparable injury in order for a permanent injunction to issue. As a 
result, an injunction should not issue. 
C. JACKLIN MUST SHOW IRREPARABLE INJURY EVEN IF A RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANT IS VIOLATED. 
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Idaho clearly requires a plaintiff to show irreparable harm in order for an injunction to 
issue. Jacklin has cited no Idaho authority, or other binding authority, that relieves a plaintiff 
ofthis burden where a real property restrictive covenant is violated. 
In Jacklin's present motions, it spends much of its memorandum citing non-binding 
authority for the proposition that it doesn't have to show irreparable harm where a restrictive 
covenant is breached. Jacklin has not shown that such a rule has been adopted by Idaho courts, 
the Ninth Circuit, or the U.S. Supreme Court. 
As set forth above, Idaho, the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court all require a 
showing of irreparable harm in order for an injunction to issue. Jacklin has not cited any 
authority binding on this Court that eliminates Jacklin's burden to demonstrate irreparable harm 
in this case involving a restrictive covenant. 
Moreover, contrary to Jacklin's assertion, per se irreparable harm is not the general rule 
in the restrictive covenant context. Jacklin has not cited any Idaho, Ninth Circuit or Supreme 
Court case law stating that forth as the general rule. To the contrary, Washington and Montana, 
two neighboring states, both require a showing of irreparable harm in the restrictive covenant 
context in order for an injunction to issue. 
Washington courts require a showing of necessity and irreparable injury to be proven in 
restrictive covenant cases. Holmes Harbor Water Co., Inc. v. Page, 8 Wn.App. 600, 508 P.2d 
628 (1973). In the restrictive covenant context, Washington courts have also held that a 
mandatory injunction should not issue where a plaintiff fails to establish that it would suffer 
substantial damage if an obstruction is not removed. Id. at 603; citing Nielson v. King County, 
72 Wn.2d 720, 435 P.2d 664 (1967); McInnes v. Kennell, 47 Wn.2d 29, 286 P.2d 713 (1955). 
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Likewise, Montana requires an applicant seeking a preliminary injunction for a 
violation of a restrictive covenant to "establish a prima facie case, or show that it is at least 
doubtful whether or not he will suffer irreparable injury before his rights can be fully litigated." 
Fox Farm Estates Landowners Ass'n v. Kreisch, 285 Mont. 264, 268, 947 P.2d 79 (1997). 
The First Circuit has expressly refused to set aside the burden to establish irreparable 
harm simply because real property is involved. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 
4 (1stCir.1991). In Narragansett, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the request for 
a preliminary injunction. Id. at 6. The court held that "[i]n cases involving real property, we 
have often found the irreparability of the injury to be of paramount concern." Id. The court 
continued, "[r]eal estate has long been thought unique ... Be that as it may, irreparable harm is 
not assumed; it must be demonstrated. And even where real property is involved, 'speculative 
injury does not constitute a showing of irreparable harm. '" Id. at 6-7. 
Similarly, in Pub. Servo Co. ofN.H. V. Town ofW. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 
1987), the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the city from removing several of its utility 
poles. Id. at 381. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that "any restraint on any interest in 
real property is per se irreparable injury," and explained that "[t]his argument confuses 
permanent alienation or destruction of real property, which is incapable of being reconveyed or 
restored, with a temporary action subject to reversal with compensation for loss suffered during 
the period of deprivation." Id. The court determined that there was no irreparable injury 
because the utility poles could be replaced on the same land, and the plaintiff could recover the 
cost of the poles, equipment, and installation as damages. Id. 
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Jacklin's present motions should be denied because Idaho law requires it to prove 
irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, and Jacklin has failed to establish 
irreparable injury. 
D. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE EVEN IF JACKLIN CAN 
PROVE SOME DAMAGES AT TRIAL, THOSE DAMAGES CAN BE 
COMPENSATED BY A MONETARY AWARD. 
Preliminarily, Jacklin should not be able to recover any damages in this matter because 
it has not requested them and has never put the Defendants on notice that it seeks damages. 
Defendants incorporate herein its Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, and the authorities cited therein for this argument. 
Notwithstanding the forgoing, in its decision and order the Court states: 
There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony 
or even argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated 
with a monetary award. The testimony of damage, while logical 
and understandable, seems speculative at the present time in that 
Jacklin has not pointed to a tenant that has left, is thinking about 
leaving, or a prospective tenant that has decided not to rent land as 
a result ofthe presence of Blue Dog. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 26. This 
is the first reference made in the matter regarding damages. 
As noted in Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, the property at issue in 
this case has not been developed. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8. 
Defendants have not developed the property or erected any structures on the property. Id. As 
a result, at the expiration of the lease between KLP and Blue Dog, the property can be returned 
to the condition it was in prior to Blue Dog's leasehold. 
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Should Jacklin be allowed to, and then establish damages at trial, because the property 
can be returned to the condition it was in prior to Blue Dog's operation, any such damages can 
be compensated by a monetary award. Jacklin has not shown that there is an inadequate 
remedy at law. Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567 (D.Idaho 1999) (requirements for issuance of a 
permanent injunction is the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of remedies at law). The Court recognized that Jacklin potentially could suffer 
damages in the form of tenants leaving or potential tenants deciding not to lease property. 
Although Jacklin has not established any such damages, even if it could, such damages would 
be capable of calculation to provide an adequate remedy at law, so an injunction is not a 
necessary remedy in this case. 
E. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE ITS EFFECT WOULD 
GIVE JACKLIN ALL THE RELIEF IT SEEKS WITHOUT BRINGING THE 
CASE TO TRIAL. 
As set forth above, and already determined by this Court, LR.C.P. 65(e) sets forth the 
standards for issuance of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent. As noted by the 
Court, it is longstanding law in Idaho that an injunction will not issue where its effect is to give 
the plaintiffthe principal relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Rowland v. 
Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869 (1925); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big 
Creek Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282,55 P.2d 720 (1936); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 P.2d 
194 (1943). 
The Court's decision and order specifically found that Jacklin failed to establish any 
damages, let alone an irreparable injury, and reserved for trial the issue of damages. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, pp.26-27. If the 
RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION: 10 
K:\K\KLP024461 \BLUEDOG00002\PLDG\RESPONSE--SECOND SJM-072209-TRP-TRP .DOCX 7/27/09 
'77.r:: 
Court were to determine that Jacklin does not have to establish an irreparable injury, and grants 
Jacklin an injunction, then Jacklin will have received the relief it seeks without bringing the 
case to trial. Such a result would be contrary to LR.C.P. 65(e) and Idaho law. 
F. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF IN THE FORM 
OF A "CEASE AND DESIST" ORDER. 
Jacklin states that its request for declaratory relief in the form of a "cease and desist" 
order seeks essentially the same form of relief as sought by the permanent injunction. See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) 
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14. 
Jacklin's argument regarding declaratory relief is based solely on the non-binding 
authority it cites for the alleged right to injunctive relief. Id. Jacklin doesn't set forth any 
separate case law or other authority to support an argument that declaratory relief in the form of 
a "cease and desist" order can be issued. Id. Therefore, since Jacklin's argument regarding 
irreparable hann fails as a matter oflaw, its request for declaratory relief in the form of a "cease 
and desist" order also fails. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request this Court to deny 
Plaintiff s (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) Motion for Reconsideration. 
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DATED this~ay of July, 2009. 
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